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Abstract 
 
The subject of corporate governance and corporate performance has been widely discussed 
and examined over the last two decades. A great deal of change has developed within British 
Boardrooms since the emergence of the Cadbury Committee Report in 1992. UK Corporate 
Governance reforms over the years have been consistently developed where an increase in 
the number of non-executive directors on board, their roles and their effectiveness, was 
evident throughout the development of these reports. For instance, the Cadbury Report set a 
minimum of three non-executive directors for each company. Also, the independent non-
executive director has become the catalyst for better performance since it has been 
recommended by the 1998 Combined Code that at least one-third of the board is to be 
independent and increased to half by the 2003 Combined Code. Although it has been evident 
that the level of compliance by companies has increased, the relationship between firm 
performance and corporate governance has been mixed and inconclusive in previous 
research. A large number of empirical works found no clear link between firm performance 
and corporate governance. There is an argument posited by scholars that better firm 
performance is achieved in well-governed firms. Therefore, the main question addressed in 
this thesis is whether a relationship exists between internal corporate governance mechanisms 
and performance of FTSE All shares non-financial firms listed on London Stock Exchange 
for a period 2005 to 2010. It specifically looks at the link between firm performance 
(measured as Tobin’s Q and Return on Assets (ROA) and board characteristics (board size, 
independent directors, CEO duality and Audit committee), managerial ownership, executive 
remuneration and financial policies (Debt and Dividend) as governance mechanisms. This 
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study will draw upon the agency theory to test whether the hypothesised relationships exist 
between firm performance and corporate governance mechanisms in the UK. 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis produced mixed results. According to OLS 
regressions, the results provide some evidence of a relationship between some governance 
mechanisms and firm performance. In general, based on market measures (Tobin’s’ Q), some 
governance mechanisms (independent directors, board size (apart from in 2006), role, 
managerial ownership (apart from in 2008), executive remuneration and debt (apart from in 
2005)) positively relate to firm performance, while audit (apart from in 2010) negatively 
relates to firm performance. However dividend pay-out produced mixed results. Based on 
accounting measures (ROA), independent directors (apart from in 2010), role (apart from in 
2006), managerial ownership and executive remuneration positively relate to firm 
performance. Board size, audit and debt negatively relate to firm performance. However, 
dividend pay-out produced mixed results. Further analysis using two-stage least square 
regressions indicate that any causal effect runs from governance to firm performance rather 
than in the opposite direction. Overall, the findings of the research are period specific. 
Variables showing significant explanatory power at the start of the sample period may cease 
to be significant or change sign at the end of the sample period.  
In the corporate world corporate governance has been a growing issue and it has contributed 
to becoming a key business discipline in the management of companies. This study 
contributes to the increasing number of research studies on the link between firm 
performance and corporate governance. The lack of clarity, mixed and permanent 
relationships provided, show that the association between performance and different 
governance is complex and dynamic: optimal governance arrangements may differ from firm 
to firm in relation to board characteristics.  
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2 Chapter one: Introduction 
2.1 Introduction 
The increasing pace of globalisation, the deregulation and integration of capital markets, the 
series of recent financial scandals in Asia and around the world, and the spectacular corporate 
collapses which took place in Europe and the USA (e.g. WorldCom, Enron, Parmalat and 
Xerox), have driven the previously strong debate on how to reduce the conflict between 
shareholders and managers and draw an efficient corporate governance system that will 
encourage sustainable economic growth. The growing importance of a strong corporate 
governance regulatory structure gathered momentum after the events aforementioned.  
Furthermore, corporate governance, whose  primary goal is to deal with identifying potential 
mechanisms in which the shareholders of a corporation have more power and exercise control 
over the managers to protect their interests, has recently brought the acute attention of 
academics and policy makers around the world. As a response to such scandals, and as a 
primary approach of protection for shareholders and stakeholders, an explicit strategy has 
developed with respect to public listed companies adopting good corporate governance 
standards. In fact, listed companies in most major markets throughout the world are now 
required to adopt high corporate governance standards. This study will primarily examine  the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (board characteristics- size, 
independent directors, role duality, Audit, Executive Remuneration, executive directors 
shareholdings and financial policies- debt and dividend) with firm performance (represented 
by Tobin’s Q and ROA) in the United Kingdom, based on quantitative methods. It is 
premised  on the agency model, and a number of corporate governance mechanisms which 
are  set up to decrease the agency costs connected with the separation of ownership and 
control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; and Fama and Jensen, 1983). Internal 
corporate governance mechanisms have been the focus of several significant reports into the 
governance of UK companies, in particular those related to board structures and board 
subcommittees (Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995; and Hampel, 1998). 
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This study will cover the academic literature related to this topic and, in particular, review the 
corporate governance mechanisms literature, focusing mainly on the agency theory impact. 
The significance of this study academically and practically will be demonstrated and 
established through further discussion. This introductory chapter will present the study 
background, its objectives, importance and significance, and will conclude with some insights 
into the methods that have been used to address the research questions set.  
2.2 Background 
It is suggested that the premise behind modern corporate finance is that the division of 
control and ownership, which characterises a large number of medium-sized and larger 
companies, creates a setting where the shareholders and managers interests often deviate. Due 
to the presence of asymmetric information and less perfect contractual relations, managers 
tend to have incentives to prioritise their own goals over the interests of the shareholders. 
There are several forms which these incentives could take, including: 1) insufficient effort as 
such showing over-commitment to exterior activities and tolerating overstaffing, 2) 
entrenchment strategies as such make an investment in a series of projects that maintain the 
managers’ roles and make them indispensable and constantly show resistance for hostile 
takeovers, 3) extravagant investment as such building empires at the expense of shareholders 
and engagement of pet projects, and 4) self-dealing as such using consuming perks to 
increase the managers’ private benefits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 and Tirole, 2001).               
 
The consequences of these divergences are referred to by recent scholars as agency costs. 
They are defined as the type of costs which are incurred to structure, monitor and bond the 
incentives contract between the manager as an agent and the shareholder as a principal.  
There is a considerable amount of empirical work conducted, following Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), which focusses on the adverse impact of agency costs on a broad range of decisions 
on the policy of the corporate and firm’s value. The literature clearly documents, for 
example, that when the interests in firms are not impeccably aligned between shareholders 
and managers, these firms favour lower leverage (Datta et al. 1992), keep substantial amount 
of cash (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004), select longer maturity debt, over-invest and display 
significant underperformance (Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005); (Core et al. 2006) and (Davies 
et al. 2005), and pay less dividends (Hu and Praveen, 2004). 
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Based on the hypothesised association that exists between firm performance and corporate 
governance, the study mainly draws upon agency theory to test the significance of this 
relationship in UK Listed companies. The utilisation of an agency theory framework is a 
catalyst not only to  explain why such relationships could exist or occur but more that it 
provides the ability to explain how firm performance and value could be improved by 
applying these corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, agency theory will assist in 
explaining the factors which affect firm performance and value, will help to understand why 
some variables could be relevant for testing, and why some patterns could or could not be 
obvious in the results.  
 
The emergence of ideas regarding the effects of agency theory was basically due to the work 
of Berle and Means (1932) exploring the division of control and ownership in firms in the 
United States. They argued that a dispersion of equity amongst an atomistic spread of 
investors reduces control and switches power to the management team. Hence, management 
and shareholders have differing interests and therefore potential agency problems arise which 
bring conflict to the firm. This work has been extended by Jensen and Meckling (1976) who 
defined such problem as a principal-agent problem which could affect firm performance and 
value, where the principal is the shareholder and the agent is the manager. Also, they found 
another conflict came from the debt relationship between creditors and firms. Additionally, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) found that additional significant 
agency problems occur between large shareholders and minority shareholders, especially in 
countries where shareholder protection is weak.   
 
It is evident that there are a multitude of factors and conditions impacting upon the agency 
relationships in the firm. Taking these conflicts into consideration, rules and guidelines are 
needed to make sure firms are well governed and directed to achieve success and stability, as 
without such guidelines and regulations these conflicts will affect firm performance. For 
reducing agency problems, there are two kinds of governance mechanisms suggested by 
agency theory: external and internal mechanisms. The external mechanisms are: the market 
for corporate control, the legal system, and the factor and product market. Meanwhile, the 
internal mechanisms are: ownership structure, the firm‘s compensation, board of directors, 
and financial policies. Agency theory control mechanisms could bring all the needed 
protections as well as checks and balances in a firm’s operations; furthermore, more 
discipline is imposed by these mechanisms upon both shareholders and management. Several 
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studies in countries around the world have been studying the relationship between firm 
performance and corporate governance mechanisms, where the results of which clearly and 
significantly show that good corporate governance practices applied and followed would 
protect the shareholders, the position of the company financially and could also improve the 
value of the company or its performance. The literature chapter will discuss agency theory in 
detail and evaluate the substantial amount of work concerning the subject of corporate 
governance mechanisms and its impact on firm performance. 
2.3 Study contribution and justification 
In the corporate world, corporate governance has been a growing issue and it has contributed 
to becoming a key business discipline in the management of companies. Based on the above 
mentioned background, this current study will examine the relationship between firm 
performance and internal corporate governance mechanisms, with the aim to provide more 
insights into this topic, and contribute to the increasing amount of research on the link 
between firm performance and corporate governance. The lack of clarity, mixed and 
permanent relationships between performance and different governance show that this 
association (of performance and governance) is complex and dynamic: optimal governance 
arrangements may differ from firm to firm in relation to board characteristics.  
There are a few elements that played a role in making the UK a particularly interesting case 
to study. Firstly, in the UK, listed company share ownership is fairly dispersed due to 
presence of law favourable to minority shareholders and the prevailing takeover code, which 
together do not encourage accumulation of capital. In the UK, the most important equity 
holders are mainly the financial institutions but there is clear evidence that some types of 
financial institutions are preoccupied with short-termism and, thus, there is not much added 
in corporate governance by them (Black and Coffee, 1994; Short and Keasey, 1999; Franks et 
al., 2001). Secondly, in the UK, boards of directors are characterised in general as corporate 
devices which cannot provide a strong disciplinary role mostly due to lack of strong powers 
that impose fiduciary duties on these directors. Thirdly, in the UK a serious discussion of 
corporate governance issues resulted from a wave of corporate failure in 1980s and 1990s, 
and a number of reports in the form of “codes of best practice” emerged as responses to such 
scandals as Cadbury (1992); Greenbury (1995); Hampel (1998) and Higgs (2003). 
Subsequently, it would be of considerable importance in the UK that the investigation of the 
impact of these internal corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance, in a period 
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after all these reports, responded to problems in corporate governance. In addition, given that 
the topic of corporate performance and corporate governance is still current and under 
research, therefore examining the impact of internal corporate governance mechanisms on 
corporate performance using both accounting (ROA) and market measures (Tobin’s Q), 
serves as an additional practical insight, and could be relevant to associates such as market 
regulators and accounting professionals who are interested in improving corporate 
governance standards.This study differs from other empirical work in this field as follows:  
 
 The selected period of the study (2005-2010) has been chosen to fall after all the 
major recommendations in the governance reports and reforms have been settled.   
 A six year period has been selected to identify and analyse the evolution and impact 
of internal corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance using both 
accounting and market measures (Tobin’s Q and ROA).  
 
 The sample under study has been taken from the FTSE All shares non-financial firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange across a six year period (2005-2010), with 
companies that survived more than three years being selected for the study. 
 
 
 This study has used up-to-date and comprehensive data from Bloomberg; this data 
was crossed checked with the annual reports for 25 randomly selected companies 
from the sample to ensure its consistency, reliability and validity.     
 
 All the internal corporate governance mechanisms (board characteristics: board size, 
independent directors, CEO duality and Audit committee, managerial ownership, 
executive remuneration and financial policies: Debt and Dividend) have been 
analysed in one regression model.  The impact of all these mechanisms have been 
examined on firm performance using both accounting and market measures (Tobin’s 
Q and ROA). 
2.4 Research objectives 
To reiterate, the main aim of this work is that of examining the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms, namely: the characteristics of board; its size, independent directors, 
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Audit, role duality, Executive Remuneration, executive directors’ shareholdings and financial 
policies; debt and dividend on the performance of firms in UK. The following research 
questions and objectives are mainly tested and examined in this study; particularly, the study 
investigates: 
 
1 How does managerial ownership affect firm performance?  
2 How does the presence of independent directors affect firm performance? 
3 How does board size affect firm performance? 
4  How does the separation of the CEO and board chair positions affect firm performance? 
5 How does the presence of Audit Committee affect firm performance? 
6 How does executive remuneration affect firm performance? 
7 How does debt affect firm performance? 
8 How does dividend policy affect firm performance?  
2.5 Study methods  
Quantitative method is the empirical approach used in this study. The quantitative methods 
are mainly OLS and 2SLS regressions analysis, where secondary data are gathered and 
collected to achieve the main goals and objectives of this work. Results are analysed using 
regression methods for quantitative data. The following table illustrates the data description 
and sources used in this study.  
Table 2.1 Data Description and sources 
Source of data Types of data Specific information 
Bloomberg and annual 
Reports 
Board characteristics, 
directors ownership and 
directors remuneration 
Board size, Independent 
directors, CEO Duality, Role, 
Audit Committee and number 
of shares owned by directors 
and executive and non-
remuneration remuneration 
Bloomberg and annual 
reports 
Financial Policies ( Debt and 
dividend), firm size 
Total debt, Earnings Per 
share, Dividend per share and 
Total assets  
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2.6 Framework of the study 
After this introduction chapter the rest of the study is divided into five chapters. The literature 
review will provide an outline of the theoretical framework of corporate governance; it 
reviews the related academic literature discussing the association between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. It also examines the potential 
interrelationship among the corporate governance mechanisms. Although several studies have 
been done and covered the subject of corporate governance and firm performance, a 
reasonable confusion still exists as to whether any particular set of governance mechanisms 
collectively or separately are able to protect or increase shareholder’s wealth. For example, a 
consensus has not yet been reached on the precise impact of managerial ownership on the 
value of a firm. Also, previous studies overlook significant aspects of the compensation 
structure and capital, in particularly managerial compensation and short-term debt, which 
could have the potential to work as crucial governance devices. The agency theory and 
principal-agent problem were covered and discussed, also the following internal governance 
mechanisms, board of directors, managerial ownership, executive remuneration and financial 
policies (debt and dividend), were presented and analysed both theoretically and empirically. 
Chapter three is the research methodology chapter where the eight hypotheses, research 
design and data are discussed. Consequently, the two methods used and the rationale for 
choosing the research methods used in the study are presented. In addition, the chapter 
introduces the analysis methods applied for each method and explains how the research 
methods were designed. The study uses two techniques, which are discussed in Chapter 4. In 
addition, Chapter 4 reports all the findings on the impact of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance measured by those of the market (Tobin’s Q) and 
accounting measures (ROA). Findings from the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
analysis produced mixed results. In general, based on market measures (Tobin’s’ Q), some 
governance mechanisms (independent directors, board size (apart from in 2006), role, 
managerial ownership (apart from in 2008), executive remuneration and debt (apart from in 
2005)) positively relate to firm performance, while audit (apart from in 2010) negatively 
relates to firm performance. However dividend payout produced mixed results. Based on 
accounting measures (ROA), independent directors (apart from in 2010), role (apart from in 
2006), managerial ownership and executive remuneration positively relate to firm 
performance. Board size, audit and debt negatively relate to firm performance. However, 
dividend payout produced mixed results. 
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3 Chapter two: Literature review 
3.1 Introduction 
The usual approach adopted when undertaking a literature review is to attempt to identify all 
the writings which might possibly fall within the area of interest and then to describe the 
main thrust of the discussion as a temporal sequence of arguments. Identifying the principal 
authors and papers by “backtracking” from a known, recent, contribution to the literature is 
efficient and this has been the case in this study. Also, creating an effective, structured and 
comprehensive literature review relies on the identification of themes and issues based on a 
general sampling of the literature. Thus an inductive approach has been followed in 
reviewing the literature based on the concept of Papineau’s tree. This concept focuses on 
descending order of core terms to demarcate those terms which are central to all researchers 
within a programme (Ryan, Scapens, Theobold, 2002). Also his concept of the hierarchy of 
core terms is considered to be useful in this study for understanding the development of a 
particular literature (Vladu, Matis and Salas, 2012). They stated that the importance of 
summarizing the internal body of the literature using Papineau’s tree (1979) is indisputable 
since particular contributions can be identified more easily and can be comprised in a well-
known framework in order to rationalise the existing literature. The main idea of Papineau’s 
(1979) was to develop according to what it is stated before  hierarchy of core terms within a 
literature with the scope of identifying the particular contributions that can be placed and 
based on that. The following figure symbolises Papineau’s tree.     
Figure 2 Papineau's Tree 
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The field of corporate governance originates mainly on the fundamental insight where 
potentially some issues are found with relation to the division of ownership and control 
bound as they are in the making of the modern corporate shape of the organization. 
Therefore, the role of corporate governance is to hold the existing market and institutional 
mechanisms that support the managers who are the controllers and self-interested to work on 
behalf of the shareholders, who are the owners in maximising the value of the firm. 
Systematic studies in this field only started twenty five years ago (Denis, 2001). Corporate 
governance practices have accordingly grown and evolved significantly in the last two 
decades. 
Within all the work that has been done on corporate governance, there is a common fact that 
all the papers point out is a central or essential theoretical perception that refers back to the 
work put down by Adam Smith in 1776. In his writing about professional managers in his 
book Wealth of Nations, he stated that: “Being the managers of other people's money [rather 
than their own] … it cannot be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance ….”.  The work of Berle and Means in 1932 went further and suggested that the 
corporation becomes an indefensible form of organization due to this problem.  
It is not viewed as a coincidence that corporate governance issues came to the surface in the 
UK in the 1980s at a time which paralleled similar issues in the corporate and financial 
markets around the world. For instance, the market for corporate control in the US was 
causing major issues in the company sector. But in Asia, the crisis in the capital market in 
1997-1998 impacted countries such as Malaysia and Thailand which were recently 
industrialising. The crisis raised some significant critical questions regarding the corporate 
governance standards in these countries. In the UK, there were some headlines raised due to 
major corporate fraud and failures where a sharp public scrutiny imposed upon big 
companies such as Maxwell Corporation and its proprietor Robert Maxwell. As a result, the 
introduction of the UK code of corporate governance in 1992 was precipitated by several of 
the big companies’ failures of the late 1980s. To a large extent, failures were considered as 
governance failure where the board failed and did not perform effectively its duties and 
functions.  Platt and Platt (2012) observe that maintaining a firm’s survival is the most critical 
responsibility of boards. They also contend that the importance of this board mandate is clear 
in the post 2007-08 financial crisis and in high profile failures worldwide. Consequently, the 
press, investors’ community and politicians worldwide are calling for corporate governance 
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reforms to strengthen the effectiveness of boards and its committees, and in this manner, 
reduce the likelihood of firm’s failure (Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa, 2011). 
 
Since launching the Cadbury Code in 1992, the UK has contributed to the debate and practice 
of governance characteristics. Thus, it was with this underlying assumption  of “code of best 
practice” in corporate governance, which the Cadbury Committee put forward, that led 
reforms for the corporate board and that was the case as the large section of its 
recommendations were clearly directed at it. In addition, Cadbury (1992) triggers governance 
reforms worldwide, due in part to the use of its key proposals as benchmark of good 
governance (Brennan and Solomon, 2008; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). 
 
Although, the issues of corporate governance have recently attracted critical attention from 
academic institutions, policy makers and regulators, the research into how public companies 
are managed and controlled is not new, as can be seen in the early work by Berle and Means 
(1932), discussing the separation between ownership and control. A number of seminal 
regulatory reports have evolved and dealt with a variety of aspects relating to governance of 
the companies such as, its shareholders, board of directors and a variety of other stakeholders.  
The main purpose of corporate governance is to maximise shareholder value in using 
effective, efficient and entrepreneurial management (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000a). 
However, it has been well documented that the relationship between corporate governance 
and corporate performance is mixed and, therefore, researchers are still conducting various 
tests to examine such relationships by using different dimensions of corporate governance 
with different measures of performance to scrutinize the significance of the relationships 
between them.  
 
The Cadbury Code of Corporate Governance, which reforms the basis of UK Corporate 
Governance Code, has attracted not only academics but also industrial research. Research 
within this context was aimed to gauge the extent and form corporations comply with the 
Code, particularly its board-related recommendations. The survey reported in Dedman (2002) 
confirms that boards were becoming more balanced in terms of their division of power and 
responsibilities. Separate positions of CEO and chairman are in place with more non-
executive directors and independent non-executive directors are instructed to provide a 
critical voice on the board. Moreover, the board responsibilities are becoming clearly defined 
and divided, with properly constituted board subcommittees, namely: remuneration, audit, 
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and, increasingly, nomination committees. In this chapter, the definition of corporate 
governance is drawn, the recent developments in the UK’s regulatory reports and the 
consequent reforms are reviewed, the agency theory is presented, corporate governance 
systems are covered, corporate governance mechanisms are explained and their potential 
effect on firm performance is discussed. After that, performance measures used in the 
literature are presented, the issue of endogeneity and causality in corporate governance is 
highlighted and, finally, a summary to briefly address the literature review issues will be 
examined.     
3.2  Corporate governance definition  
The subject of corporate governance has witnessed great interest in the current global 
business environment. It compromises a wide range of regulations and practices under which 
the managers of the firm is responsible to achieve success within the legal compliance 
framework and realistic objectives. There are different ways to define corporate governance, 
whether through some narrow definitions that focus on companies and their shareholders, or 
within broader definitions that include the accountability of companies to many other 
stakeholders.  
It has been argued that the definition of corporate governance has not been set in solitary or 
unified definition, and thus the definition applied depends on the cultural, political, economic, 
and the legal system of the countries in which they are located and operating in (Salacuse, 
2002), but some authors have worked to clarify this concept. However, all the definitions 
address the main elements, such as systems of control inside the company, relationships 
between the company’s stakeholders, and transparency and accountability to help the users of 
information. The following different definitions illustrate that, whilst the definitions vary, the 
same original ideas are present. Corporate governance is defined by the Cadbury code as “the 
system by which companies are directed and controlled”. Meanwhile, it is defined as a set of 
mechanisms that could be used by external investors to defend their interests and rights 
against the insiders, e.g. managers and controlling shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, 2000).  
The OECD (2004) defines it as: Corporate governance involves a set of relationships 
between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. 
Corporate governance provides the structure through which the objectives of the company 
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are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are 
determined. Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and 
management to pursue objectives that are in the interest of the company and its shareholders 
and should facilitate effective monitoring”. In addition, Banks (2004) defines it as the 
framework followed and applied in a corporation on behalf of its stakeholders and 
shareholders. These definitions of corporate governance demonstrate the broader level that is 
based on the congruency of objectives between the management of the company and its 
stakeholders. 
Following this narrow perspective, corporate governance is related to the return on 
investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). It is defined as assuring that the creditors to 
corporations and the investors gain the return on their investment. In addition, corporate 
governance is defined in relation to another theory that influences the corporate governance 
debate which is agency theory. Agency theory focuses on principal-agent relationship rather 
than a broad range of stakeholders. These following definitions take the view of agency 
theory. ‘Corporate governance is the manner in which organisations, particularly limited 
companies are managed and the nature of accountability of the managers to the owners' 
(Dictionary of Accounting, Oxford University Press, 1999). 
 
Definitions of corporate governance on the broader side emphasize that stakeholders and 
shareholders should share a larger amount of responsibility. According to Solomon and 
Solomon (2004), corporate governance in the broadest way is defined as “the systems of 
checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, which ensures that companies 
discharge their accountability to all their stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way 
in all areas of their business”. However, corporate governance is defined also as the 
mechanism in which the board controls all the actions of CEOs, managers, and other 
stakeholders to improve the value of the shareholders (Monks and Minow, 2004).  
Having clarified the debate about the lack of a universally accepted definition of corporate 
governance, there is no surprise that another debate is existent about what constitutes good 
corporate governance for firms (Plessis et al., 2005). Many studies have argued that good 
corporate governance needs to be developed internally by establishing voluntary practices 
depending on the context of the firms, and it is proven that the “one size fits all” mechanism 
should not be implemented as it does not secure best practices for companies (Arcot and 
Bruno, 2006). Several recent factors have increased the need for good corporate governance 
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due to developments, globalisation, fraud and abusive scandals which have brought an 
awareness of insufficient governance and the need for reform.       
3.3  The development of Corporate Governance Codes in UK 
Modern firms were historically a product of a small quasi-governmental arrangement often 
chartered by the Crown to undertake a specific trading purpose. These modern firms are 
evolved from a financing arrangement where a group of people share the same interest to 
develop a large trade expedition which needs a massive capital investment, as it could not be 
sponsored by one individual (Adelopo, 2013). The corporation as it is known today is a 
product of a long process traced back to the Middle Ages, the period of the Renaissance and 
to the great Industrial Revolution (between late 18
th
 Century and early 19
th
 Century). The 
long process of evolution, especially in the 19
th
 Century, has a significant impact on the 
perception of the way the modern corporation operates. Therefore, the work done by Berle 
and Means (1932) has witnessed a huge acceptance and is highly recognized because it 
provides a significant insight into the interactions within corporations. They proposed that 
there is a separation between the owners of the organizations and the management team, and 
this separation requires a formal arrangement placed in contracts between the two parties. 
They suggested that the separation is due to the expansion of size of the corporation and the 
constant distancing of owners from the daily running of the organization. Also, it has  been 
recognized that Jensen and Meckling (1976)’s work on the relationship between agent and 
principal is equally vital, even though such relationships were first discovered and discussed 
in the 18
th
 century by Adam Smith in his book Wealth of Nations. However, the issues of 
governance in corporations such as the prospect of contradictory interests between the 
principals and agents were observed and discussed by Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Fama (1980), which initiates the discussion on Corporate Governance.  
However, after the publication of Berle and Means’ work in 1932, under the title of “The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property”, the issue of sound governance regarding reducing 
agency problems gained a massive importance. Their work detailed the separation of 
ownership from management which resulted in lack of power in the hands of the shareholders 
to keep controlling the management of large public corporations who are supposed to work in 
their interests. Alongside  the division of control and ownership, another essential concern of 
equal importance results from the dispersion and diffusion of the ownership, which reduces 
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their abilities to run the corporation collectively, with the ultimate option of being able to sell 
their shares which can be taken by shareholders who are not satisfied with the performance of 
the firm. This is considered a factor in affecting controlling management by shareholders. 
The term corporate governance was not generally used in the analysis until 1984. In the UK, 
there was a book published by R. I. Tricker in 1984 under the title of Corporate Governance, 
practices, procedures and powers in British Companies and their Boards of Directors. In 
addition, Cheffins (2001) made a comparison of the development of the Berle and Means 
Corporation in the US and in the UK. Although the UK was the only single country which 
followed a similar construct of the US model of the firm based on dispersed ownership and 
corporate capitalism (Coffee, 2012), this development as suggested by Rose (1994) is recent 
and was achieved in the late 1980s. The corporations in the UK prior to this time were 
characterised by a high proportion of family owned organizations (Chandler, 1990). The 
factors which transformed the corporate outlook of the firms in UK are financial service 
regulations, impact of company law and political ideology (Cheffins, 2001).  
Based on Cheffins (2001), the modern firm as defined by Berle and Means (1932) has been 
noticeable in UK since the mid-1980s. Therefore, it is reasonable to start reviewing corporate 
governance development around this time. In the last two decades, several reports have made 
a major development in the corporate environment that shaped the corporate governance 
structure in UK. Those reports resulted in revisions to corporate governance practice which 
tackled the main issues involved in governance arising since 1992. These issues in the 
corporate governance area and accountability have emerged and attracted interest in UK 
listed companies. The subject of Corporate Governance has become one of the most 
significant topics of concentrated research endeavour in the fields of accounting, finance and 
econometrics. The original incentive of such interest was the unanticipated collapse or failure 
of a number of high profile companies at the end of 1980s and early 1990s such as Maxwell, 
BCCI, Coloroll and Polly Peck, which were an evident indication about bad corporate culture 
(Cadbury Report, 1992), as they resulted in massive losses for both stakeholders and 
shareholders. However, despite the  growing issues such as directors’ excess, dissatisfaction 
of institutional investors and the misbehaviour of directors, at that time, the academics 
reacted only to address those issues after the Cadbury Report in 1992 (Collier and Gregory, 
1996).  The absence of both governance and accountability had worsened the situation within 
and surrounding the unsuccessful companies. The collapse of companies in the 2000s (Enron, 
2001, and WorldCom, 2002) in the USA is regularly mentioned as the immediate reason for 
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addressing the problem of corporate governance (Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007). In 
addition, the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997-1998, has focussed the attention of 
academics, regulators, policy makers to assess the various governance regimes applied and 
followed in the affected countries (Backman and Butler, 2003).  
It is well understood that better governed firms have higher value and their accountability is 
improved (Beiner and Schmid, 2005). It is believed that shareholders and firms use internal 
corporate governance mechanisms as tools to reduce corporate risk and to enhance the value 
of the firm (Beckley, Parker, Perrett, 2008). The importance of good governance has received 
considerable attention from large companies in UK, as is reflected in the adoption of various 
governance reports, and this has brought corporate governance issues under increasing 
scrutiny. The main concerns were about the composition and behaviour of the board of 
directors as guardians of the interests of shareholders, the role of the CEO and the chairman 
of the company, the role of executive and non-executive directors, independency of non-
executive directors and accountability of statutory auditors, the transparency of company 
reports and accounts and the power and ability of external shareholders to monitor the 
management team (Collier and Gregory, 1996). 
The first institutional reaction to these governance issues in the UK was the establishment of 
the committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance in 1991. The chairman of 
this committee was Sir Adrian Cadbury and it was set up jointly with other various 
institutions such as Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), the 
Financial Reporting Council (FRC), and the London International Stock Exchange (LISE).  
This committee became known as the Cadbury Committee because it was chaired by Sir 
Adrian Cadbury and, accordingly, in December 1992 the first report was published under that 
name (Cadbury Report, 1992).  
 
 The establishment of the Committee was to consider different issues relating to financial 
reporting and accountability and to consequently make recommendations on good practice. 
The main issues were premised on the responsibilities of the executive and non-executive 
directors regarding their reviews and reports on corporate performance to the shareholders 
and other interested parties, the audit committee and its role and composition, the main 
responsibilities of the auditors and the value and the extent of audit, and finally, the links 
between all the stakeholders, boards and auditors (Cadbury Report, 1992). Although the 
financial scandals spurred the establishment of the Cadbury Committee, its recommendations 
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were initially directed at the board. While the report made recommendations for company 
auditors and investors, the corporate board was its central focus.  
The Cadbury Report’s main recommendation was to develop a code of best practice which all 
listed companies in the UK would abide by, underpinning a ‘comply and explain’ rule rather 
than by legislation. In the report, the main focus was on leadership, composition of the board 
and its role, and recommended that companies should: 
 Separate the individuals occupying the roles of Chairman and CEO at the same time 
 Appoint at least three non-executive directors 
 Establish a remuneration committee and auditor committee, both committees to solely 
consist of non-executive directors 
 The company annual reports and accounts should clearly state the responsibilities of 
the directors for the preparation of published financial disclosures 
Moreover, in the Cadbury report (1992), institutional shareholders were encouraged to take a 
more involved and active role in monitoring the companies, especially with regard to 
applying their votes at the annual general meeting. Also, the Cadbury Code (1992) 
encouraged the accounting profession to seek options in which the statutory audit might 
become more effective and objective (Collier and Gregory, 1996). The heart of the objectives 
of the committee’s recommendations was to design the code of best practice to achieve the 
essential high standards of corporate governance behaviour. Subsequently, the London 
International Stock Exchange (LISE) accepted the Cadbury report recommendations as the 
best practice. Following the Cadbury report (1992), all the listed companies registered in the 
UK have been obliged, as a condition for continuing listing, to state in their annual report to 
shareholders their compliance with the code, and to state the reasons for whether there were 
any areas of non-compliance (Conyon and Mallin, 1997).   
Since the Cadbury Report, numerous other reports have been issued dealing with diverse and 
developing aspects of corporate governance. Continuing concern about the remuneration of 
the top executives in UK companies led to establishing a new committee in 1995 chaired by 
Sir Richard Greenbury (Greenbury Committee 1995). The purpose was to identify a best 
practice to address the issue regarding the determination of the remuneration of directors and 
to set up a code of conduct for such practice. Although, the Cadbury report in 1992 included 
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remuneration in its recommendations - in particular, the establishment of the remuneration 
committees and the disclosure of remuneration which were addressed in the code of best 
practice - a deep and comprehensive discussion attracted both the public and the politicians 
concerning the high pay earned by executives in the large listed companies. The Greenbury 
Committee recommended the following: 
 Setting up a pay structure to align the interest between shareholders and directors 
 Establishing a remuneration committee comprised exclusively from non-executive 
directors to report on remuneration affairs 
 Reporting all the details of the components of directors’ remunerations 
 Shareholders’ consent should be required for long-term incentive plans 
 Companies should deal with the remuneration in a reasonable manner and should not 
offer directors’ service contracts with a notice period of more than one year 
 Link between the performance of the directors and the remuneration packages 
In addition, the report of the committee set its observations on the issues in directors’ 
remuneration; they argue that there is a causal link between performance and remuneration. 
The improvement in the UK’s industrial performance has supported the directors’ increasing 
pay and compensation because of their ability in positively affecting the performance of the 
companies (Gregory, 2001). Therefore, the remuneration packages offered has of necessity 
been attractive to motivate and retain the qualified managers and directors.  
Cadbury recommendations initially suggested establishing a committee on corporate 
governance mechanisms to assess the importance and efficiency of the recommendations 
operating in practice. In November 1995, both the Cadbury Committee and the Greenbury 
Committee requested the establishment of another committee to review the implementation 
of their committees’ recommendations. A committee was established under the chairmanship 
of Sir Ron Hampel, which consequently issued a report (Hampel, 1998). The committee was 
sponsored by The Confederation of British Industry, The Consultative Committee of 
Accountancy Bodies, The London Stock Exchange, The National Association of Pension 
Funds, and the Association of British Insurers (Cadbury, 1992). The Hampel Committee 
started its deliberations in 1995, which coincided with Greenbury recommendations (1995) to 
promote high standards of corporate governance. Hampel (1998) also sought to review the 
initial impact of the Greenbury (1995) recommendations on remuneration decisions and 
disclosure. 
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The main remit of this committee was to conduct a review of the application of the 
recommendations addressed by the previous two committees and to put forward its own 
recommendations. The Hampel Report was issued in January 1998 and an adaptation of a 
new flexible approach was needed to make the implementation of the recommendations 
which commonly approved with the earlier two reports. In January 1998, the report was 
submitted by the committee to its sponsors against the remit which is enclosed within that 
report on page 65. The main five points of the committee’s terms of reference were: 
 Apply an assessment to check if the main purpose of the Cadbury code and its 
application has been attained, suggesting any changes to and removals from if needed 
 Review constantly the executive and non-executive director roles, ensuring the 
importance for the board of the directors’ solidity and recognising the directors’ 
common legal responsibility 
 Ready to follow any related matters rising from the report of the Study Group on 
Directors’ Remuneration chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury 
 Point out when needed shareholders’ roles with relation to issues in corporate 
governance 
 Point out when needed auditors’ roles with relations to issues in corporate 
governance  
 All the other related matters should be dealt with  
The Hampel committee initially provided little of added recommendations but it emphasized 
the balance between accountability and prosperity because the accountability factor was 
covered sufficiently in Cadbury and Greenbury. Accordingly, Hampel (1998) recommended 
that superior governance be built on principles rather than prescription and it could be 
achieved by permitting the companies to offer information in a different style and avoid a 
“box-ticking” exercise. After the Hampel report (1998), the committee issued a further 
document which consolidated and amended the recommendations of Cadbury (1992), 
Greenbury (1995) and the Hampel Proposals (1998) and the result was a single combined 
code containing a set of principles and provisions published in 1998, based on good corporate 
governance practices and principles in the UK (Combined Code, 1998). 
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A further development took place in 1999, when a new report was published by the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. This report of a committee headed by Nigel 
Turnbull concentrated on issues of internal control in the governance of UK companies 
(Turnbull, 1999).  It considered the recommendations imposed by Hampel (1998) and did not 
impose new internal control requirements but required the directors to check regularly the 
quality of internal control and take into account suitable measures to control the risks facing 
the company.  It also asserts that directors should review the current procedures to evaluate 
their adequacy and relevance for the new risks confronting the corporation.  It provides 
guidelines for the directors in order to report on the effectiveness of the internal control in the 
companies for the shareholders. In addition, Turnbull (1999), consistent with other views, 
moves away from a prescriptive advice approach; it allows companies which do not have an 
internal audit function from time to time to review and choose to establish specific internal 
audit function. After that, the Myners (2001) report was issued and the establishment of the 
committee was to promote greater shareholder activism. 
Following the Enron and WorldCom Scandals the Smith Committee had been established. 
The government responded to the corporate failure in the US and requested the Financial 
Reporting Council to assess the preparedness in the country in avoiding such failure. Higgs 
and Smith reports of 2003 respectively examined the role and effectiveness of non-executive 
directors and the role of audit committees, and those reports led to an updating of the 
Combined Code. But shareholder performance and soft regulation remained basic key points 
of the reforms (Cosh, Guest and Hughes, 2006); thus the report supports all the main 
recommendations in the Combined Code such as separation of the positions between the 
chairman of the board and the chief executive. It emphasizes the meeting of the non- 
executive directors annually as a group with the attendance of the executive’s directors, and 
that the annual reports should note that such a meeting had taken place. 
The Financial Reporting Council in July 2003 incorporated the recommendations of the 
various committees and published the revised ‘Code’ on corporate governance in the UK. 
The amended Code requires listed companies to reveal more detailed information about 
compliance and the Code principles. This practice helps the board to identify their positions 
in regard to compliance and to use compliance as a communicating tool between them and 
stakeholders and investors. As stated by Cadbury (1992), the Code is established on best 
practices and on well-managed companies in this field. Thus it is not deemed a theoretical 
normative model showing the companies what to do, but it composes a practical and 
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pragmatic approach to set governance mechanisms for a listed company. In theory, 
companies with higher compliance with the Code should constitute a good governance 
system with higher efficiency and better corporate performance. 
The Combined Code was updated in 2003, emphasizing that the board should not be a focus 
of power in one or two individuals. The code states that other than smaller companies, half of 
the board at least, without the chairman, should comprise independent non-executive 
directors determined by the board. Corporate governance reports have been developed in the 
UK in a reactive manner more than proactive. However, the framework of the corporate 
governance in UK is well developed and it covers the whole range of main mechanisms such 
as structure and independence of board of directors, ownership structure, independence and 
integrity of the audit process and institutional investors (Fraser and Henry, 2003). The main 
provisions of the amended version of the Combined Code in 2006 (FRC, 2006) are: 
 A single board is collectively responsible for all the operating actions whether leading 
the firm, setting the values or taking decisions 
 Separation of the chairman and chief executive, and clear division of the 
responsibilities of running the board and the company 
 Balance between independent non-executive directors and executive directors 
 Regular assessment of the efficiency of the board and its committees 
 The shareholders should approve the appointment of the directors 
 Executive remuneration should be decided/approved by the independent directors 
 There should be linkage between the performance of the directors and remuneration 
packages 
 The responsibility of the board in assessing the position of firm and internal control 
 Establish an audit committee from independent directors with experience to take 
responsibilities 
 Regular contact between the board and the shareholders 
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 Institutional shareholders are required to communicate with the companies and have 
responsibilities regarding their votes 
The Code is constantly evolving and a recent edition of the Combined Code was issued in 
June 2008. There are two major changes between the 2006 and 2008 editions as a main 
difference. Firstly, the restriction for one person chairing more than one FTSE 100 company 
is removed. Secondly, for the large companies outside the FTSE 350, the chairman of the 
company is allowed to sit on the Audit Committee as long as he/she was considered initially 
independent on appointment (Combined Code, 2008). The Financial Reporting Council 
conducted its review of the effectiveness of the Combined Code and it requested observations 
from listed companies, directors and investors to include in the updated version of the code. 
Based on the views received, the FRC published a progress report listing the central issues to 
appear from the opening phase of its review. In December 2009, there was a final report on 
the effectiveness of the Combined Code with some changes taking into account some 
recommendations and it proposed to change the name of the Combined Code to the UK 
Corporate Governance Code. The new Code was issued on 28 May 2010 and replaced the 
Combined Code (2008) with some limited but major changes. Four new main principles have 
been introduced addressing the responsibility of the chairman in leading the board, the need 
for sufficient time devoted by the directors, the requirements for NEDs to constructively 
challenge and the requirement for the board to have balance between experience and skills. 
However, one change has focused mainly on the recommendation for the re-election for 
directors. Measures also include promotion of diversity and balance in connection to the 
board’s composition, particularly in relation to gender. It also addresses the remuneration 
issue and the link between performance and pay for executive directors which have to be 
agreed in criteria not concentrated purely on finance and must consider the company’s risk, 
long term interest, and systems. 
 
Overall, sound corporate governance aims to establish principles and practices for all listed 
companies to comply with. Consequently, firm’s governance quality is linked to the degree of 
variation in extent and form of compliance with the Code which theoretically is supposed to 
be reflected on its performance as well. Firms fully complying with the Code indicate good 
governance and subsequently, because less agency costs exist, it is likely in theory to have 
better performance and increased firm’s value. Those successive codes have responded to the 
changes and the issues which occurred in the last two decades. But most importantly, the 
36 
 
question is whether the companies have reacted to these recommendations and how much 
impact these recommendations influence the overall performance. 
Table 3.1Development of corporate governance codes in the United Kingdom 
 
Source: Taylor (2004: 418) (Arrows do not show straight away that there is a hierarchy 
but only the yearly development leading to the Combined Code, 2006). 
3.4 Theories on the role/effects of Corporate Governance 
This section discusses the relevant extant theories that attempt to link internal corporate 
governance structures and firm financial performance. Theories underlying corporate 
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governance have been drawn from a variety of disciplines, such as accounting, economics, 
finance, and law, amongst others (e.g., Rwegasira 2000; Mallin, 2007; Solomon, 2007; 
Durisin and Puzone, 2009). As a result, past studies have adopted several theoretical 
perspectives. Common among them include agency, resource dependence, managerial 
signalling, legitimacy, organisational, political costs, stakeholder, stewardship and transaction 
cost economies theories. Clarke (2004) offers a detailed overview of most of these corporate 
governance theories. 
In this study, and as in many others that will be reviewed in this chapter, corporate 
governance is approached from a finance perspective, using a quantitative research 
methodology. In fact, much of the prior research on corporate governance has been carried 
out based on agency theory (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009). Agency theory is, therefore, 
adopted as the principal underlying theory. However, given the complex nature of corporate 
governance, and in line with both prior studies (e.g., Nicholson and Kiel, 2003; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006), as well as recent calls for the adoption of multiple-theoretical approach to 
corporate governance research (van Ees et al., 2009; Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, p.259), 
where applicable, agency theory is complemented with information asymmetry and 
managerial signalling, organisational, political costs, stewardship, and resource dependence 
theories. This gives the study a multiple-theoretical orientation. 
3.4.1 Internal corporate governance and firm performance: Supporting Theories 
3.4.1.1 Information Asymmetry and Managerial Signalling Theory 
Prior studies have relied on information asymmetry and managerial signalling as a supporting 
theory to explain the link between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) in modern 
corporation (e.g., Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Black et al., 2006a). It suggests that managers as 
insiders typically have much more information, including private information, about their 
companies than shareholders or prospective shareholders (e.g., Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007). 
In this regard, and in making portfolio decisions, prospective shareholders in particular face 
two problems. Firstly, potential investors face the problem of selecting firms with the most 
capable management (adverse selection) (Rhee and Lee, 2008). Secondly, and just as it is 
with agency theory, they are confronted with the problem of ensuring that managers do not 
use their superior information to extract excessive perquisites or invest in unprofitable 
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projects (moral hazard) (Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007). Jensen and Meckling (1976) and 
Mishkin (1997) suggest that faced with asymmetric information and market uncertainty; 
rational prospective shareholders have two possible options. Firstly, they may either choose 
to take into consideration the potential costs of adverse selection and moral hazard in pricing 
a security of a firm. Secondly, they may also choose not to make the investment altogether. In 
this case, whichever option prospective shareholders choose is likely to have a negative 
impact on the cost of outside equity capital for firms. To minimise the selection dilemma 
facing investors, better-governed firms (i.e., firms with the least adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems) will have to find ways by which they can credibly signal their quality to 
prospective shareholders. A major way by which firms can creditably signal their quality to 
the market or prospective shareholders is to adopt good corporate governance rules. 
 
In theory, by electing to comply with the recommendations of a code of good corporate 
practices, a firm will essentially be signalling to investors that it is better-governed. This 
suggests insiders will behave well with their investment, and by implication work in the 
interest of shareholders. As a corollary, investors will bid-up share prices because with better 
corporate governance, they are likely to receive a greater portion of their firms’ profits as 
opposed to being expropriated by managers (e.g., La Porta et al., 2002; Beiner et al., 2006). 
As equity values appreciate, the cost of outside equity capital can be expected to fall (e.g., 
Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Black et al., 2006a; Chen et al., 2009). For example, by appointing 
independent non-executive directors to the board, a firm signals to potential investors of its 
intentions of treating them fairly, and for that matter the safety of their investment. In this 
regard, by signalling (disclosing) its better governance qualities to investors, a firm reduces 
information asymmetry. This is likely to lead to an increase in share price and firm value for 
existing shareholders due to the potential increase in the demand for its shares (e.g., Deutsche 
Bank, 2002, p.5; Black et al., 2006a and b). Equivalently, an increase in a firm’s share price 
should, ceteris paribus, result in a reduction in the cost of outside equity capital (e.g., 
Botosan, 1997; CLSA, 2000).  
3.4.1.2 Stewardship theory 
Contrary to agency, information asymmetry and signalling theories that place emphasis on 
managerial opportunism and monitoring, stewardship theory posits that executive managers 
are intrinsically trustworthy individuals (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003). As such, managers 
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should be fully empowered to run firms because they are good stewards of the resources 
entrusted to them (Letza et al., 2004). Further, stewardship theory makes several assumptions 
about the behaviour of senior managers. Firstly, it assumes that since top managers usually 
spend their entire working lives in the company they govern; they are more likely to 
understand the businesses better than outside directors and so can make superior decisions 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Secondly, executive managers possess superior formal and 
informal information and knowledge about the firm they manage, which can aid better 
decision-making (Donaldson and Davis, 1994). Finally, competitive internal and external 
market discipline and the fear of damaging their future managerial capital ensure that agency 
costs are minimised (e.g., Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a). As a result, proponents of 
stewardship theory contend that better financial performance are likely to be associated with 
internal corporate governance practices that grant managers greater powers, such as 
combining the positions of company chairman and CEO (Donaldson and Davis, 1991,1994). 
3.4.1.3 Resource Dependence Theory 
Resource dependence theory is the final supporting theory of corporate governance that this 
study relies on. It suggests that the institution of internal corporate governance structures, 
such as board of directors is not only necessary for ensuring that managers are effectively 
monitored, but also they serve as an essential link between the firm and the critical resources 
that it needs to maximise financial performance (Pfeffer, 1973). Firstly, the board and non-
executive directors in particular can offer essential resources, such as expert advice, 
experience, independence, and knowledge (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Secondly, they can 
bring to the firm reputation and critical business contacts (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
Thirdly, the board can facilitate access to business/political elite, information and capital 
(Nicholson and Kiel, 2003). Finally, the board provides a critical link to a firm’s external 
environment and significant stakeholders, such as creditors, suppliers, customers, and 
competitors. As a result, it has been argued that greater level of links to the external 
environment is associated with better access to resources (Nicholson and Kiel, 2003). This 
can impact positively on firm financial performance. 
3.4.1.4 Agency theory 
Agency theory seems a dominant subject and has been broadly used in a variety of subjects 
within corporate finance and significantly in corporate governance studies and analyses 
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(Dedman, 2004). The effects and consequences of agent-principal theory have been an 
attractive subject for a large number of researchers around the world (Carrillo, 2007).  
 
It is very often seen as the most used theoretical approach to the analysis of corporate 
governance, based on the idea of the division between ownership and control which is 
involved in the current corporate. It initially started with the work of Berle and Means (1932) 
which highlighted the separation between the management of the firm and its ownership. It is 
mainly focused on the alignment of the interests of both parties - the agents and the principals 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Fama, 1980). It indicates the relationship between these two 
parties, the principals who are the shareholders or the owners of the firm and the managers as 
their agents to manage and control the firm, but may not take full action in the interest of the 
shareholders, but instead work to enhance their own interest. This situation was documented 
by Adam Smith in the eighteenth century in his commentary on joint stock companies (Cited 
by Cadbury, 2002, p.4): “being managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, 
directors of such companies cannot well be expected to watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own”. 
 
Also, the significant work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) have 
developed and strengthened this theory. They suggested that the agency problem arises 
between the principals and their agents, as the agents are employed for a reward to run the 
business and to make the decisions on behalf of the owners. This relationship is shown to be 
bedevilled with two major interdependent problems: (1) the possibility of the agent having 
more access to the information over the principal (information asymmetry), and (2) potential 
prospects of opposing interests between the agent and the principal (Hill and Jones, 1992, 
p.132). 
 
There are three main assumptions from which the agency problem arises.  Firstly, Eisenhardt 
(1989, p.58) stated that with regard to risk-bearing it is presumed that the agent and the 
principal do not probably have the same outlook. Secondly, essentially the agent and the 
principal might not share the same interests and goals. Thirdly, both parties to the relationship 
are assumed to be utility maximisers (opportunistic) to the extent that even if their goals or 
risk preferences were not to inherently differ, ceteris paribus, there would be a compelling 
reason to believe that a rational agent would not always act in the best interests of the 
principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.308). 
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Thus, as agent, the management acts on behalf of the principal for fiduciary duties to run the 
organization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985a). There are four main 
manners which have been identified where the self-interested managers could cause costs 
which might reduce the shareholders’ wealth. Firstly, utility managers might exploit their 
position to take advantage of the resources of the corporate and use power to award 
themselves packages of excessive compensation. Secondly, they might abuse the corporate 
wealth by choosing to maximize their own wealth in consuming more bonuses and 
perquisites. Thirdly, they might choose to use the available cash and make investment in non-
profitable projects and less efficient opportunities over paying out dividends when it is 
convenient. Fourthly, they might also not devote enough time, put greater effort, and/or 
assign individual skills. Finally, managers may either choose to devote less time, effort, 
personal skill and/or inventiveness to maximize the value of some activities, for example not 
looking for some profitable new investment projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.313). 
 
But in general, the theory assumes that the managers are self-interested, opportunistic and 
individualistic in nature, and are interested to maximise their own wealth and status to the 
detriment of the shareholders. Consequently, the theory is established on the assumption that 
there is constantly a deviation amongst the objectives between the shareholders and the 
management. The managers are unlikely to act in shareholders’ best interests and it can result 
in conflict between the two parties because managers are directly controlling the company 
and they have direct access to accurate information, which is considered an advantage over 
the shareholders, consequently such conflict leads to the agents’ failure for maximizing 
shareholders’ wealth and affects the performance of the firm (Morck et al. 1988). Therefore it 
is in the shareholders’ interest to apply monitoring and control mechanisms over the 
management team, to ensure that their interest is aligned with the managers’ interest 
(Carrillo, 2007).  Consequently, in order to protect the interest of shareholders, a suitable and 
an appropriate corporate governance structure needed to be established (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006).   
Also, Eisenhardt (1989) states that agency problems could arise due to two issues: moral 
hazard in the contracts and adverse selection for the managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Moral hazard is represented in the case where there is no perfect deal between the agent and 
the principal and does not cover all the actions performed by the managers, thus some 
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decisions taken by the management are not optimal and might be opportunistic.  As the moral 
hazard occurs after the contract, however, adverse selection takes place before and after the 
contract between the agent and the principal (Sung, 2001). Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 
(2007) stress that adverse selection happens when the shareholders possibly hire agents who 
lack the experience and skills to deliver expected returns and that might be due to the 
existence of information asymmetry between the principals and the agents (Scapens, 1991). 
In addition, the shareholders and the managers certainly have different risk attitudes (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Thus, the principals are required to take actions to establish forms of 
controls due to the continuous existence of information asymmetry. Annelies and 
Gaeremynck (2012) examine the impact of principal-principal agency problems on the 
quality and effectiveness of corporate governance structures in listed companies from 14 
European countries between 1999 and 2003. Using a simultaneous equations model, they find 
that the conflict index affects the quality and effectiveness of corporate governance. When 
agency conflicts are severe, the costs of installing good governance are high for the majority 
shareholders and the quality is low. Once installed, however, good governance structures 
complemented with a high-quality disclosure environment leads to higher firm value, 
especially in companies with a severe agency conflict. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that there is no doubt that finding and setting up some 
mechanisms for control will lead to conceding three main costs. Firstly, the principal is able 
to cut down and minimize the abnormal actions of the agents by expending some resources to 
develop a monitoring system to help him control the agent. Such a technique might impose 
extra effort on the principal to be able to control his agent’s behaviour by including some 
conditions in the contract with regards to some restrictions in the budget, operating rules and 
compensations policies and some others. Secondly, Hill and Jones (1992, p.132) argue that 
the agent is probably required by the principal to spend resources (bonding costs) to secure 
that there is no harm caused to the principal by some particular action taken by the agent. It is 
presumed that the agent might ex-ante incur bonding costs to guarantee the right to be 
managing the principal’s resources. Thirdly, it is assumed that there will still be a divergence 
between the decisions taken by the agent and these decisions that aim to achieve 
maximization of shareholders’ wealth, regardless of the introduction of bonding and 
monitoring mechanisms (governance structure), known as residual loss. In summary, agency 
cost is known as the total of the three costs mentioned above, the bonding costs of the agent, 
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the monitoring costs of the principal and the residual loss remaining (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, p.308). 
Brennan (1995) declares that agency cost is due also to the impracticality of creating a 
complete contract for every single management’s action or decision between the shareholders 
and the managers in which the management may directly benefit and protect the 
shareholder’s wealth. Agency problems are likely to exist in different instances within the 
firm, but are most probably to be found in decisions regarding diversification investing, and 
mergers and acquisitions (Lane et al, 1998). This could be linked to the tendencies of 
management to avert appropriate offers in pursuit of their own interest to the damage of the 
shareholders (Lane et al. 1998; Buchholtz and Ribbens, 1994). The agency problem is most 
represented in the relationship between management and shareholders, and it attracts the most 
attention, however, it could exist in other relationships, for example between management 
and debt holders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Stulz, 1990). 
Fama (1980) discusses the increasing separation of ownership from management; he suggests 
that as the ownership side is increasingly dispersed, management tends to act more freely and 
become less accountable and their actions less monitored by the shareholders. Morck and 
Steier (2005) argue that because management is primarily involved in the decision making 
process in the firm, the owners are either dispersed in numbers or they lack the experience 
and the right sort of skills to manage the business successfully or to take the right investing 
decisions for long term. However, managers are closely running the business on a daily basis 
and for sufficient time to be able to obtain more accurate information about the firm than any 
individual owner. This leads to the classic problem of information asymmetry (Aboody and 
Lev, 2000). The agency problems are exacerbated due to the differences in the nature and 
scope of such information between the management and the shareholders. Thus, the owners 
are often at the weakest side in this conflict and that encourages the management and gives 
them an unrestrained opportunity to take sub-optimal decisions and consume perks for their 
interests, causing the harm for the main objectives in maximizing the wealth of shareholders 
(Murphy and Zimmerman, 1993). 
To achieve the target in encouraging the agents to act in the interest of principals, several 
mechanisms have been adopted to reduce conflicts of interest and to protect shareholders 
interest (Weir, Laing and McKnight, 2002). McColgan (2001) declares how Agency theory 
assumes that shareholders respond to the conflicts of interest in two ways. Firstly, they 
increase different monitoring methods to ensure that managers are keen and determined to 
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maximize the firm’s wealth. Secondly, they introduce incentive schemes for management that 
encourages them to perform to their optimum towards achieving long term success. These 
mechanisms include incorporating as many possible clauses in the contracts to provide 
security and align interest between the owners and the management (Denis, 2001). Nyman et 
al (2005) propose other mechanisms to control an agent by a principal, firstly, through 
implementing an information system purposely aimed to control the agent and, secondly, by 
creating an agreement with the agent based on results oriented contracts, for example 
compensation related to certain achieved results. Hence, such contracts could increase the 
cost for the principal. 
Finally, by incurring bonding costs, managers can be urged to sign contractual guarantees 
that insure shareholders against malfeasance on their part (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, 
p.308). These may include: (1) having the financial accounts audited by independent public 
auditors; (2) appointing independent non-executive directors to monitor managers; and (3) 
imposing minimum managerial shareholding to align interests with shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, pp.323, 325). For greater effectiveness, shareholders must achieve an 
optimal balance between instituting behaviour-oriented internal structures (i.e., board and 
auditing structures) and outcome-oriented contracts (i.e., salaries, stock options, and 
shareholding) (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58). Internally, agency theory focuses on writing efficient 
contracts and implementing effective monitoring and bonding to secure shareholders’ 
interests (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58). Externally, it relies on efficient market factors (i.e., 
corporate control and managerial labour) to govern or discipline internal managerial 
misbehaviour (Fama, 1980, p.294). Firstly, there exist efficient internal and external 
managerial labour markets, which exert pressures on firms to rank and remunerate managers 
according to their performance (Fama, 1980, p.294). Fama (1980, p.293) contends that 
internally there is usually competition among top managers to become ‘boss of bosses’. There 
is also competition between top managers and lower managers who think they can gain by 
replacing shirking or less competent managers above them. This creates intrinsic vertical and 
horizontal monitoring of managers by managers themselves. Externally, each manager’s 
current and future outside opportunity wage is determined by the current and future successes 
or failures of the managerial team (Fama, 1980, p.292). This means that each manager has an 
interest in the performance of the manager above and below him/her. As a consequence, each 
manager undertakes some amount of monitoring in both directions. This serves as a restraint 
on managers who may have incentive to expropriate shareholders’ wealth (Fama, 1980, 
45 
 
p.293). Secondly, there exists an efficient market for trading capital and corporate control. 
This means poorly performing firms may be easily acquired by their better-governed 
counterparts. Crucially, it offers owners of capital (shareholders) the opportunity to hedge 
against the failings of any particular firm by diversifying their holdings across different firms. 
This makes the separation of ownership and control in modern corporations an efficient form 
of economic organisation (Fama, 1980, p.291). 
 
Corporate governance mechanisms aim to mitigate agency problems and ensure that 
managers act in the best interests of shareholders (e.g., Netter et al., 2009). There are many 
reports which include guidance on corporate governance and encourage the management 
team to be more accountable (Nenova, 2003). The Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel reports 
in the UK have suggested a number of important methods for aligning the acts of the 
management with the interest of shareholder, such as linking rewards to company profits, a 
method used extensively in UK companies, which offer share options to managers and 
directors.  Another suggestion is based on increasing the stake of management in the equity 
of the firm (Tourigny et al. 2003). In addition, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that 
increasing the share ownership of management will bring their interest in line with the 
shareholders, however, Lane et al. (1998) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) conclude that the 
risks of management entrenchments should be recognized. It is identified when the share 
ownership of the management is so significant and could be used as a power to influence the 
composition of the board, excessive consumption of perks and facilitate management elusion. 
Other methods are considered as well, such as adding incentives to management and relating 
management compensation to performance, reducing free cash flow available in the firm and 
sacking directors in the event of poor performance. The Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel 
reports have tried to develop the accountability and transparency in the corporation, and plan 
an effective structure for corporate governance standards in the UK in order to support the 
intervention of non-executive directors and auditors to hold their responsibility and enforce 
adequate checks and balances on executive directors regarding shareholders’ interest. 
 
In addition to these reports, the corporate governance literature also suggests many ways in 
which agency problem conflict can be reduced; for instance, Depken et al. (2005) declare that 
reducing agency costs can be identified between internal and external mechanisms. Internal 
mechanisms can include compensation contracts and monitoring activities within the firm, 
while external mechanisms include monitoring activities by the capital market, including 
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legislators, investment professionals and investors. Despite the fact that these mechanisms are 
different in nature; they share a common objective, which is to align the interests of the 
managers with those of the shareholders (Osterland, 2001).  
Monks (1998) insists that shareholders can play an essential role in encouraging managers to 
work for shareholders’ interest and maximize their profit by practising shareholder activism. 
Shareholder activism is the actions taken by shareholders in order to oversee managers and to 
pressure them to work their best for the shareholders. One of the main tools to practice 
activism by shareholders is by voting on the proposals, in replacing and appointing new 
managers in the annual general meeting. The board of directors can be regarded as another 
mechanism to reduce agency costs (Fligstein and Choo, 2005); the board of directors can 
monitor managers’ behaviour to ensure that they are working for the interest of the 
shareholders. Shareholders want the directors to take decisions to maximize the value of the 
firm’s shares; however managers have their own personal aims, such as high pay and job 
security. These aims will essentially be guided by three things, their pay, their perks and job 
security (Jensen and Warner 1988). This means that directors will act in both sides, 
safeguarding the interest of shareholders, maximizing their wealth and at the same time will 
employ their efforts to pursue their individual objectives. However, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argued that, if managers have some shares in the corporation this would align their 
interest with the shareholders’ in order to increase the value of the firm and consequently 
reduce agency costs. But, the dispersion of ownership still allows the managers to control the 
firm due to access to more accurate information. 
According to agency theory, the board of directors, which is dominated by outside directors, 
is capable of providing effective monitoring for executive directors and will establish 
strategies which will consequently be able to benefit the shareholders. Therefore, the board of 
directors is considered the main mechanism which leads the firm to success, in particular, the 
composition of the board of directors. Blair (1996) states that directors are believed to be the 
representatives of the owners but in the modern corporation, managers must be controlled and 
monitored by the shareholders to make sure that they are not using their power to deviate 
their interest from the owners. As discussed earlier, the source of agency problems is the 
division between control and ownership, thus an active and independent board of directors in 
the modern firm could reduce the agency problems. These independent directors are acting as 
agents on behalf of shareholders in monitoring the acts and the decisions taken by the 
management whose main interest may be to enhance its own benefits rather than maximizing 
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shareholder value. Therefore, any changes achieved in the behaviours of the management due 
to activities imposed by independent directors will benefit the shareholders through the 
maximization of their wealth. Previous governance research have utilised agency theory as its 
theoretical basis, for example, Yermak (1996) studied the board size with firm performance, 
Bhagat and Black (2002) examined the effect of board composition on performance. 
Corporate governance best practice is structured to protect the boards’ activities and functions 
from any unfettered impact or influence and not to be dominated by any individual. The 
board is better to be balanced with the majority of directors being non-executives, and 
additionally the establishment of a number of board sub-committees. This approach is 
expected to increase the transparency of management activities thereby reducing the cost of 
expenditure on controlling and monitoring mechanisms and as a result reduces the agency 
costs related with these functions due to diminution in information asymmetry. Mallin (2004) 
states that the code of corporate governance is able to help to reduce the information 
asymmetry between agent and principal. It forces listed firms to disclose more information 
about the corporation in which the principal, based on this public information, can evaluate 
better whether the agents have performed their responsibilities and duties or failed to fulfil it. 
In the large public corporations, asymmetry of information could be better controlled, as 
those firms are more established, have built a good disclosure practice and they are under 
scrutiny from the regulators and the market (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991 cited by Cai et 
al, 2008).  Also, corporate governance regulations regarding accountability mechanisms such 
as internal control, audit and financial reporting are used to manage the risks (Spira and Page, 
2003). 
Many studies have been carried out to examine the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms and different factors, in particular its impact on the corporate financial 
performance (Shliefer and Vishny 1997; Boubakri et al. 2011). However, these studies are 
not similar regarding their findings and they have not reached the same conclusion. For 
instance, it has been argued that although there is an increase in public and academic interest 
on the mechanisms of corporate governance in active capital market, there is no clear 
evidence that there is a positive relationship between good corporate governance practices 
and corporate performance (Klein et al. 2005). Others, such as Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
and Boubakri et al. (2011), found that there is a positive relationship between firms’ 
performance and good corporate governance practice, in particular foreign or external 
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ownership of shares. Leblanc and Gillies (2003) supported these findings by concluding that 
better performance can be achieved with better corporate governance. 
To sum up, agency theory suggests that due to the separation of ownership and control in 
modern firms, rational managers are less likely to always work in the interests of owners. 
Agency theory posits that a net reduction in agency costs arising from the institution of these 
internal corporate governance structures should help increase firm value and/or improve 
financial performance (Shabbir and Padget, 2005, p.3). This will result in agency costs being 
incurred, including monitoring, bonding and residual loss. All else equal, the institution of 
effective corporate governance structures will reduce agency costs. This is likely to increase 
firm value and/or financial performance. Information asymmetry and managerial signalling 
theory takes similar view to agency theory. It suggests that by incurring signalling costs, 
better-governed firms can increase their value by signalling their better quality to prospective 
investors. This is the overriding theory underlying the recommendations of a raft of corporate 
governance reports in many countries (e.g., Cadbury, 1992; OECD Principles, 1999). It has 
also been the major motivation behind an established body of empirical research that attempts 
to link internal corporate governance structures with firm financial performance, either 
through the use of empirical econometric models based on some equilibrium assumptions 
(e.g., Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Weir et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006; and Guest, 2009, amongst others) or recently through the construction of composite 
corporate governance indices (e.g., Gompers et al., 2003; Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 
2006a; Henry, 2008; and Chen et al., 2009). 
By contrast, stewardship theory suggests that due to their information and knowledge 
advantages, better financial performance is likely to be associated with greater managerial 
trust and powers. Finally, resource dependence theory indicates that internal corporate 
governance structures like the board of directors help to link the firm to critical business 
inputs needed for higher financial performance. 
3.5 Corporate governance systems 
The most important component of any corporate governance system is the board of directors 
(Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009).The ownership structure of the firm has an effect on the nature 
of agency problems between managers and owners as well as amongst shareholders. It is 
suggested that problems that arise when the ownership of the firm is dispersed are different to 
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those when that firm ownership is concentrated. In developed countries such as, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Canada, dispersed ownership leads to managers 
and shareholders not sharing the main interests as their interests’ alignment are conflicting 
and that have become a problem (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, in concentrated 
ownership when one shareholder has the most power and effective control of the firm, in 
countries such as Germany, Japan and developing countries, the central problem is that 
interests’ divergence has arisen between large shareholders and minority shareholders. 
 
In diffused ownership, there are a large number of shareholders, each holding a small block 
of the shares of the ownership of the firm. These small shareholders – called outsiders - do 
not have great incentives to occupy efficient role with regards to all the activities of the firm 
to be monitored and tend to not get involved in decisions with regards to the management of 
the firm. Therefore, diffused ownership structures is regarded or referred to as outsider 
system. These owners in the outsider systems tend to rely on the independent members on the 
board to play the effective role in monitoring the managerial behaviour, including 
guaranteeing adequate disclosure, assessing objectively the performance of the managers and 
securing a protective way of the shareholders’ rights. Subsequently, the outsider system is 
deemed more accountable and is likely to foster liquid markets. However, a regulatory 
framework and a well-functioning legal structure are required for this system.   
    
In concentrated ownership structures, there are a small number of individuals, either 
manager, families, firms, boards and lenders, who have the power of ownership and control. 
These individuals or groups are called insiders because they often manage, control or have a 
strong influence on running the operations of the firm. Hence, concentrated ownership 
structures are regarded or referred to as insider systems. There are many ways in which 
insiders exercise control over firms, such as pyramidal and cross-ownership structures 
(Wiwattanakantang, 2001). For example, ownership structure system takes the concentrated 
form in countries such as Japan and Germany in comparison with countries like the United 
Kingdom and the United States; also, in Germany and Japan banks play more crucial 
governance roles. While Prowse (1992) proclaimed that in Japan financial institutions are the 
most vital large shareholders, in Germany, the most crucial shareholders are the firms, 
followed by families (Franks and Mayer (2001). Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) stated that 
in the United Kingdom the dispersion of ownership was obvious before strong shareholders’ 
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rights came into existence and the most significant cause of this was acquisitions and 
mergers. 
According to Mayer (2000), an insider system is followed in continental Europe; a small 
number of shareholders have the control concentrated in their hands, with a conflict of 
interest creating an agency problem between large and minority shareholders. Shareholders 
are obliged to use their rights of voting and their power to affect firm performance.  La Porta 
et al. (1999) found that in European continental countries the three largest shareholders 
generally accounted for more than 50 percent of shareholders. Consistent with La Porta et 
al.’s view, Gorton and Schmid (2000) studied German firms, their findings showing that there 
is a positive relationship between the performance of the firm and ownership concentration of 
the bank, where shareholders are associated with firms by common shares, partially 
managing and controlling them. Two boards are included in such a model: management and 
supervisory. Meanwhile in Japan, the model is categorized by specific groups or holdings 
(kabushiki), where traditions within the families, obligation and consensus are noteworthy 
and a strong rapport exists amongst the government, banks and firms. Table 2.2 highlights the 
dominant characteristics associated with insider and outsider systems 
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Table 3.2 Outsider and Insider Systems characteristics 
Outsider system Insider system 
Large firms controlled by management, but 
owned predominantly by outside 
shareholders 
Firms owned by insiders who also wield 
control over management 
US, UK, Canada, and Australia Emerging countries, Japan and Germany 
System characterised by the separation of 
ownership and control; agency problems 
Little separation between ownership and 
control; agency problems are rare 
Hostile takeovers frequently occur Hostile takeovers are rare 
Dispersed ownership Concentrated ownership 
Control by a large range of shareholders Control by a small group of insiders 
No transfer of wealth from minority Wealth transfer from minority to majority 
Strong investor protection Weak investor protection 
Potential for shareholder democracy Controlling shareholders misuse power  
Shareholding characterised more by exit than 
by vote 
Large shareholders have power and voice 
used in their investments in other companies  
Source: Solomon (2007, p. 185) 
*Many European countries show features of both systems and lie in an intermediate position. 
3.6  Corporate governance mechanisms 
The aim of corporate governance as a mechanism is to deal with the problems arising from 
the control and ownership separation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Two types of governance 
mechanisms—external and internal— for mitigating agency problems are proposed by 
agency theory (Jensen, 1993). Internal control mechanisms including: board of directors, firm 
compensation, ownership structure and financial policies (debt and dividends), are suggested 
by these researchers (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Denis & McConnel, 2003; Denis, 
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2001; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Jensen, 1986). Whereas external control mechanisms 
include the market for corporate control, legal system, and the factor and product market 
(Bushman and Smith, 2001). It is suggested that these mechanisms are able to provide 
protection and checks of the operations in a firm, enable discipline of the management and 
shareholders. Farinha (2003) extended the previous arguments and added some items such as 
the role of reputation and security analysts and dividend policy and debt policy as internal 
mechanisms. Schultz,Tan and Walsh (2010) examine the governance-performance relation 
for firms included in the ASX 200 index at any time during the period 2000 to 2007 
inclusive. They selected variables that proxy for the remuneration policies, board structure, 
ownership and a range of performance measures such as total returns (TR), Tobin’s Q (Q), 
accounting profit rate (PR) and return on assets (ROA). They adopt a dynamic GMM 
specification procedure that is robust to dynamic endogeneity, simultaneity and 
heterogeneity. They observe no causal relation between governance and firm performance, 
suggesting that apparently significant relations uncovered by pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and fix-effects models are the result of spurious correlations. 
Meanwhile Hassan (2009) researched the corporate governance in Australia and categorised 
the monitoring corporate governance mechanisms into three groups: I) mechanisms within 
the company that included board size, board composition, CEO duality, CEO tenure, CEO 
compensation, and managerial ownership; 2) mechanisms outside the company that included 
ownership concentration, debt, and corporate takeovers; and 3) government regulations and 
rules.  
 
In general, the impact of a good governance mechanism on firm performance produced a 
mixed and inconclusive result all over the world. These evidences however are still not 
convincing in proving a connection between good corporate governance practices and firm 
performance (Heracleous, 2001). In the next section, a detailed and comprehensive review of 
studies in corporate governance mechanisms relevant to the current study is presented, 
identifying a specific set of corporate governance mechanisms and their impact on firm 
performance. Moreover, taking into account that the current study takes the agency theory 
framework and the concept of agency problem as a base—including how corporate 
governance mechanisms play a role in controlling this problem and the impact of these 
mechanisms on firm performance—the next sections review and discuss various corporate 
governance mechanisms connected to the current study. 
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3.6.1 Board of Directors 
The corporate governance literature suggests that internal and external mechanisms play a 
central role in improving the firm value and its performance (Baghat and Black, 2002). Such 
mechanisms embrace board characteristics (size, independent, CEO), management team, 
politics, regulations and government. Board of directors is a collective of people who are 
nominated by the shareholders of a company, and responsible for making decisions on their 
behalf as it would be impossible for shareholders to meet frequently to make detailed 
decisions especially when the company has a large number of shareholders (Yung, 2009). 
Monks and Minow (1998) view the board of a firm as a pivot between the management team 
and the shareholders. Its mission is to link between the vast number of shareholders dispersed 
around the world and the main managers in head office.  
 Board of directors play a major role in the relationship between the corporate governance 
and firm value (Hanrahan et. al, 2001). In relation to the value of the firm, the main role of 
the boards is to perform its fiduciary duties, such as monitoring the management activities, 
selecting the staff for a firm. The two most important functions of the board of directors are 
those of advising and monitoring (Raheja, 2005; and Adams and Ferriera, 2007). Also, to 
protect the value of the firm the board appoints and monitors the performance of an 
independent auditor (Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach, 2008).The board‘s main duty is to 
protect and promote the interest of the shareholders to make sure their interest is intact 
(Rossouw et al., 2002, p.289). Also, the board’s main role is to guarantee conformance and 
ensure the performance of the management in the firm and that could be through different 
functions such as executive action (strategy), direction (advice), service and resource support 
(resource dependence), supervision (monitoring) and accountability (Brennan, 2006, p.580). 
 
 Previous studies summarised the main role of boards in agency control, strategic decisions 
and policy support role (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999), to provide a network to firm 
reputation and legitimacy (Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) and the resource acquirer role 
(Johnson et al, 1996). Fama and Jensen (1983a) suggest that the board of directors approve 
management decisions and monitor their performances. Their fiduciary duties towards the 
shareholders, such as monitoring the activities of the managers, evaluating the performance 
of the senior executives, reflect the importance of their roles in governance, and their 
contribution towards providing strategic decisions in the direction of the companies increase 
their responsibilities. However, Jensen (1993) and Brennan (2006) suggest that the corporate 
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board has to be efficient and effective in implementing its functions to be capable of 
protecting shareholders’ interests. The efficiency and effectiveness of board performance is 
affected by a variety of factors, for instance, size, composition and diversity (Yermack, 1996; 
Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009).  
 
The emphasis recently on leadership and board composition in the UK is consistent with the 
view of agency theorists of the governance role of the board. Fama 1980, and Fama and 
Jensen (1983a and 1983b) stress that the agency theorists place the board of directors in the 
heart of corporate governance. For controlling agency problems between shareholders and 
managers, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) tested the use of a number of mechanisms, such as 
institutions, presence of outside directors, shareholding of insiders and the managerial labour 
market. The rise in the standards of corporate governance has appeared in appointing the 
board of directors and how the executives and non-executives have been controlled and 
monitored (Bhagat and Black, 2002).  
 
The Cadbury Report (1992) proposed a potential structure for the board; it indicated that 
boards consist of a substantial number of non-executive directors and it should be reasonably 
balanced and act in the interests of shareholders. Dedman (2002) suggests, in a review of the 
major changes shaped by Cadbury Report regarding the corporate governance in UK, that 
there is a prevalent compliance with the report, but the existing studies fail to find any direct 
impact between the non-executive directors on UK boards and the value of the firm. In a 
study based on a sample of 460 UK listed companies, Dahya et al (2002), recognized the 
increase in non-executive directors on UK boards as they suggest the percentage rose from 
(35.3 %) to (46%) after the publication of the Cadbury Report. Also, Song and Windram 
(2004) find that the extent and the nature of the responsibilities and roles of non-executive 
directors and in particular the outsiders sitting on the Audit Committee have significantly 
changed from monitoring and reporting to a more advanced role in internal control functions 
and risk management. In addition, Dahya et al. (2002) report that over 80% of UK boards 
have appointed two different individuals for the role of Chairman and CEO. Those studies 
confirm that, post-Cadbury Report, many changes have occurred regarding the composition 
of boards in UK publicly listed companies.  
 
There are various studies in the US which have tried to study corporate governance structure 
and other mechanisms. For example, Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) examined the relationship 
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between governance structure and bond ratings and yields. Their proposition is focused on 
using different governance mechanisms which could decrease the default risk by monitoring 
the performance of the managers and mitigating the agency cost through reducing 
information asymmetry between the firm and the lenders. The firms which employed 
governance mechanisms, represented by the incidence of outside directors and institutional 
investors, were found to have lower bond yields and higher ratings for new bond issues 
resulting from these better outside controls on the board and institutional ownership. 
 
Hermalin and Wiesbach (2003) proposed that there are a number of regularities which have 
been established due to some empirical work on boards: 1) board composition—as measured 
by insider-outsider ratio— does not show correlation with firm performance, 2) there is a 
negative relationship between the number of directors on the board of a firm and the financial 
performance of the firm, 3) board actions seem to be linked to the characteristics of the board, 
4) boards seem to develop over time subject to the negotiating position of the CEO relative to 
that of the existing directors, 5) changes in ownership structure, CEO turnover and firm 
performance seem to be influential factors that have an effect on boards changes. They 
propose two issues: endogenity and equilibrium or out-of-equilibrium phenomena- that could 
make empirical work on boards of directors as well as other empirical work on governance 
more complex.   
 
Numerous aspects of the Anglo-Saxon model of boards of UK and US firms have been 
examined by many scholars and researchers in respect to their effectiveness to improve 
governance and performance of a firm. These various aspects include: size of the board; 
CEO/chairman duality; the board and its sub-committee structure and composition; board 
share ownership; board meeting frequency; diversity/qualifications of directors; and 
cross/multiple directorships held. Generally, until very recently, one or a number of various 
aspects of the board have been selected and then been tested on their relationship or impact 
on firm performance and its value. 
3.6.1.1 Board Composition 
Board composition is another main board variable examined against firm performance. It is 
basically the proportion of executive and non-executive directors on the board; in other 
words, it might be termed a mixture of insider and outsider. In listed UK companies, board of 
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directors consist of a mixture of executive directors and non-executive directors (Solomon 
and Solomon, 2004). The executive directors include CEO and senior managers who are 
expected to contribute to the effectiveness of the board exploiting their skills, their expertise, 
and their specific knowledge in the industry where the company operates (Cadbury Report, 
1992). After the Code was introduced, there has been a significant rise in the appointment of 
non-executive directors in UK firms. Little is known about the effects of the composition and 
structure of corporate boards on the probability of corporate failure, despite the renewed 
enthusiasm in issues of corporate governance and corporate failure (Fich and Slezak, 2008; 
Platt and Platt, 2012). 
 
 The non-executive directors are usually individuals with certain knowledge of the industry, 
and they normally occupy a senior management position in other listed companies (Coyle, 
2004). The underlying assumption is that non-executives, in particular the independent 
members as stated by the Code, play a major role in improving the board decision making 
process in  respect to key areas such as, assessment and evaluation, selection, succession 
planning, management compensation and, when necessary, replacement of the chief 
executive officer.  
 
The independent directors protect the rights of shareholders by implementing the principles 
of corporate governance and could play a role as a mediator (Bhagat and Jefferris, 2002). The 
board meetings are typically chaired by the company chairman who might be an executive 
director or a non-executive director. CEO duality occurs when the same individual holds both 
positions in the same time, which is a contentious issue in the current corporate governance 
environment, because from a negative perspective CEO duality can lead to worsening 
performance. This is because the board of directors is unable to remove the underperforming 
CEO and can cause an agency cost if the CEO practises his own interest at the expense of the 
shareholders (White and Ingrassia, 1992). However, from a positive perspective, Alexander, 
Fennell and Halpern (1993) suggest that a single person holding both roles of CEO and 
Chairman can improve the value of the firm, as the agency cost is eliminated because cost of 
asymmetry is not present while both positions are held by one individual. However, the 
recent recommendations of the amended corporate governance reports (Hampel 1998 and 
Combined Code 2006) emphasize the need for two different individuals in those two 
positions (Conyon and Mallin, 1997). Several studies have examined the relationship 
between the proportion and the number of non-executive directors and the effectiveness of 
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the board in achieving the target as fulfilment of its various duties and improvement in firm 
performance. There is no evidence that the number or proportion of non-executives directors 
has any impact on the decision made by the board regarding dismissing managers after poor 
firm performance (Dedman, 2002). She also found that CEO dismissals occur only following 
a prolonged period of poor performance. 
 
A survey Conducted by Russell Reynolds Associates (2002) reveals the views of “FTSE 
Chairmen”, which are the chairmen of the largest public British companies quoted on the 
London Stock Exchange, including 68% of the FTSE 100. The results indicate that the main 
factors to provide a successful board are not based on the structure but on its capability. The 
success of the board is not initially achieved by board structure, ratio of executive directors 
and non-executive directors in the same board, independence, and diversity, as the capability 
of the board is the most important to its effectiveness as confirmed in the survey by the 
majority of the chairmen. The survey reveals another issue which is relevance of the board, as 
capability is not only about effectiveness and quality but also about relevance which, for 
example, should include in the board of international businesses foreign nationals and 
international experience. However, the British unitary board system has gained support from 
the majority of the chairmen. Additionally, a percentage of 61% from the participants believe 
that there is an important issue represented by the number of non-executive directors to 
executive directors. Some of them believe that if the representation of non-executive directors 
on the board is less than half, their impact would be subdued.  
 
Conyon (1994), surveys the changes in the governance structures of UK firms between 1988 
and 1993, and   with respect to the changes which occur in corporate boards, found that there 
has been a significant rise in the proportion of non-executive directors only in the smallest 
boards composed between 0 and 8 members or largest board consisting of more than 13 
members. The impact of board composition on firm performance has been examined in a 
small number of UK studies. US scholars examined the issue of the proportion of non-
executive directors on board and found that larger boards could become less functional 
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) or that the CEO may control it more easily (Jensen, 1993). 
 
These studies do not provide great support for the hypothesis that a large number of non-
executive directors are associated with stronger firm performance. Vafeas and Theodorou 
(1998) find, in their study of 250 UK firms in 1994, that the number of non-executive 
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directors has no significant impact on firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Weir and 
Laing (2000) study 200 UK companies in different times (1992 and 1995), and their findings 
suggest that there is a negative impact on profitability due to the greater number of non-
executive directors in charge, but no significant effect on share price performance. In another 
study based on 311 firms between 1994 and 1996, Weir et al. (2002) find that the number of 
non-executive directors has an insignificant impact on Tobin’s Q. Those results are mostly 
consistent with results from other studies outside the UK, for example, Yermack (1996) and 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). Griffith (1999) examines the impact of board structure on 
firms’ value using the percentage of inside to outside directors. His study utilises data 
provided by Standard and Poor’s 1996 ExecuComp for a sample of 969 firms. He found that 
there is strong evidence of a non-linear relationship between insiders’ directors on the board 
and Q as estimated by utilising methodology suggested in Lewellen and Badrinath, 1997. The 
firm’s value increases first and then decreases as the ratio of insiders increases. But the 
highest value of Q achieved was when 50% of the board includes insiders. But, in terms of 
firms’ certain decisions, Peasnell et al. (2005) argue that there is evidence on less earning 
manipulation where there are a higher number of non- executive directors. However, 
regarding the dismissal of CEOs or executive compensation, there is no evidence that a 
higher percentage of non-executives leads to such decisions (Cosh and Hughes, 1997).  
 
Comparing to the US, stronger evidence is found to support the view that the higher 
percentage of outside directors is linked with better particular decisions, for instance, CEO 
turnover, acquisitions and executive compensation (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1998) found that underperforming firms are more likely to replace the insider 
directors by outsiders, and they suggest two possible explanations for their findings. Firstly, 
the insiders are perceived to be responsible for poor performance and, therefore, the 
companies might fire the insiders and appoint outsiders to fill the vacancy. Secondly, it is 
matched with agency theory when poor performance could indicate poor management and the 
shareholders react in placing more outsiders to represent them on the board. Based on 
takeover performance, Cosh et al (2006) find that the number of outside directors has a 
slightly negative impact on long run returns and on announcement, but find insignificantly 
positive impact on their operating performance measures. Thus, in general there is no 
consistent or significant impact across the measures. In a study carried out by Clifford and 
Evans (1997) in investigating the level of the independency in the board, directors were 
classified as outsider, grey and insider to better reflect board composition. In their initial 
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study, they stated that 35% of non-executive directors were engaged in some transactions 
with their companies which potentially threatened their independency (grey area directors). 
This study was conducted on 100 firms in Australia and their findings indicate that big firms 
appoint bigger board size where a larger number of non-executive directors were represented 
on that board. But the Companies Related Party Disclosure illustrated that 35.2% of the non-
executive directors in their sample are either a professional advisor, a director/employee on 
an interrelated company, have a loan from the company, provide supply, or have a customer 
relationship with the company. 
 
Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) examine the relationship between different independent 
governance variables and firm performance in UK. The data used was based on an initial 
survey in 1997, questionnaires sent out to the chairmen of the companies, 134 chairmen 
responded. The performance data was gathered from the FAME and QUEST database. The 
governance variables used as independent are: size of the board, board tenure, and percentage 
of independent directors, board committee and pay. Firm performance measures as dependent 
variables are sales turnover and cash flow return on total sales. The main finding is that there 
is insignificant relationship between the governance variables and performance apart from the 
number of insider directors which has a significant impact. There might be some critical 
threshold for the suitable number of executive directors but some executives who are not 
overwhelmed with executive responsibility should accomplish their roles on the board and 
therefore improve the firm performance as suggested by the authors. In addition, they also 
examine the relationship between board practices and the performance of the firm and they 
found that the board of directors who implements duties such as monitoring the performance, 
supervising the management and good communication could increase the values and achieve 
higher firm performance. 
3.6.1.2 Board size  
Corporate governance codes have gradually developed recommendations on the issue 
concerning the number of board members based on its importance in running the firm and its 
impact on performance. However, the UK Code has not suggested any specific number for 
board size, but it recommends that boards should not be too large because they will be 
unmanageable. In the US, the average board size decreased between 1991 and 1995 (Wu, 
2000); also the number of insider directors has witnessed a reduction within the same period. 
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Several factors have contributed to that; mainly the rise of shareholder activism, mostly from 
institutional shareholders like CalPERS, who persuaded their investee firms to decrease the 
number of board members (Wu, 2000).  It has been suggested that an ideal size is between 
five and sixteen members, taking into consideration the diversification of the firm and its size 
(Brown and Caylor, 2004).  Guest (2008) points out that the specific institutional context of 
the UK is interesting because UK boards arguably play a much weaker monitoring role than 
the US firms. There is an argument posed by leading scholars that board size should be no 
more than 8 or 9 members (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; and Jensen, 1993). 
 
 Board size is another variable within the corporate governance structure which has been 
examined in previous studies. The link between board size and firm performance was 
examined in previous literature; board size could have an impact on the value of the firm as 
the role of the boards is to discipline the management of the firm and the CEO so that it could 
influence the value of the firm (Dallas, 2004; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Adams and Ferriera 
(2007) point out that the two most vital functions for the boards are those of monitoring and 
advising. Larger boards tend to provide an increased pool of expertise, greater management 
oversight, and access to wider range of contracts and resources (Williams et al., 2005; Psaros, 
2009). 
On the empirical side, different studies show that their findings are conflicting when 
examining the association between firm performance and board size (e.g., Yermack, 1996; 
Adams and Mehran, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008 and Guest, 2009). The number of 
directors on the boards has changed over time and it is different across the firms due to the 
monitoring role, managerial characteristics of the firm and relative to specific growth. Raheja 
(2005) argues that board size could represent and reflect a trade-off between the particular 
benefits of the firm achieved by the increased monitoring and the resulting cost of this 
monitoring. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) indicate that larger boards are correlated with better 
firm performance because larger boards are more likely to have a diversity of skills, 
experience, and nationality and gender.  
 
Dalton et al. (1999) states the idea that a larger board is advantageous:  the broader collective 
information the larger board has gathered, the better the performance. Also, Lehn et al (2004) 
pointed out that larger board size and the increasing number of non-executive directors has an 
advantage to use the more collective information for monitoring purposes. Pfeffer (1973) 
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suggests that a larger board could run the firm better by using a range of expertise to make 
recognized decisions for the firm. Board size has a positive impact on firm value for larger 
firms, and hence larger board size might be an optimal value maximizing result for these 
firms (Coles, et al. 2008). Goodstein et al. (1994) suggest that larger boards provide a better 
access to the external environment of the firm which mitigates its uncertainties and that 
enhances its chances to secure a number of resources such as finance, contracts and raw 
materials. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) argued that even though larger boards 
primarily enhance main board functions, there is a worry that lack of communication and 
coordination between its members could negatively impact its effectiveness and firm 
performance. Also, this suggested that larger boards face a bigger difficulty from higher 
agency problems and thus they are not very effective compared to smaller boards, thus 
restricting board size could lead to higher efficiency (Yawson, 2006). Cheng (2008) reports a 
positive relationship between board size and financial performance. He used data from 1,252 
firms covered in the Investor Responsibility Research Center's (IRRC) data set on corporate 
directors over the 1996–2004 periods. Cheng’s (2008) results suggest that larger boards have 
lower variability of financial performance. In times of crisis, such as those faced by distressed 
firms, larger boards will be effective since they are expected to avoid making risky decisions 
(Chanchart, Krishnamurti and Tian, 2012). Larger boards tend to provide an increased pool of 
expertise, greater management oversight, and access to wider range of contracts and 
resources (Williams et al., 2005; Psaros, 2009). 
 
However, Tomasic et al. (2003) argue that a smaller board of directors is likely to be more 
cohesive and consequently easier for the CEO to control all the members.  The CEO is unable 
to dominate a larger board because their strength is greater and they could resist the irrational 
decisions taken by the CEO as reported by Zahra and Pearce (1989). Contrary to this, it is 
argued that it is easy for the CEO to be able to control larger boards as the latter might 
function ineffectively (Jensen, 1993). Larger boards decrease cohesiveness and are more 
diverse, but this diversity encourages debate and results in a wide range of decisions among 
the members of the board (Dalton et al, 1999). Compared to smaller boards, the larger boards 
acquire numerous opinions, more specific skills and obtain more information about the firm 
and about the industry’s environment. It is argued by Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2004) that 
particular companies might benefit from a bigger board, the results in their study indicating 
that there is a positive relationship between board size and firm performance mainly 
measured by Tobin’s Q. A study in the U.S banking industry, Adams and Mehran (2005) 
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found a significant positive relationship between firm performance and board size. Contrasted 
with this, larger boards could negatively affect the value of the firm due to the existence of an 
agency cost amongst the members of larger boards while smaller boards are more effective 
for the firm’s financial performance (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Sonnenfeld 2002).  Another 
study supports this finding by suggesting a negative relationship between a large board size 
and firm value. On the other hand, Yermack (1996) stresses that the small board is effective 
in its decisions because there are fewer agency costs among their members. Yermack (1996) 
studied 452 large US corporations between 1984 and 1991 and he measured firm value by 
Tobin’s Q. He found the relationship between smaller boards and firm value significant and 
positive. After controlling a variety of other factors, such as, industry, firm size, growth 
opportunities and insider stock ownership, he found the relationship still positive and 
significant. Also, Eisenberg et al. (1998) studied a sample of Finnish firms and found similar 
results.  
 
In addition, Cascio (2004) studied the relationship between the size of boards and a number 
of organizational outcomes, in particular, the relationship between board size and firm 
performance. Mixed results were obtained as both smaller and larger boards were found to be 
effective and beneficial on the performance. Eisenberg et al (1998) examined the relationship 
between board size and profitability in a study based on small and average sized Finnish 
firms and they found that there is an inverse relationship. Dahya et al. (2002) studied the 
relationship between performance-related-top-management turnover and board size. The 
sample selected was 460 UK listed firms over the period of 1988 to 1996. The findings 
reflected that a negative relationship exists between these two variables. Guest (2009) 
selected for his study 2,746 UK listed firms from 1981 to 2002 to examine the relationship 
between board size and firm performance. He chose three different performance measures 
(profitability, share returns and Tobin’s Q) and he found that there was strong evidence of a 
negative impact of board size and these three performance measures. O’Connell and Cramer 
(2010) investigated the association between firm performance and both board size and board 
composition for companies quoted on the Irish Stock Market. The study also examined the 
impact of firm size on the relationship between firm performance and board characteristics. 
The study found evidence that board size exhibits a significant negative association with firm 
performance, the relationship between board size and firm performance is significantly less 
negative for smaller firms, and a positive and significant association between firm 
performance and the percentage of non-executives on the board is apparent.  
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A study by Conyon and Peck (1998) investigated the impact of board size on the performance 
of the firm between 1992 and 1995 in several countries in Europe (United Kingdom, Italy, 
Netherlands, France, and Denmark). Their findings indicate that the relationship is an inverse 
one. Moreover, they investigate the effect on firm performance when there is a change in the 
board structure. For example, the UK sample showed that a decrease of performance by 
1.36% was associated with an increase in the size of the board from 10 to 11 members. 
Vafeas (1999a) reports that firms with small boards vary between five to seven members are 
better informed about earnings. Brown and Caylor (2004) suggest that the most ideal board 
size for an improved firm performance is between six and fifteen members. Most of the 
studies on the impact of board size on firm value have found an inverse relationship (e.g., 
Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996).  
 
Loderer and Peyer (2002) find a significantly negative impact on Tobin’s Q (although not on 
profitability) for firms in Switzerland, whilst Beiner et al. (2006) find no negative impact 
using a comprehensive set of listed Swiss companies. Both Mak and Kusnadi (2005) and 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) find a significantly negative impact of board size on Tobin’s Q 
for Malaysian firms. Bozec (2005) finds that board size has a significantly negative effect on 
sales margin but not on profitability for 25 large Canadian firms. Conyon and Peck (1998) 
examine 481 listed UK firms for 1992-1995 and find a significantly negative effect of board 
size on both market to book value and profitability, whilst Lasfer (2004) finds a significantly 
negative impact on Tobin’s Q for UK firms as well. Darrat, Gray and Wu’s (2010) study 
shows that larger boards and greater proportion of inside directors, respectively, reduce 
complex and technically sophisticated firms’ failure. Fich and Slezak’s (2008) study also 
underlines that larger and less independent boards with a lower proportion of outside 
directors and larger ownership stakes of non-management shareholders are more likely to 
fail. 
In contrast, Dalton et al (1998) suggest, generally, a larger board is positively linked with 
firm performance. But they only found a small, positive association between board size and 
firm financial performance. For small firms, the relationship between board size and firm 
financial performance was stronger because it was moderated by the size of the firm. This 
suggests that board size and other board characteristics could interact together and influence 
the performance of the firm. Similar results found in the following studies in the United 
States such as Huther (1997), Coles et al. (2008), Vefeas (1999a and 1999b), Cheng et al. 
(2008) and other studies other in the United States evidence such as Eisenberg et al. (1998), 
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Bozec (2005), Guest (2009) found similar results. But there are some studies in the United 
States which have found that board size has a positive effect on firm performance such as 
Adams and Mehran (2005) and Dalton et al. (1999). 
 
Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja (2007) and Linck, Netter and Yang (2006) also 
demonstrate that the skills of directors along with the skills required by the company should 
be considered in selecting directors. They believe that there is an optimal board size for each 
company according to its nature and situation. However, this interpretation is by no means 
universally held. Determinants of board size have been examined by several studies such as 
Lehn et al. (2004), Boone et al. (2007) Coles et al. (2008), Guest (2008); and Linck et al., 
2008). The findings of these studies mentioned above indicate that there is a relationship 
between the size of the board and the size of the firm. Some proxies such as financial 
leverage, firm age and industrial diversification were employed as a measure of complexity 
and showed to have a positive effect on board size (Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; 
Guest, 2008; and Linck et al. 2008). There is big evidence supported by these previous 
studies that some particular variables of the firm influence the size of the board which show 
consistency with value increasing motives. Therefore, based on these findings it is suggested 
that board size could influence the performance of the firm differently based on the type of 
that firm. There is evidence that firms which are large, diversified and relying more on debt 
financing will originate more value of these firms due to the presence of larger board of 
directors (Coles et al., 2008). 
 
Nevertheless, there is no universal consent with this interpretation. As discussed earlier, a 
number of studies showed that some particular firm variables, Tobin’s Q, profitability and 
firm size have an impact on board size (e.g Lehn et al., 2004; Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 
2008; Guest, 2008; and Linck et al., 2008). Wintoki and Yang (2007) criticised past studies 
for not showing sufficient control for endogeneity problems since board size is negatively 
influenced by firm performance.  Wintoki and Yang (2007) addresses this issue and uses a 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator that allows board size to adjust to past 
performance, and finds no relationship between board size and firm performance.  
 
Although several studies have argued that firms benefit from having larger boards for 
monitoring, strategy, and resources but yet to be agreed whether firm performance would be 
better improved by larger or smaller boards or what exactly is the optimal number of board 
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members, large boards are more diverse and less cohesive. Thus, with few exceptions, the 
negative relationship between firm performance and board size is well established across 
countries. Table 2.3 summarises the main empirical findings discussed here related to board 
characteristics and firm performance. 
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Table 3.3 Previous Empirical Studies of the Relationship between Board Characteristics and Firm Performance 
Author (s) Place and period Board 
Variables 
Performance 
measures 
Methods used Main Findings 
Weir et al. (2002) UK- 1994-1996 Outside directors 
and role duality 
Tobin’s Q OLS No relationship 
Abdullah (2007) UK- UK listed firms 
1999-2001; 2002- 
2004- 
Outside directors 
and board size 
Q, ROA, and 
sales to total 
assets 
2SLS Negative relationship 
Faccio and Lasfer 
(1999) 
UK- 1650 firms 
1996-1997 
Role duality and 
outside directors 
ROE, ROA, 
Tobin’s Q, and 
P/E 
Multivariate No relationship 
Dahya et al. (2002) UK- 460 firms 1988-
1996 
Role duality and 
outside directors 
3-year average 
industry-
adjusted 
ROA 
Multivariate  
Analysis 
Positive relationship with 
Cadbury recommendations 
Mura (2006) UK- 1100 
nonfinancial firms 
1991-2001 
Outside directors Tobin’s Q GMM Positive relationship 
Dahya and 
McConnell(2005b) 
UK- 700 listed firms 
in 1988 
Outside directors IAROA; stock 
return 
Multivariate Firms with outside CEOs 
have higher return. 
Lin et al. (2003) UK- 714 
appointments in UK 
firm from 1993 to 
1996 
Outside directors CAR Regression Analysis No relationship 
Dahya and 
McConnell(2005a) 
UK- 1124 listed 
firms 1989-1996 
Event study 
Outside directors 
and role duality 
ROA and stock 
prices 
Multivariate Outside directors—positive 
relationship; splitting the 
roles—no relationship 
Vafeas and 
Theodorou (1998) 
UK- 250 listed firms 
1994 
Outside directors MB OLS No relationship 
Dulewicz and 
Herbert (2004) 
UK- 86 listed firms 
1997-2000 
Outside directors Cash flow 
return/total 
SPSS No relationship 
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assets 
Lee and Filbeck 
(2006) 
US- 2000-Compustat 
data-1013 firms (less 
than $18 million) 
Board size ROA OLS Negative relationship 
Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1990) 
US- 1978-1985 Board size Sale growth Multiple Analytical Positive relationship 
Sundaramurthy 
et al. (1997) 
US- 261 firms 
adopted 486 
antitakeover 1984-
1988 
Outside directors 
and role duality 
Market reaction 
to cumulative 
average 
abnormal return 
(CARs) from 
adoption 
antitakeover 
provisions 
Regression analyses 
(OLS) 
Outside directors and role 
duality—increase the 
negative impact of adoption 
Rechner and 
Dalton (1991) 
US- 1978-1983 
230 Fortune 500 
firms- 
Role duality ROI, ROE, and 
profit margin 
OLS Negative relationship 
Villalonga and 
Amit (2006) 
US- 1994-2000 
Fortune 500 
Family directors Tobin’s Q Multivariate OLS 
regression 
Positive relationship 
Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) 
US- 1992 S&P 500 Outside directors 
(in family firm) 
Tobin’s Q OLS Positive relationship 
Bhagat and Black 
(2002) 
US- 1988-1991 Outside directors 
and board size 
Tobin’s Q, 
ROA, ROS, and 
market return 
OLS, 2SLS Negative relationship with 
board size and no 
relationship 
with outside directors 
Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008) 
US- 1990-2002 
1990-2003 
1990-2004 
Outside directors 
and role duality 
Risk-adjusted 
Shareholder 
Return and 
operating Rate 
of Return 
Simultaneous 
Equations 
Contemporaneous and 
subsequent operating 
performance negatively 
correlated with board 
independence and positively 
correlated with role duality. 
Coles et al. (2008) US- 1992-2001 Outside directors Tobin’s Q OLS, 3SLS External directors—
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and board size negative for high R&D 
firms; Board size—positive 
for large 
diversified firms 
Klein (1998) US- S&P 500 firms 
1992-1993 
Outside directors ROA, market 
returns, and 
Jensen‘s 
productivity 
measures 
OLS Negative 
Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) 
US- Forbes 800 
firms  1988 
Outside directors Tobin’s Q 2SLS Negative 
Daily and Dalton 
(1992) 
US- 100 US listed 
firms 
Role duality ROA-ROE-PER Regression No relationship 
Rosenstein and 
Wyatt (1990) 
US- 1251 external 
directors 1981 to 
1985 
Outside directors Share prices OLS Positive relationship 
Mehran (1995) US- 153 firms 1979-
1980- 
Outside directors Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
OLS No relationship 
Yermack (1996) US- 452 firms 1981-
1991 
Outside directors 
and board size 
Tobin’s Q and 
ROA 
OLS, FE No relationship for board 
independence and negative 
relationship with Q and 
board size 
Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) 
US- 134 firms 
1971-1983 
Outside directors Tobin’s Q 
ROA 
OLS, 2SLS No relationship 
Schellenger et al. 
(1989) 
US Outside directors ROA, ROE, 
RET, 
and RET/STD 
OLS- 526 firms 
1986- 
Positive relationship 
Zahra and 
Stanton (1988) 
US- 100 firms 
1980 to 1983- 
Outside directors ROA and ROE OLS No relationship 
Baysinger and 
Butler (1985) 
US- 266 firms 
1970 and 1980 
Outside directors ROE OLS Positive relationship 
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3.6.1.3  Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
The CEOs are very important in every organization as they play a primary role in creating 
value for the shareholders (Brian, 1997). Defond and Hung (2004) stress that the CEO is able 
to incorporate and follow governance provisions in a firm to improve its value. Moreover, the 
investors are more interested to invest in the firms where the corporate governance provisions 
are higher and well implemented, because these firms are more likely to create value for 
those shareholders (Morin and Jarrel, 2001).  It is argued that the CEO’s position and their 
proper remunerations have an effect on the value of the firm because the decisions of the 
board about firing and hiring a CEO could affect the performance of the firm (Holmstrom 
and Milgrom, 1994). The underperforming CEO usually loses his job because he does not 
generate value for the shareholders and the board generally terminates his contract (Brickley, 
2003). The shareholders who fire their CEOs presumably assume that their underperforming 
companies are a result of the performance of the CEO and they believe the successor will do 
better (Audas, et al, 1999). 
Other issues relating to the role of CEO include the salary and the tenure.  According to 
Monks and Minow (2004), the board is responsible for determining the salary and the proper 
remuneration for the efforts of the CEO. Therefore, the board usually align the interest 
between CEO and firm by linking the earnings of a CEO with the way the firm is performing. 
It is suggested by Yermack (1996), that the CEO is motivated by such an action and will 
perform better as his financial interest is associated with the performance of the firm. In 
addition, the tenure of the CEO is a vital determinant of the performance of the firm. The 
hiring contracts of the CEOs are usually based on short-terms and that bring concern for the 
CEOs about the performance of the firm during their tenure. Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) 
argued that the stock price in such period could not be reasonably considered as a proxy for 
corporate performance as the CEOs set their objectives for short and medium terms. 
However, Heinrich (2002) states that the management team could provide some incentives 
based on long term performance which drives the CEO to plan for a longer strategy.  
The relationship between the turnover of CEO and firm performance is negative because the 
shareholders stop investing in these firms as the confidence is lost (Dedman and Lin, 2002). 
Huson et al, (2004) declare that shareholder returns and operational performance in both UK 
and US companies have shown an improvement in the following 36 months from CEO 
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replacement. Hillier et al (2006) found that a negative reaction occurred on the day of 
announcement. 
3.6.1.4 CEO Duality 
The separation of the roles of Chief Executive and Chairman has been a key element within 
the development of UK corporate governance reforms process and from the Cadbury Report 
onwards. Given the importance and the particular role of the chairman at the head of the firm, 
it is better to be separated from the Chief Executive’s role (Cadbury Report, 1992) otherwise 
if these are combined in one person then it represents a significant concentration of power. 
The Cadbury Report recommended the acceptance of division between both roles to ensure 
there is a balance of power and authority in the board. Therefore, currently a combined role 
of Chairman and Chief Executive is a controversial arrangement for UK listed companies. 
The CEO Duality has recently become a common problem in the board deliberations. Jensen 
(1993) states that for the board to be effective Chief Executive officer role should be 
separated from the chairman’s; in other words both positions should not be held by one 
individual. Also, he believes that CEO Duality causes information problems as he provides 
the information for the board and determines the agenda. Agency theory has supported the 
preference for a separation of the Chairman and Chief executive as there is a potential 
concern for the CEO to dominate the board and that reduces the effectiveness of board 
monitoring (Finkelstein and D'aveni, 1994). CEO Duality plays a crucial role in affecting the 
firm’s value, on a positive side the agency cost is eliminated between the Chairman and Chief 
Executive when one person holds both roles (Alexander et al, 1993). The impact of chairman 
independency on firm’s performance and value has been examined. For instance, Bhagat and 
Black (2002), Sanda et al, (2003) and Ogbechie et al. (2009) all argued that firms are more 
valuable when the CEO and board chair positions are separate. But, Dahya, Garcia and 
Bommel (2009b) investigate the impact of splitting the roles of CEO and chairman on 
corporate performance in 1124 UK firms over the period 1986 to 1997.They find that 
companies separating the combined positions of CEO and chairman did not experience 
absolute development in corporate performance. Dahya, Garcia & Bommel (2009b) find no 
differences in corporate performance between companies that combined the roles of CEO and 
chairman, and other companies that separate the roles. 
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However, on a negative side, CEO Duality affects the performance of the firm adversely as 
the board is unable to replace the underperforming CEO. Also, the CEO could pursue his 
own interest at the expense of the shareholders and that could create agency costs where the 
shareholders pay more monitoring and residual costs (White and Ingrassia, 1992). Holding 
both positions is contrary to the principles of corporate governance and it affects the value of 
the firm in a negative way because of lack of discipline of the CEO by the board as confirmed 
by Goyal and Park (2002).  
 
Coles and Hesterly (2000) argue that both separation and duality of Chairman and CEO have 
no different effect on firm financial performance and such relationships depend on the 
board’s composition. In addition, a further study suggests that no affect has been recognized 
whether dependant on separation or duality of the roles of CEO and Chairman on financial 
performance (Conyon and Murphy, 2000). Brickley et al (1997) examine some issues relating 
to CEO duality in large US firms. Their findings suggest that accounting performance is not 
related to whether the two roles are separated in the companies or not.  Another study by 
Boyd (1995) utilising data from US firms found no evidence to suggest that CEO duality has 
an adverse impact on shareholder wealth. Cosh and Hughes (1997), in a study based on a 
sample of the largest UK companies; show that the percentage fell from 94% in 1981 to 50% 
in 1996 for firms that combine the two roles.  
Cadbury Committee compliance survey findings have been reported by Dedman (2002), 
where 684 firms’ reports have been examined for the period from June 1993 and December 
1998. In the largest 500 firms, the reports generated by this survey showed that there are 
more than 80% of the firms with the separation of chief executive and chairmen roles, and 
more than 70% of smaller companies ( by market capitalisation) have split the two positions.   
A study of Times top 1000 companies in 1998 found that 58% of respondents have divided 
the role of chief executive officer and the chairman, but it is reported that there had been an 
increase to77% by The UK Code of Corporate Governance (Conyon, 1994). Dedman (2002) 
examined the 300 non-financial constituents of the FTSE All Share Index between 1989 and 
1995. She found out that there is an increase from 68% to 86% between 1989 to 1994 with 
regards to the separation of the two positions of CEO and chairman within the selected 
companies. The relationship between executive remuneration and performance is examined 
by Conyon and Peck (1998). They tested UK companies and their findings indicate that there 
is no evidence that firms with CEO duality are paying excessive remuneration.  
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Generally, there is a significant increase within the companies that comply with the corporate 
governance codes with regards to duality, as the majority of public listed companies split the 
roles of CEO and the chairman. The rest of the companies which yet to comply seem to have 
managers embrace entrenchment signs (CEO age, Ownership and tenure), as found by 
Dedman (2002) and Weir, Laing and Wright (2005). 
3.6.2  Board independence 
The UK scandals of the 1980s, for example Polly Peck and Maxwell Communications have 
led to several reforms throughout the 1990s. Higgs (2003) report was designed to strengthen 
the role of non-executive directors, particularly independent non-executive directors. In the 
UK, the Combined Code (2003) classified the directors as “independent” or “not 
independent”. Also, it expects that the number of executive directors and non- executive 
directors should be balanced by the board as the domination of the board’s decision taking 
could become limited for individual or small groups of individuals. In the US literature, 
directors are categorised into three categories: outsiders and grey (Lehn et al., 2004).There 
are many benefits from using independent directors in the corporate decision making; the 
primary rationale is that outsiders provide an effective mechanism to monitor the 
managements’ actions, to balance the different perspectives, to prevent abuses of power, and 
to broaden the experience base of the governing body of the company.  
Several empirical works have examined the relationship between the board composition and 
the performance of the firm. The results found in the previous studies have yet to indicate 
statistically any significant positive relationship between better financial performance and the 
degree of board independence. A study carried out by Bhagat and Black (2002) in the US on 
the relationship between board independence and firm performance, where independence in 
this study is measured as the fraction of independent directors minus the fraction of insiders, 
and different firm’s performance measures such as Tobin’s Q, Sales to Assets Ratio, Return 
on Asset and Market Adjusted Stock Price Returns. The results indicate an inverse correlation 
between firm performance in the recent past and board independence. The control variables 
utilised in the study are ownership characteristics, firm size, industry and board size. 
Even though Bhagat and Black (2002) found in their study that underperforming firms were 
expected to increase the degree of board independence, they did not suggest that there is any 
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evidence to support such strategy. However, Bhagat and Black (2002) argue that no evidence 
has been found about greater board independence increasing the performance of a firm. The 
direction of causality of relationships is probably viewed as a certain issue of research. The 
weak results found by Bhagat and Black and other similar studies in previous research do not 
support the predictable intuition that favours a high degree of independence in the board. 
Because they found that firms with greater independent board are not necessarily performing 
better (Brown and Caylor, 2004). 
However a stream of research shows a positive association between the proportions of 
outside directors and firm financial performance (e.g. Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash, 2011). 
Baysinger and Butler (1985) examined 226 large US companies over the period of 1970 -
1980. They studied the differences in financial performance as a function of board 
composition of those firms. Their findings indicate that the percentage of independent outside 
directors on the board has a positive lagged impact on the average return on equity of the 
company relative to the average return of the industry. This result shows that firms with more 
independent outside directors on their boards in the beginning of the period enjoyed better 
financial performance in the late 1970s than other firms which have lower outside directors. 
However, in the same study the authors found no evidence that firms underperforming in the 
start of the period reacted by appointing outsider directors in the end of the period.  
 
Other studies have proposed that firms might perform worse with a higher proportion of 
independent directors. For instance, Yermack (1996) details that a negative correlation 
between the percentage of independent directors on the board and Tobin’s Q of the same 
period but using different performance measures such as operating income/sales, operating 
income/assets and sales/assets, he found no significant correlation. It is considered that the 
proportion of independents on board is an internal assessment that is anticipated to affect the 
value of the firm positively (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). But the findings showed the 
opposite of their suggestion and they could not provide an explanation for the obtained result. 
But they suggest that an explanation provided by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) could be 
considered as reasonable. Hermalin and Weisbach explained that outside directors are 
appointed on the board of underperforming firms rather than the opposite. Weisbach (1988) 
examined the impact of board composition on the relationship between underperforming 
firms and CEO turnover. He found that firms with the outsiders dominating the boards were 
significantly more likely to replace the CEO on the basis of the performance of the firm, 
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measured by stock return and changes in earnings before interest and taxes, than firms with 
insiders dominating the boards. Thus, independent boards of directors are likely to be 
attached to the corporate performance when it comes to CEO compensation and turnover 
(Dahya et al. 2002).  Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) suggest that the stock market reacts 
positively and produces abnormal returns for the appointment of independent directors. 
However, there is no evidence that independent directors improve the value of the firm or 
increase its profitability, indeed the correlation might be even negative (Kaplan and Minton, 
1994). In a similar way to Hermalin and Weisbach they suggest that a likely reason is that 
poorly performing firms tend to add more outside directors.   
Bhagat and Black (2002) examined the relationship between board independence and firm 
performance (measured as Tobin’s Q, turnover ratio, return on asset, sales per employee and 
operating margin). Their study was based on US firms and they found a negative relationship. 
Consequently, there is no significant correlation between board composition and different 
performance measures. Klein (1998) examined the relationship between firm performance 
and the structure of board committee for the US firms. Her findings showed that the 
relationship between the percentage of executive directors and firm performance is not 
significant. But she found that the percentage of insiders on finance and investment 
committees is linked positively with measures based on accounting and stock performance. 
Thus, the executive directors are better involved and informed about the operations run in the 
firm. Her findings also indicate that there is a weak but positive relationship between the 
presence of outside directors and firm performance. In addition, Vafeas and Theodorou 
(1998) examined empirically the relationship between the characteristics of the board and 
firm performance in 250 UK firms. They found out that no association is clearly shown 
between firm performance measured as market to book ratio and board characteristics, for 
instance, board composition, board committee, leadership structure and managerial 
ownership. However, Pearce and Zahra (1992) found in 1986 that a higher percentage of 
outsiders on the US boards resulted in better financial performance (accounting measures). 
Also, Schellenger et al. (1989) found a positive relationship between the percentage of 
outsiders on the board and the firm’s performance as measured by risk-adjusted market 
return. 
There are different explanations for understanding why an increase in independency on the 
board has not promised an improvement in performance. The existence of the inside directors 
on the board could add to the value of the firm and are considered a major reason in 
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improving its performance. An optimal board is comprised of insiders, independent and 
affiliated directors who enhance the board with different skills and experience (Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985). Weisbach (1988) revealed that the presence of inside directors on the board 
may attract other directors to assess their performance as potential CEOs for the future. 
Previous research had examined the independency with other issues such as dividend policy, 
capital expenditure and CEO appointment.  
In the UK, Dahya and McConnel (2005b) examined the relationship between the outsiders’ 
representation on the board and the appointment of the CEO. Firstly, they analysed the 
appointment of 523 CEOs between 1989 and 1999.  The findings show significant positive 
correlation between the possibility of appointing an outside CEO and the percentage of 
outside directors on the board. Also, higher abnormal stock returns are generated by the 
appointment of an outside CEO compared to the appointment of an inside CEO. However, 
Hamill, McGregor and Rasaratnam (2006) argue that a temporal pattern could emerge with 
respect to the market's assessment of the incremental benefit of having additional outside 
directors.  They carried out an empirical study on the UK FTSE 350 companies for the period 
1990 to 2000, their findings suggesting that a temporal impact apparently exists with respect 
to the perception of the market of the value of the outsiders’ director appointment.  
 
Another study by Vafeas (2003) examined the relationship between NED’s independence and 
length of board tenure. Their findings suggest that non- executive directors, who serve for a 
long period, with more than twenty years, tend to be not independent because they have a 
higher equity investment. Additionally, they have become members on the board committees 
whether nomination or compensation committees. These findings show the importance and 
the need to set a term limit for the directors. Cotter and Silvester (2003) studied 109 public 
Australian companies and found that there is a link between full board independence, 
substantial shareholders and management ownership. They found that the independence level 
is high whenever there is an absence of large shareholders and there is a poor management. 
However, they found no strong link between firm value and board independence and that 
could be a result of the short period in which the study was held, covering one reporting year. 
A different study on US firms based on size and structure of director compensation and board 
independence was carried out by Ryan and Wiggins (2004).The final sample comprises 1,018 
firms. Financial and accounting data come from the Standard & Poor’s Research Insight 
database and the board compensation data for 1995 and 1997 from the Standard & Poor’s 
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ExecuComp database, which provides information on firms in the S&P 500, the Midcap 400, 
and the Smallcap 600. The findings of Ryan and Wiggins (2004) indicate that powerful 
executives and weak boards lead to ineffective policies for director compensation.  
Beekes, Pope, and Young (2004) examined the link between accounting quality and board 
independence for UK non- financial firms. This study indicates that board composition is not 
an essential element for financial reporting quality. For measuring the board composition, a 
binary variable is utilised in this study which is a categorical variable as it takes a value of 
one if the fraction of outsiders for firm i is above the value of the median of the sample and 
zero otherwise. In contrast, for the accounting quality measures earnings timeliness and 
conservatism are utilised. The findings reveal that with respect to bad news in firms with 
higher percentage of outside directors there is a superior timeliness in earnings. Mura (2007) 
studied 1100 UK non-financial firms and reported an efficient monitoring by the non- 
executive directors. He confirms that the boards have been more effective on behalf of other 
shareholders since the Cadbury and other codes have been issued in UK. 
Cotter et al (1997) examined the effects of director incentive and board composition on the 
tender offer process. The hypothesis was that outside directors could have a bigger incentive 
to maximize the shareholder value if they have reputation capital at stake. It is measured by 
the fraction of the board that hold one additional outside directorship at least. They analysed 
140 tender offers that occurred over the period 1988-1991 and the findings indicate that the 
percentage of directors holding added directorship was linked positively to the initial tender 
offer, the abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of the first tender offer and the 
total shareholder increases. The conclusion was that outside directors with reputation capital 
at stake are more likely to seek to maximize the shareholder value. Byrd and Hickman (1992) 
examined a sample of tender offer bids by 111 companies between 1980 and 1987. They 
examined the relationship between the presence of independent outside directors and the 
return to shareholders of bidding firms. They hypothesized that shareholder interests are 
better protected by independent boards. They found that return to bidder companies with 
independent boards was significantly less negative compared to non-independent boards.  
Examining the behaviour of outside directors within the perspective of takeover activity is 
considered effective and capable of providing valuable insight into the effectiveness of 
outside director monitoring. Brickley et al (1994) studied the effect of outside directors 
regarding the adoption of “poison pill” takeover defences. Since the board is capable of 
77 
 
adopting the poison pills without the approval of the shareholders, then the presence of 
outside directors on the board would be tested in order to pursue the maximization of 
shareholder value. They examined a number of US firms which adopted poison pills between 
1984 and 1986. The hypothesis was that if outside directors represent the interest of 
shareholders then the proportion of outside directors on the board should decrease the 
opportunity to use the poison pills which damage the shareholder wealth. They found that the 
stock return in the two-day around the announcement of adopting the poison pills was 
positive as the outside directors represent the majority of the board. The opposite is found 
when the outsider directors were less than half of the board. 
Desai, Kroll and Wright (2005) studied the effect of outside board monitoring on acquisition 
outcomes. A number of firms were selected regarding their announcement of completing a 
major acquisition process from 1985 to 1995. They divided the sample into different 
categories, owner-controlled firms and manager-controlled or owner-manager-controlled 
firms. They found that the outcome of the acquisition for firms in the manager-controlled 
sample was affected by the percentage of the outside directors on the board and the stock 
ownership of the outsiders. However, the opposite results were observed for the acquisition 
outcome for the owner-controlled firms. 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (2007) discuss independence as 
criteria for the directors in the UK and the US. It is argued that the criteria established in the 
Combined Code in the UK and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US was based initially on 
independence in appearance. Also, the discussion underlines issues of ‘independence’ which 
could affect the firm’s operations. It is believed that the effectiveness of the board is better 
obtained with independent leadership, improving the dynamics of the boardroom and 
objective decision-making process. However, it is also argued that the board influence could 
have a bad effect with too great an emphasis on board independence. In summary, the US 
boards are likely to play a stronger monitoring role than the UK boards due to the dual board 
structure while in the UK the chief executive officer does not serve as chairman of the board. 
Guest (2008) discussed that this perspective is supported by the UK evidence on the impact 
of outside directors on either firm performance in general (Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998) or 
on other monitoring tasks (Franks et al, 2001). However, the US evidence shows that there is 
a positive impact achieved from the outsider proportion on specific tasks (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). Meanwhile, the presence of NEDs makes the board more independent in its 
decisions, and brings more skills, expertise, experience and business network contacts 
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(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009). A high percentage of NEDs on 
the board is associated with easy access to all information required to make accurate and high 
quality decisions, which can positively affect corporate performance (Nicholson and Kiel, 
2007). 
3.6.3 Audit Committee  
Since the launch of the Cadbury report of 1992 which was followed by some several reports 
of corporate governance, a considerable increase has been noticeable in the UK within the 
companies for adopting voluntary Audit Committees. Although in the UK the corporate 
governance guidelines have not been compulsory as in the US, audit committees in both 
countries are considered to have the potential to play a vital role in the emergence of 
corporate governance provisions.  
The Cadbury Committee (1992) and Collier (1992) define the audit committee as the 
existence of a sub-committee of the board consisting of a large number of non-executive or 
independent directors with duties of monitoring auditing activities. Following the 
development in worldwide corporate environments, particularly, due to the several corporate 
collapses between 2001 and 2008, there has been an increased emphasis suggesting only 
independent non-executive directors should be members of the audit committee. In the 
Combined Code 2003, Section C.3.1, page 16 states that: “The board should establish an 
Audit Committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies, two members who 
should all be independent non-executive directors. The board should satisfy itself that at least 
one member of the Audit Committee has recent and relevant financial experience.” 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) announce that there are some corporate governance mechanisms 
proposed by the agency model to reduce the agency costs linked with the separation of 
ownership and control. Tafara and Peterson (2007) argued that the shareholder dispersion 
model followed in the UK was similar to the US; the corporations necessarily establish 
different corporate control forms in which the audit committee is one. However, Collier 
(1992) argued that the rise in the adoption of Audit Committees in the UK is firmly 
associated with the increase in the emphasized importance of the existence of non-executive 
directors on the board. 
 Based on the agency model, the Cadbury Report (1992) and later revisions have argued that 
audit committees have been an added control mechanism that secures and promotes the 
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interests of shareholders. It has led to achieve this interest by increasing accountability and 
fulfilling and enhancing the effective financial management of the firm (Cadbury, 1992). In 
addition, an audit committee is considered another internal governance mechanism in which 
the impact is to improve the quality of financial management of the firm and consequently its 
performance (Weir et al, 2002). From an agency perspective, an effective audit committee 
fulfils its oversight role when it is independent of management, has a level of financial and 
industrial experience to carry out its duties, and actively monitors internal controls and 
financial reporting (Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein and Neal, 2006). Rainsbury et al. (2008) 
point out that the presence of the Audit Committee is likely to reduce agency problems 
related to moral hazard and adverse selection, whether through oversight functions and 
monitoring in both reporting and auditing. Because the expectations were so high regarding 
the importance attached to the audit committees in improving the corporate governance 
(Rezaee, 2009),  caution has been introduced in order to reduce such expectations (Turley and 
Zaman, 2007; Spira, 2002). Also, other events represented in the collapse of Enron and the 
downturn of the global economy adjusted these expectations because their (Audit Committee) 
effectiveness and activities depended on several factors, and not all are considered within 
their influence (Kalbers and Forgarty, 1993). However, Zhang et al (2007) state that the 
Audit Committee is still valued as one of the crucial governance mechanisms that are 
recommended for improved corporate accountability, transparency and reporting quality in 
firms. Therefore, restoring market confidence and stopping any panic divestment, it was 
crucial that guidelines and structures were provided that could diminish the possibility of 
corporate failures due to lenient governance regime and  weak corporate control   
The impact of the audit committee on performance has been relatively slightly reported (Weir 
et al, 2002). The board subcommittee structure and quality increases the quality for the 
managers responsible for monitoring duties in the firms as found by Vafeas (1999). A study 
conducted by Wild (1994) on the quality of managerial accountability to shareholders before 
and after the formation of an audit committee in the US. He concluded that the market 
reacted favourably to earnings reports after the establishment of an audit committee. In 
contrast, Klein (1998) examined whether audit committee and board characteristics are 
related to earnings management by the firm in the US. They found that the presence of an 
audit committee or its structure causes no effect on a range of accounting and market 
performance measures; in addition, there is lack of evidence to support an analysis or 
observation about the structure of board subcommittees significantly affecting performance 
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(Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) studied the association 
between audit committees and firm performance, using the market to book ratio of total 
assets as a measure of firm performance, and found that there is no link between firm 
performance and the composition of audit committee. Moreover, they found that the 
percentage of non-executive directors on the board has no association with firm performance. 
 
Bedard and Gendron (2010) reviewed 103 audit committee studies. They identified each 
paper objectives, theoretical perspectives, data gathering methods and country studied. They 
solely focused on 85 studies evaluating AC effectiveness through quantitative measurement 
for 85 studies. They examined 113 distinct analyses ensuing from 85 articles indicates that 
the proportion of studies finding a positive association with effectiveness varies greatly along 
the characteristics. In decreasing order of proportion, the results are: presence of an audit 
committee (69%), independence (57%), competence (51%), number of meetings (30%), and 
size (22%). 
Even though code of corporate governance in UK requires all public listed companies to 
appoint an audit committee, there are some uncertainties by analysts and critics questioning 
how effective audit committees are in improving the financial reporting standard of the firms 
and bringing it to higher levels. It has been suggested that there are some problems found in 
the researches in this area as it is difficult to witness in practice how these committees work, 
assuming that issues being discussed at such meetings are of a sensitive nature (Spira, 2002). 
However, Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2013) reviewed recent empirical research seeking to 
investigate various aspects of audit committees’ governance role. Evidence on the stock 
market reaction to audit committee issues suggests that investors both welcome the presence 
of audit committees and react positively when members are appointed with relevant 
expertise.  They found that there is a significant amount of evidence offering support to 
current regulations concerning the desired characteristics of audit committees. Regulators 
believe that more frequent audit committee meetings indicate the audit committee’s diligence 
in effectively discharging its responsibilities so that agency problems are minimised 
(Raghunandan and Rama, 2007). In addition, the presence of audit committees is likely to be 
associated with a high quality reporting system (McDaniel et al., 2002, Beasley et al., 2009). 
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3.6.4 Executive remuneration 
Executive remuneration has been explicitly discussed and reviewed by the Greenbury Report 
(1995). The Remuneration Committee is a sub-Committee of the board which mainly 
determines the executive remuneration. It is recommended by the Combined Code (2006) 
that remuneration committees should be composed only of independent non-executive 
directors. Conyon and Murphy (2000) argue that executive directors in the UK do not earn as 
much as their counterparts in the US and the research studies in the UK have been conducted 
in different contexts. However, studies on executive remuneration have mostly focused on the 
senior executives of listed firms (e.g. Main et al., 1993; Conyon, 1999). 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the principal-agent relationship is normally 
considered in the context of understanding the executive remuneration contracts as the 
managers (agents) are interested in different incentives to the shareholders (Principals). Due 
to the moral hazard problem where some of the managers’ actions are hidden from the owner, 
the manager could follow his own interest to the detriment of the owner without any 
punishment (Holmstrom, 1979).  
 
It is argued that agency theory foresees that well-prepared and agreed compensation packages 
in advance, which assist in aligning the shareholders’ and managers’ interests, could be 
crucial in alleviating agency problems in firms. The Principal-agent model proposes that the 
managers’ self-interest and incentives could be aligned with the goal of the firm by aligning 
the managers’ compensation to the performance of the firm. Also, dispersed shareholders 
might aim to persuade managers to achieve shareholders’ interest by the most appropriately 
designed compensation contracts. The writing of the employment contract is considered a 
vital method where the owners have the ability and advantage to control their managers’ 
actions (Fama and Jensen (1983a and 1983b).   However, the existence of information 
asymmetry which affects the CEO decisions and the investment opportunities of the firm 
have an impact on constructed contracts. But Jensen and Murphy (1990) observe that the 
remuneration contract may alleviate the existing issues by realigning the managers’ 
incentives with the principals’. There are some different incentives that could be included in 
the compensation policy, such as stock options, equity ownership, performance-related pay or 
bonus and LTIP are applied to bring together the goals and the interest between the managers 
and the owners. In addition, it is emphasized by agency theorists that there is potential for 
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these incentives to guarantee that the interests are aligned between shareholders and 
management. Frequently these incentives are often presented within the same package of 
structure and level of executive remuneration (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). However, if the 
pay-setting process is manipulated by any actions, executives could construct a reward 
system separate from performance or considering shareholders’ interests (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2001). Thus, compensation contracts are required to include the managers’ 
preferences and firms’ objective aligned together.  
 
Inside the perspective of agency theory, where it is generally believed that the agent is 
assumed as both risk and effort averse and the principal is presumed to be neutral or averse 
regarding risk, it is likely expected for the executive compensation contracts to offer an 
insurance and incentive effect (Ezzamel and Watson, 1997).  Holstrom (1979) discusses a 
potential association between executive remuneration and owner-oriented performance, as he 
mentions that in some cases, where the managers’ efforts and outcome are noticeable, the 
owner can control the agent by monitoring and the compensation of the manager will be 
limited despite the level of outcome. However, when the outcome is noticeable and the effort 
is unnoticeable, the reward of the manager is linked to the output gained in order to 
encourage the agent to increase the outcome by exerting greater effort.  
 
Executive remuneration and performance is considered as a potential topic used by 
researchers keen to test whether shareholder or managerial interest prevail in listed firms. The 
main objective of a large number of studies has been focused on executive remuneration and 
performance, as referred to agency theory, or the other aspects between executive 
remuneration and firm size, as based on managerialism. The potential link between executive 
remuneration and company performance is supported by the proposal that firms have a 
common goal in maximizing shareholder wealth which is achieved and affected by 
management decisions and that directly influences their rewards depending on the output 
(Lewellen and Huntsman, 1970).  
 
The relationship between firm performance and compensation policies are linked positively 
according to Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Gaver and Gaver (1993). It is confirmed that 
firm performance which used annual stock return as a measure is significantly associated 
with compensation and this relationship is positive, as argued by Core et al. (1999). In 
another study, Cyert et al. (2002) studied the negotiation process between the board of 
83 
 
directors and the CEO in the US in setting an equity-based compensation for the CEO and 
found that there is a strong positive relation between compensation and economic 
performance of the firm. Brick, Palmon and Wald (2006) examined the relationship between 
CEO compensation and board characteristics. The matched compensation and firm data are 
obtained from Standard and Poor's Execucomp and Compustat data sets for 1441 firms from 
1992 through 2001 for the US firms. They found that there is a negative association between 
the excess compensation paid to directors and firm performance by controlling CEO, firm 
and governance characteristics.  
 
However, regarding the relationship or impact of firm size on compensation policies, the 
results are mixed. In a study in the US on the relation between the investment opportunity set 
and financing, dividend, and compensation policies, Gaver and Gaver (1993) results indicate 
that level of cash compensation with the firm size is positive and strongly associated. In 
contrast, the findings of Jensen and Murphy (1990) show that in small firms CEOs are likely 
to have more compensation based incentive than CEOs in larger firms. It is explained that in 
bigger firms there is significant diversification of ownership and the management are 
monitored and controlled. In general, the total compensation could embrace several elements, 
salary, bonus, and value of restricted stock, saving and thrift plans and other benefits. Cyert et 
al (2002) found that the relationship between firm size and contingent compensation is 
significant and positive, as the overall sum of CEO compensation is associated with firm size. 
However, Palia (2001) argues that both compensation and firm value are difficult to be 
measured because they are determined and affected by several characteristics related to the 
firm and they are not observable, intangible assets are different, different power of markets 
and differing managerial monitoring mechanisms. Garen (1994) analysed a simple principal- 
agent model to determine how well it explains variations in CEO incentive pay and salaries 
for 415 corporations in the US. He found in his study that while the size of firms increases 
the pay performance, sensitivity is reduced due to the impact of residual standard deviation in 
returns. 
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Table 3.4 Previous studies examined the relationship between directors’ remuneration and performance. 
Author and Year Country Independent variables Dependent variables Relationship 
Conyon (1997) UK Directors’ compensation, 
separating the roles of 
CEO and chairman 
Shareholders’ return, directors pay Positive, No relation 
Florackis and Ozkan 
(2008) 
UK Managerial compensation The agency cost Negative 
Ezzamel and Watson 
( 1997) 
UK Cash Compensation Return on equity  
Shareholder return  
No significant 
correlation between 
ROA and Pay.  
Significant correlation 
for shareholder returns 
in one year only  
Main, Bruce and 
Buck (1996) 
UK Cash compensation and 
share options  
Shareholders return  Strong correlation 
between shareholders’ 
return and pay  
Gregg, Machin and 
Szymanski (1993) 
UK Cash compensation  Shareholder return and EPS Weak correlation 
Harvey and Shrieves 
(2001) 
USA The presence of outside 
directors and block 
holders, the use of 
leverage and CEOs near 
or at retirement age 
The use of incentive compensation Positive 
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Kamg et al. (2006) USA Compensation structure  
Equity-based 
compensation 
Investment, investment incentive Positive,  positive 
Brick et al. (2006) USA Q, sales, Log employees, 
Return on Assets, Cash 
flow, stock validity, 
Change in Q and  Average ROA Negative 
Perry (1999) USA Incentive compensation 
for independent directors 
in the board, the fraction 
of independent directors 
on the board and 
institutional ownership 
CEO turnover following poor 
performance, stock-based incentives 
Positive, positive 
Jiraporn et al. (2005) USA Weak shareholders’ right, 
potential managerial 
entrenchment 
Compensation, CEO pay Positive, positive 
Cyert et al. (2002) USA The existence of largest 
external shareholder on 
the board, the equity 
ownership on the board 
The size of CEO equity 
compensation, managerial 
compensation control 
Negative, positive 
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3.6.5  Managerial shareholding 
It is suggested that directors’ shareholding is viewed as an incentive mechanism which has a 
prospect to align the shareholders’ interests with those of the managers. Managers will 
behave differently when they own large portions of the firm. In this case managers, 
shareholders and the whole firm have similar interests (Gugler, 2008). Taking the hypothesis 
of convergence of interests as a basis, Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the 
relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership is positive and linear. 
Consequently, extending their work and based on their idea, other studies such as Morck et 
al., (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) and (1995) propose that the relationship 
between agency costs and managerial ownership is non-monotonic. Director ownership of 
shares is viewed as one of the important internal mechanisms of corporate governance which 
suggested to possibly solving the agency problems. There are two contrasting theoretical 
propositions: entrenchment and convergence-of-interests. 
 
Agency theory suggests that director share ownership helps in reducing the conflicts of 
interest that exist between shareholders and managers (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1993). This convergence-of-interests model maintains that as the 
proportion of equity owned by directors increases, their interests and those of shareholders 
become more aligned and the incentive to indulge in opportunistic behaviour diminishes. 
This is because the greater their financial stake represented in the shares owned means it is 
more costly for them as well if the shareholders’ wealth maximisation suffers. Consequently, 
there are additional incentives for directors who possess large numbers of shares to be active 
in their monitoring to the actions of the managers which could decrease agency costs and 
improve the financial performance of the firm. 
 
However, another strand of the theoretical literature suggests director entrenchment as an 
alternative hypothesis to convergence-of-interests (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and 
Servaes, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999). The entrenchment hypothesis proposes that the 
market forces (discipline) both internally and externally could assist in aligning shareholders’ 
interests with those of the managers when directors share ownership is at low levels.   
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 However, it contends that at high levels of shareholding, directors may hold sufficient voting 
power to protect themselves against such disciplinary forces, and as such directors will prefer 
to pursue non-wealth maximising goals. This is because the private benefits in the form of 
perquisites consumption, such as guaranteed employment with an attractive salary that will 
accrue to directors, are greater than the utility they will obtain from pursuing optimal projects 
that will increase the wealth of all shareholders. This results in director entrenchment in 
which other shareholders are unable to remove or influence the actions of the managing 
directors, even in the face of serious under-performance or misbehaviour. In this case, the 
director share-ownership-performance relationship is expected to be negative. Stulz (1988) 
models entrenchment as occurring from a lack of external market discipline where it is more 
difficult to remove managers when they control large portions of the company's stock.  Denis 
et al. (1997) propose that ownership by company directors reduces the likelihood of internal 
control systems being able to exert discipline on management. Faccio and Lasfer (1999) also 
contend that managerial entrenchment may result in the CEO creating a board that is unlikely 
to monitor. Further, the theoretical literature suggests that combining the convergence-of-
interests hypothesis with the entrenchment hypothesis gives rise to a non-linear director 
share-ownership-performance relationship (e.g., Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 
1990). This means that at low levels of director share-ownership, interests’ alignment may 
help increase firm financial performance. However, at high levels of director share-
ownership, director entrenchment impedes beneficial takeovers, and thus decreases firm 
value. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that as the ownership of the company by inside managers 
increases, so too does their incentive to invest in positive NPV projects and reduce private 
perquisite consumption. Ownership provides incentives to managers by tying their wealth on 
a one-to-one basis with the company's shareholders. Managers capture a larger fraction of the 
gains from their decision making their incentive to increase shareholder wealth increases. 
However, the incentive benefits of increased managerial ownership come with the increased 
control afforded to management through higher shareholdings. Higher ownership allows 
managers to remain in their position and heightens the extent of agency problems within the 
company. In addition, the control afforded by higher managerial ownership suggests that 
director shareholdings will be a significant determinant of other aspects of internal 
governance. 
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A number of empirical studies have attempted to verify Jensen and Meckling (1976)’s 
theoretical arguments by examining the role of managerial ownership in company decision 
making. Evidence of the positive role that managerial equity ownership may play in 
investment decisions is provided by Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) and Denis et al. (1997). 
In addition, both Lang et al. (1995) and Fenn and Liang (2001) find evidence of a positive 
relationship between managerial equity ownership and cash distributions to company 
shareholders following asset sales and amongst companies with high levels of free cash flow 
respectively. Ang et al. (2000) find that managerial equity ownership and control are 
correlated with higher levels of operating efficiency in a sample of privately held US 
companies. These authors suggest that such companies provide a means of investigating the 
zero agency cost base case of Jensen and Meckling (1976) where a sole manager owns and 
controls the company. The authors conclude that their results support the theories put forth by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) concerning ownership structure and 
organisational efficiency. Lastly,  Jensen et al. (1992), Denis and Denis (1994), and Denis 
and Sarin (1999) find that higher levels of managerial ownership lead to lower levels of board 
independence, lower cash distributions to shareholders, and less reliance on external capital 
markets for borrowing requirements. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) believe that there is a positive 
relationship between present value of shares owned by managers and companies’ 
performance. Hossain et al. (2001) report a positive linear relationship between proportion of 
shares owned by managers and financial performance in the New Zealand market. Gelb 
(2000) indicates a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
 
Mixed evidence is provided on the role of industrial focus, growth prospects, leverage, and 
other aspects of a firm's governance environment in impacting levels of managerial 
ownership [see Jensen et al. (1992), Denis and Denis (1994), Cho (1998), Denis and Sarin 
(1999), Himmelberg et al. (1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001)]. Furthermore, Davies, 
Hillier, and McColgan (2005) examine the relationship between director shareholdings and 
firm value, measured by Tobin's Q, in a sample of 802 UK industrial listed firms for 1996 
and 1997. Their findings reveal that Tobin's Q increases at director shareholdings level of 7% 
and then decreases at director ownership level of 26%. The positive relationship between firm 
value and ownership is attributable to managers holding higher equity stakes in highly valued 
companies with good investment opportunities, while a negative relationship may exist as a 
result of share sales following good performance or management increasing their equity 
ownership in response to a threat to their control following poor performance. 
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A number of empirical studies have also attempted to uncover evidence of a direct 
relationship between managerial equity ownership and firm value. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
fail to find evidence of a linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. 
However, several studies have tested for non-linearities when examining the direct 
relationship between ownership and corporate value. These studies generally attribute 
declining firm value as managerial ownership increases over certain ranges to the onset of 
managerial entrenchment. Examples of these studies are Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), who each document evidence of a non-
monotonic relationship between managerial equity ownership and corporate value.  
 
Several studies have attempted to examine the direct relationship that may exist between 
managerial shareholdings and firm value. Both Faccio and Lasfer (1999) and Short and 
Keasey (1999) find evidence of a cubic relationship between managerial shareholdings and 
firm value, which is consistent with the US findings of Davies et al. (2004) who find 
evidence of a highly non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm value, 
where value originally increases with ownership, then decreases, increases again, decreases 
again, and finally, increases with ownership at the highest levels of director shareholdings. 
Additionally, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) and Weir et al. (2002) find mixed evidence on 
the relationship between managerial shareholdings and firm value. In their overall sample, 
Faccio and Lasfer find an insignificant relationship between ownership and firm value. The 
evidence reported here relates to their sub-sample of companies with growth prospects above 
the median firm for their overall sample of companies, as measured by the firm's Price-
Earnings Ratio (P/E). Finally, Lasfer (2002) found that for firms with high growth prospects 
the relationship between managerial ownership and firm value is curvilinear in a similar 
manner to McConnell and Servaes (1990). However, for low growth companies the 
relationship is positive and linear. Lasfer concludes that low growth firms benefit fully from 
governance incentives which reduce the agency costs of free cash flow. 
 
Morck et al. (1988) investigate the relationship between director share-ownership and firm 
value, as proxied by Tobin’s Q using a cross-sectional sample of 371 Fortune 500 US firms 
in 1980. They report a non-monotonic relationship between director share-ownership and 
firm value. This suggests market value of firms’ first increases, then declines, and finally 
increases slightly, as ownership by directors’ increases. Specifically, Morck et al. (1988) 
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document a statistically significant and positive director ownership-performance link at lower 
levels (0% to 5% - interests convergence), a statistically significant and negative relationship 
at moderate levels (5% to 25% - entrenchment), and additionally a statistically significant and 
positive association at higher levels (above 25% - interests convergence) of director 
ownership. 
 
Their evidence suggests that at low levels of director ownership, interests alignment help 
increase firm value, while at high levels, director entrenchment negatively affects financial 
performance. Recent U.S. and UK studies by McConnell and Servaes (1990), Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991), Short and Keasey (1999), Weir and Laing (2000), and Davies et al. (2005) 
have supported the non-monotonic director share-ownership-performance relationship. 
Various studies (Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Short and Keasey (1999), and Lau (2004)) 
look at the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. Hermalin and 
Weisbach’s findings indicate non-linear change in firm performance over a certain range of 
managerial ownership that is at levels of ownership less than one per cent corporate 
performances improved (Q increases with ownership). However, at levels of ownership 
greater than 20%, Q decreases with ownership. The results suggest that increases in 
ownership above 20% the management become more entrenched. Lau (2004) supports a 
cubic relationship of managerial ownership on corporate value, as suggested by Short and 
Keasey. Lau extends her analysis to cover three countries; United Kingdom, France and 
Germany. Likewise, the relationship between insider’s ownership of the firm and Q is a 
significantly curvilinear relationship (McConnell and Servaes, 1990).  Their findings show 
that the shape of the curve slope goes up to the point where insider ownership approaches 
roughly 40% to 50% and the curve slope then goes down a little.  
    
Based on the onset of managerial entrenchment, previous studies (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1991; Morck et al, 1988; McConell and Servaes, 1990) suggest a non-linear relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance. Davies, Hillier, and McColgan (2005) 
propose that the tendency of management to maximise shareholder wealth is a function of 
three unobserved factors; external market, internal controls and convergence of interest. They 
put forward a quintic relationship between managerial ownership and performance (measured 
as Tobin's Q). They examined 802 UK industrial firms and found out that there is an 
interdependence relationship between, the level of investment in the firm, managerial 
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ownership and corporate value. The results also exhibit that managerial ownership influence 
the corporate value and vice versa. 
 
Different studies, on the contrary, suggest that there is no relationship between firm 
performance and insider ownership. Demsetz and Lehn (1985), for instance, examined 511 
firms in the United States in 1980. They found out that accounting profits rates and 
ownership concentration is not significantly related. However, their findings indicate that 
variation in ownership structure in their sample is explained by factors such as industry, firm 
size, and instability of profit rate. Extending Demsetz and Lehn, Himmelberg, Hubbard and 
Palia (1999) selected 600 firms randomly from the Compustat universe over the three-year 
period 1982-1984. They argue that managerial ownership changes would not have an impact 
on firm performance. Based on their results they view that there are common factors which 
determine the relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership. They 
suggest that examining the disclosed ownership percentage does not adequately capture 
important social dimensions of ownership. For example, directors and block holders may 
have a web of personal and business connections. 
 
Cho (1998) examines the interdependence of ownership structure, investment, and corporate 
value among Fortune 500 manufacturing companies in 1991. His initial findings indicate that 
corporate value is affected by the structure of ownership because it initially affects the 
investment process. However, the simultaneous regression results show that investment 
determines corporate value, and the corporate value has an effect on ownership structure. In 
another study by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), they found out that the relationship between 
firm performance and ownership structure is not statistically significant. Peasnell, Pope and 
Young (2005) used UK data to examine the relationship between managerial ownership and 
the use of outside directors. They found out that there is non-linear relationship between 
board composition and managerial ownership. In addition, they indicate that outsiders are 
able to assist in controlling agency problems linked with control and ownership separated, but 
they are limited for their help in control to low levels of managerial ownership. Thus, it is 
assumed that the managers are entrenched at the higher levels of managerial ownership. 
Similarly, the relationship between firm value and managerial ownership is reported to be 
weak by Faccio and Lasfer (1999).  
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A recent US study, Hutchinson, Gul and Leung (2005) looks at director entrenchment and 
governance problems. They use the free cash flow (FCF) problem identified by Jensen (1986) 
to proxy for the corporate governance problems. Their findings support the view of interest 
convergence that boards are motivated and incentivised to monitor the firm's earnings 
effectively whenever they have a stake in the firm's profit residual. In addition, their findings 
show that as the stock ownership increases and the board becomes entrenched, the agency 
costs goes up. They also test for the moderating effect of firms' growth opportunities on the 
relationship of director stock ownership and earnings return. They found that this is 
particularly true in the low growth firms, and the agency cost of entrenchment is more severe 
if the firms have corporate governance problems. 
 
In Agency Theory directors tend to deviate from shareholder wealth-maximization by 
excessive consumption of perquisites (perks) when they do not have an ownership stake in 
the firm. Accordingly, higher insider stockholding aligns directorial interests with 
shareholder interests. Along this line, using a simultaneous equations model, Chung and 
Pruitt (1996) examine 404 publicly held US companies in 1987 and found that CEO equity 
ownership positively influences Tobin's Q. In addition, Core and Larcker (2002) analyzed 
195 US firms that had adopted target ownership plans for top executives from 1991 to 1995. 
Prior to the plan adoption, the firms show low stock returns and have low levels of 
managerial stock ownership. They found that managerial equity ownership and the firm 
performance (measured as excess accounting returns and stock returns) were higher after the 
plans were adopted. They consider that the increase in the managerial ownership results in 
improvement of the firm performance. Mehran (1995) suggests that firm performance is 
positively related to the percentage of equity held by managers. However, investigation of 
383 Forbes-standing US firms in 1987 by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) found no effect of 
insider directors shareholding on Tobin's Q. Loderer and Martin (1997) find a weak positive 
relationship between executive ownership and acquisition performance (abnormal return). 
Their findings indicate that performance appears to affect how many stock executives want to 
hold in their firm. They document that the higher Q induces the executives to reduce their 
holdings while more profitable acquisitions encourage larger stockholdings by the executives. 
Yeo et al (2002) examine how ownership structure affects the earnings informativeness for 
Singapore listed companies. They use two ownership variables in the study; managerial 
ownership and external unrelated block holdings. Their findings suggest a non-linear relation 
between managerial ownership earnings informativeness. On the other hand, earnings 
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informativeness associates positively with external unrelated block holding which is 
consistent with monitoring function of the block holders. 
 
McWilliams (1990) attempts to link managerial ownership with anti-takeover amendments, 
his findings indicate that as managerial ownership increases stock price reactions to 
amendment proposals becomes negative. In New Zealand, results from a study of 128 firms 
listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange by Bradbury and Mak (2000) provide evidence of 
non-linear association between the level of managerial ownership and the choice of a less 
restrictive takeover amendment. Cosh, Guest and Hughes (2006) investigate the relationship 
between takeover performance and board share-ownership in the acquiring company for a 
sample of 363 UK takeovers completed in the period of 1985-1996.They separate board 
share-ownership into; CEO shareholdings, executive shareholdings and non-executive 
shareholdings. Griffith (1999) tests the impact of ownership held by CEO of the common 
stock of the firm on firm value. His hypothesis was that firm value is clearly affected by the 
share owned by the CEO. He found out that there is an increase in the firm value (measured 
by Tobin’s Q) when CEO ownership rises from 0 to 15% of the firm), but a decline is noticed 
when his ownership rises to 50% and increases again afterwards.  
 
In short, quite different and even contradictory results have emerged from the numerous 
investigations and studies in developed countries. The ownership concentration–firm 
performance relationship warrants further attention. The following Table 2.5 summarises the 
main empirical findings discussed herein related to the ownership structure–firm performance 
relationship.
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Table 3.5 A number of prior Studies of Relationships between Ownership Concentration (by insider or outside investors) and Firm 
Performance 
Author Place and period Ownership variables Performance measures Methods used Main Findings 
Leech and Leahy 
(1991) 
UK- 1983-1985 Insiders ownership and 
external block 
holdings 
Market value / Share 
capital; ROS; ROE 
Multivariate regression Negative relationship 
Curcio (1994) UK- 1972-1986 Insider ownership Tobin’s Q Total factor 
productivity 
OLS Non-linear relationship 
Nickell et al. (1997) UK- 1985-1994 External block 
holdings 
Productivity growth rate Regression technique Positive relationship 
Short and Keasey 
(1999) 
UK- 1988-1992 Insider ownership RSE and VAL OLS Non-linear relationship 
Faccio and Lasfer 
(1999) 
UK- 1996-1997 Insider ownership Accounting rate, 
Tobin’s Q, and market 
to book 
Multivariate 
analysis 
Non-linear relationship 
Davies et al. (2005) UK- 1996-1997 Insider ownership Tobin’s Q 2SLS Non-linear relationship 
Morck et al. (1988) US- 1980 Insider ownership Tobin’s Q and 
accounting profit rate 
Piecewise regression Non-linear relationship 
Cho (1998) US- 1991 Insider ownership Tobin’s Q OLS-2SLS No relationship 
Holderness et 
al.(1999) 
US- 1995 Insider ownership Tobin’s Q Piecewise 
linear regression 
Non-linear relationship 
Wruck (1989 US- 1979-1985 Insiders and external 
block 
Holdings 
Cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) 
Piecewise linear 
regression 
Non-linear relationship 
Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) 
US- 1971, 1974, 
1977, 1980, and 
1983 
Insider ownership Tobin’s Q Piecewise linear 
regression 
Non-linear relationship 
Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) 
US- 511 companies, 
1976-1980 
External block 
holdings 
Post-Tax accounting 
Profit/Book value of 
equity 
2SLS No relationship 
D. Denis and Denis 
(1994) 
US- 1985 Insiders and external 
block Holdings 
ROE, ROA, Operating 
income to assets, 
Tobin’s Q, and market 
Standard t-test No relationship 
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to book value. 
Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988) 
US- 1979-1980 External block 
holdings 
Q and ROE Standard t-test No relationship 
Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008) 
US- 1990-2002; 
1990- 
2003; 1990-2004 
Insider ownership Risk-adjusted Share-
holder Return and 
operating Rate of 
Return. 
Simultaneous Positive relationship 
McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) 
US- 1976 and 1986 Insiders and external 
block Holdings 
Tobin’s Q OLS Non-linear relationship 
and positive for 
blockholdings 
Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) 
US- 1987 Insider ownership Tobin’s OLS and 2SLS No relationship 
Mehran (1995) US- 1979-1980 External block 
holdings 
Tobin’s Q and ROA OLS No relationship 
Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) 
US- 1980 and 1981 Insider ownership and 
external blockholders 
Tobin‘s Q 
Accounting profit rate 
OLS and 2SLS No relationship 
McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) 
US- 1976, 1986, 
and 1988 
Insiders and external 
block Holdings 
Tobin’s Q OLS Non-linear relationship 
with insider and positive 
impact with external 
Loderer and Martin 
(1997) 
US- 1977-1988 External blockholders Tobin’s Q OLS No relationship 
Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) 
US- 1992-1999 Insider ownership Tobin’s Q and ROA Regression Positive relationship 
Agrawal and 
Mandelker (1987) 
US- 356 US listed 
firms, 1979-85 
Insiders and external 
blockholders 
Cumulative abnormal 
return 
Regression Positive relationship for 
large shareholders and 
no relationship with 
insiders 
Himmelberg et al. 
(1999) 
US- 400 companies 
from 
1982-1992 Fixed 
effects- 
Insider ownership Tobin’s Q and ROA 2SLS Non-linear relationship 
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3.6.6 Financial Policies 
 Another factor which could impact the firm performance is financial policies (Debt and 
dividend). Also debt and dividends have been used in other studies as control variables for 
performance impacts not linked to corporate governance mechanisms, for instance studies as 
Morck et al. (1988) and Demstez and Lehn (1985). However, other studies used these two 
variables as corporate governance mechanisms (Bohren and Odegaard (2001), Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989), Aljifri and Moustafa (2007), and Silveira and Barros (2007). In contrast 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) used debt as a corporate governance mechanism.  
 
Management discretion is controlled and limited if firms utilise debts and pay dividends 
(Jensen, 1986). The debt factor in a firm can make certain that the cash flow of such a firm is 
utilised to pay the liabilities due to creditors who might force liquidation in case obligations 
are not met. In the same way, a high dividend pay-outs policy can lead to the satisfaction that 
cash flow is distributed to shareholders and can ensure that less money is left for managers’ 
discretion to finance risky projects that do not guarantee profit. In addition, Easterbrook 
(1984) comments that high dividends enforce the firms to go to the market for new finances 
where the management team is required to attract new investment and therefore must inform 
the public about future plans. In this regard, agency theory proposes that these two variables 
have an impact on improving the firm performance. Moreover, Stulz (1988) suggests that 
debt reduces agency cost (monitoring and bonding), while a higher threat of bankruptcy is 
imposed upon management if they fail to commit for payments. Subsequently, the managers 
are likely to be proactive and more efficient upon fear of a potential loss of work and 
reputation, thus they perform in favour to increase firm performance.   
 
Debt is an effective mechanism to be employed to reduce agency problems (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). The latter claimed that with debt there is less need for external equity to be 
issued and debt reduces the divergence between shareholders and managers,  thus the interest 
between managers and shareholders is increasingly aligned. However, debt could have 
positive or negative effects on firm performance, the negative impacts more often taking 
place in firms with various profitable growth opportunities (McConnell and Servaes, 1995). 
Hence, the best debt policy is based on the level of investment opportunities.  
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Meanwhile, several studies (Morck et al., 1988; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Holderness et 
al., 1999; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001 and Welch, 2003) have found results that are 
consistently supportive for the negative relationship side. Furthermore, the impact of debt on 
performance is expected to differ amongst countries due to some differences in the financial 
development and legal procedures in these countries.   
  
The role of dividends payment in this context is considered essential as equity is reduced due 
to dividends payments and could require replacement debt finance. The crucial role of 
dividends for monitoring is identified by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986). Easterbrook 
(1984) proposed that agency problems could be controlled by dividends by the monitoring 
imposed by primary capital markets of the activities and performance of firms. Providing 
higher dividend payouts, firms need to raise debt or have to choose selling common stock on 
the capital market where banks, securities exchanges and suppliers are scrutinising the 
management of these firms. Dividend payments could help dissipate cash and avoid wasting 
it in a negative value project which restricts to some extent the investment opportunities by 
managers (Jensen, 1986). 
 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) tested the free cash flow perspective upon 429 US firms for a 
period of 1979 to 1984. They relied on the framework used by Berle and Means (1932) and 
Jensen (1986), and based on their findings they concluded that debt and dividends are 
substitute mechanisms to reduce agency costs for firms with low growth opportunities. They 
set up the sample into two groups of dividend changes: the first group of firms with Q values 
less than 1 and the other with Q values greater than 1. The findings show that Low-Q firms 
enjoy larger abnormal return comparing to high-Q firms. They reported that there is a 
positive association between share prices with increasing dividends in firms having low 
investment opportunities (measured by Q).  
 
Thomsen (2004) examined the relationship among blockholder ownership, dividends and 
firm performance for firms with net assets exceeding US$ 2 billion in 1998. The study was 
carried out on 12 European countries and the US. It identifies a negative impact of 
blockholder ownership on firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q attributable to the 
interaction effects with dividend policy. The performance of European firms was not 
materially negatively affected with low investment rates, high payout ratios and smaller 
equity bases. 
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Bohren and Odegaard (2001) studied non-financial firms listed in the Oslo Stock Exchange in 
Norway for the period between 1989 and 1997. They found that more debt and higher 
dividends decrease firm performance. In contrast, Beiner et al. (2003) studied Swiss firms 
and found a positive relationship between firm performance and debt after controlling for 
endogeneity.  Based on signalling theory, there is an argument that insiders have more access 
for the company information and know more than the outsiders about the future prospects of 
the firm and thus they use dividends in a way to alert the market about future earnings. 
  
The relationship among investment, financing, and dividend decisions is examined by 
Pindado and Torre (2006). They selected 135 Spanish-listed firms from 1990 to 1999. They 
used Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) regression and found that when debt increased 
insiders reduced their ownership. Also, Toledo (2010) utilised debt as an essential mechanism 
to mitigate the agency problems and increase firm performance. He found that performance 
of Spanish firms decreased due to more debt and he realised that mutual causality relationship 
is existent between debt and firm performance. 
 
La Porta et al. (2000) examined dividend policies of listed companies in 33 countries. Two 
alternative models of dividends were used; the first dividend model was a result of effective 
legal protection and the second model was a reserve for effective legal protection. Firms paid 
higher dividends in countries where minority shareholders have better protection while on the 
other hand firms with rapid growth paid lower dividends due to shareholders’ rights being 
protected and can claim eventually if the firms expect some potential investment 
opportunities. However, in contrast shareholders prefer receiving dividends irrespective of 
potential investment opportunities within a poor legal protection context. Moreover, an 
existent opposite relationship between shareholders’ rights and dividends payments lead to, in 
a weak shareholders’ rights context, firms paying higher dividends. La Porta et al. (2007, p. 
27) summed it up as “data suggest that the agency approach is highly relevant to an 
understanding of corporate dividend policies around the world”. Brick, Palia, and Wang 
(2006) examined the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance.  using Tobin‘s Q, ROA, and Alpha (the abnormal returns) as performance 
measures, finding that these three measures have a negative relationship between debt and 
performance and  concluding that profitable firms exploit more retained earnings and utilise 
less external finance. 
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There are some studies which examine the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance in developing countries, where dividends payments and 
debt were included, (Jayed and Iqbal, 2007; Garay and Gonzales, 2008; Tam and Tan, 2007; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Arman and Ahmad, 2010; Sarkar and Sarker, 2008). Their 
findings suggest that there is no positive relationship between debt and firm performance and 
that it cannot be used to reduce agency problems. These findings stem from poor investor 
protection in developing countries (La Porta et al., 2000). Meanwhile, Alwi (2009) found that 
debt cannot reduce the conflict among shareholders, as he divided the shareholders into two 
groups - high ownership and low ownership concentration- but dividend policy can.  
  
To sum it up, financial polices (dividend payments and debt) have a positive impact on firm 
performance which increase firm value and reduce agency problems. However, in developing 
countries due to legal systems and ownership structure the relationship between managers 
and shareholders is likely to severely suffer and therefore agency problems increase. 
Moreover, Gompers et al. (2003) argue that good shareholders’ rights protection imposes 
restrictions upon the managers in using cash and forces them to utilise less debt and works in 
the shareholders’ interest. Table 2.6 summarises the main empirical studies discussed herein 
related to the financial policies–firm performance. 
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Table 3.6 A number of prior empirical studies examining the relationship between financial policies and firm performance 
Author(s) Region Financial 
policies 
variables 
Performance 
measures 
Period & 
Methodology 
Results 
Dahya and 
McConnell 
(2005a) 
UK- 1124 listed firms 1989-
1996 
Debt ROA and 
stock prices 
Event study Positive relationship 
Brick et al. 
(2006) 
US Debt Tobin’s Q, 
ROA, Alpha 
1,063 firms from 
1992 to 2004 
Negative 
Demsetz and 
Villalonga 
(2001) 
US- 1980 and 1981 Debt Tobin’s Q, 
profit rate 
OLS and 2SLS Negative 
Holderness et 
al. (1999) 
US- 1995 Debt Tobin’s Q Piecewise linear 
Regression 
Negative 
Morck et al. 
(1988) 
US- 1980 Debt Tobin’s Q, 
accounting 
profit rate 
Piecewise 
regression 
Negative 
Lang and 
Litzenberger 
(1989) 
US- 429 US dividend 
announcements for the 
period 1979 to 1984. 
Debt Tobin’s Q 429 US dividend 
announcements 
for the period 
1979 to 1984. 
They find that low-q firms 
have larger abnormal 
returns than high-q 
firms(positive) 
Agrawal and 
Knoeber 
(1996) 
US- Forbes 800 firms 
1988- 
Debt Tobin’s Q 2SLS Negative 
McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) 
US- 1976, 1986, and 1988 Debt Tobin‘s Q OLS Negative 
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Welch (2003) Australia- 114 listed firms 
1999-2000 
Debt Tobin‘s Q 114 listed firms 
1999-2000 
Negative relationship 
Thomsen 
(2004) 
12 countries and US- Firms 
more than US$2 billion in 
1998 
Dividend Tobin‘s Q Firms more than 
US$2 billion in 
1998 
Negative relationship 
La Porta et al. 
(2000) 
27 Countries- 13698 firms 
1996 
 
Dividend Sale growth OLS  
dividend and High growth 
Beiner et al. 
(2003) 
Swiss- 275 listed firms in 
2002 
Debt Tobin‘s Q OLS and 2SLS Positive 
Bohrenand 
Odegaard 
(2001) 
Norway- All listed firms in 
1989- 
1997- 
Debt and 
dividend 
Tobin‘s Q OLS and 3SLS Negative relationship 
Toledo (2010) Spain- 106 listed companies 
2007 
Debt Tobin’s Q Simultaneous 
equations 
Negative 
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3.7  Performance measures 
Understanding different aspects of performance measurement and choosing relevant 
measures are important for pursuing research objectives. Performance measurements offer 
insights into appropriate measures for answering research questions. However, it is not 
always agreed as to what performance measures should be employed and used (Dalton et al. 
1980; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). There are various measures which have been used regularly 
in past researches as a measure for firm performance (e.g., value ratio, labour productivity, 
net present value, market-to-book value, and earnings per share). The measures of 
performance for the purpose of this thesis could be divided into two majors groups: market 
measures and accounting measures, specifically Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
 
Regarding Return on Assets (ROA), several studies have used this measure such as Lin, 
Huang, and Young (2008), King and Santor (2007), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Al- Khouri 
(2006), Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998), Mehran (1995), and  Denis and Denis (1994). 
Accordingly ROA is measured as earnings after interest expenses and taxes divided by total 
assets. With respect to Tobin’s Q which was first introduced by Tobin in 1967, it has been 
used by many researchers such as, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Holderness, Kroszner, and 
Sheejan (1999), Cho (1998) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988). Tobin‘s Q is measured 
as the ratio of market value of assets (equity and debt) by the replacement value of assets. 
However, other studies used Tobin’s Q and were calculated in different ways. For example, 
in Tobin‘s calculation, Yermack (1996) calculated Q by dividing the market value by the 
estimated replacement costs of assets. Chung and Pruitt (1994) compared their model, which 
defined Tobin‘s Q as the market value of equity plus the value of preferred stock plus total 
debt divided by the book value of total assets, with the Lindenberg and Ross (L-R) (1981) 
model
 finding that the replacement value for the firm‘s plant, equipment, and inventories is 
equal to their book value. Chung and Pruitt (1994, p. 72) stated: “The very high degree of 
observed consistency between L-R and the approximate Q formulas over the 1978 to 1987 
time period strongly suggests that financial analysts wishing to employ approximate Q values 
in day to day business decisions may do so with considerable confidence”. 
 
While accounting data is very important in corporate governance, accounting measures do 
not reflect all agency costs (Wiwattanatang, 2001), directing researchers to go into using 
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market indicators of performance (e.g. stock prices). In both developed and developing 
countries, Tobin’s Q—the ratio of market value of assets (equity and debt) to the replacement 
value of assets—is broadly used as a proxy of firm performance measure. Firm’s accounting 
and reporting systems provide financial accounting data, and this quantitative data regards the 
financial position and performance of the firm over a specified and particular period. The 
management of the firm provides financial statements which are subject to audit to prove that 
they are fairly presented according to the general accounting principles and standards. Prowse 
(1992) discussed that as stock market returns are suspected to modify for any conflicts 
between managers and shareholders, accounting measures are favourable for examining the 
relationship between firm performance and corporate governance. The role of accounting 
data in the operation of corporate governance mechanisms has been examined in previous 
studies in corporate governance (e.g., Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Morck et al., 1988; Demsetz 
& Lehn, 1985; and Holderness & Sheehan, 1988). However, accounting measures need to be 
carefully considered as the study results might be biased by using accounting measures. 
Accounting measures are normally established on historical data, which could cause lack of 
comparability and lead to distortions amongst firms. Therefore, the accounting valuation may 
be not up to date. Tobin‘s Q displays the financial strength of the firm and it is used in the 
financial market as a proxy for a firm performance. Tobin’s Q has been used in several 
studies (e.g. Durney & Kim, 2005; Beiner, et al., 2004; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; 
and Morck et al., 1988). However, there are some disadvantages when using market 
indicators as performance measures.  
 
Pham, Suchard, and Zein (2007, p. 4) reported that “Tobin’s Q suffers from a number of 
problems. First, the measurement of Q is subject to accounting treatment of balance sheet 
items. Second, Q also reflects a firm’s growth opportunities. A change in a firm’s Q over time 
may simply reflect changes to the valuation of future growth opportunities which arise in part 
from factors exogenous to managerial decisions, such as economic and industry conditions”. 
Khanna & Palepu (1999) argue that using market measures to assess performance assuming 
that the firm’s true value is reflected by the stock prices, however it is not always the case as 
such measures are not valid all the time as capital markets may be illiquid and lack timely 
disclosure. A similar problem applies to accounting data because the quality of the data is 
based heavily on the quality of the accounting standards of the country. Moreover, Tobin’s Q 
is also a proxy for risk and growth opportunities and is not a clear measure of performance 
(Gupta, 2005). 
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In conclusion, Tobin’s Q involves looking ahead (what will management do?) while 
accounting measures necessarily look backwards (what has management done?). However, 
with respect to accounting measures, the accounting standards set by the accounting 
profession and the government constrain the accountant, while with respect to Tobin’s Q, it is 
strongly affected generally by the level of the market and investor confidence (Omran et al., 
2008).  As such, a trade-off occurs between disadvantages and advantages of market-based 
measures versus accounting measures. Eventually, in selecting measures of performance, 
their suitability in association to various environmental issues and specified research 
objectives should be considered carefully. Taking into account that the literature has not 
favoured one measure of performance,  that there is no obvious consensus existing about the 
selection of this dependent variable and because each has advantages and disadvantages, for 
the sake of the robustness of the findings it is better to use alternate measures (Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006) Consistent with this view, Welch (2003, p. 291) suggested that: “While 
Tobin’s Q is the most common measure that has been used to date in modelling the 
relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance, it is important to test 
the robustness of reported results to the use of an alternate performance measure”. 
3.8  Endogeneity and causality 
The problems of endogeneity and causality are very important in corporate governance 
research because both of these problems can impact our results. Thus, in order to avoid any 
misleading or inconsistent results, these problems will be investigated. Endogeneity refers to 
the presence of unobserved variables that impact both firm performance and corporate 
governance mechanisms. It indicates that a relationship exists between the error terms of 
independent variables, which may make the OLS regression inapplicable for estimating the 
parameters of each equation. Consequently, OLS assumptions will be violated when 
estimating the equations. Gujarati (1999, pp. 492-493) stated that: 
“In simultaneous equations regression models what is a dependent (endogenous) variable in 
one equation appears as explanatory variables in another equation. Thus, there is a feedback 
relationship between variables. This feedback creates the simultaneity problems rendering 
OLS inapplicable to estimate the parameters of equations individually. This is because the 
endogenous variable that appears as an explanatory variable in another equation may be 
correlated with the stochastic error term of that equation. This violates one of the critical 
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assumptions of OLS that the explanatory variable is either fixed or non-random or if random, 
it is uncorrelated with error term”. 
 
Several previous studies (e.g., Al-Khouri, 2006; McConnell & Servaes 1990; Morck et al. 
1988) examined the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance 
mechanisms, assuming that such mechanisms impact firm performance without an 
endogeneity relationship—although others have argued that some governance mechanisms 
are endogenous to the firm performance. Results have indicated that not only corporate 
governance impacts firm performance, but also firms with high performance are more likely 
to have better corporate governance. Silveira and Barros (2007, p. 9) suggested that ― 
“The main endogeneity problem in corporate governance research refers to the possible 
presence of omitted variables and potential simultaneous determination of the variables of 
interest”. 
 
Ignoring this problem in regression may make the coefficient inefficient and unreliable, 
thereby affecting the results. Causality refers to the direction of impact. Several studies have 
argued that—instead of corporate governance mechanisms impacting firm performance—the 
causality may be the other way around, meaning that high performance impacts change in 
corporate governance mechanisms. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996, p. 394) argued that ― 
“The use of one mechanism may depend upon the use of others. As a consequence, empirical 
estimates of the effect that single control mechanisms have on firm performance will likely be 
misleading”.  
 
Firms with higher performance could be more likely to adopt better corporate governance 
mechanisms (i.e., either good corporate governance leads to higher performance or higher 
performance leads to good corporate governance). Empirically, Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1988) found that CEO turnover is related to firm performance. They argued that outsiders 
were more likely to join boards after firm’s experienced poor performance. In addition, Kole 
(1994) developed one of the first academic studies to investigate the causality between firm 
performance and ownership. She found that the relationship between firm performance and 
insider ownership runs from firm performance to insider ownership. She suggested that 
increased ownership is an incentive for high firm performance. Recently, Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008, p. 257) stated that: 
106 
 
“The relation between corporate governance and performance might be endogenous, raising 
doubts about the causality explanation. There is a significant body of theoretical and 
empirical literature in accounting and finance that considers the relations among corporate 
governance, management turnover, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and 
corporate ownership structure. Hence, from an econometric viewpoint, to study the 
relationship between any two of these variables one would need to formulate a system of 
simultaneous equations that specifies the relationships among these variables”. 
 
Accepting these arguments, OLS analyses will produce misleading conclusions and not 
provide consistent coefficients for the model. In following these arguments in the literature, 
the current study investigates the relationship between firm performance and corporate 
governance mechanisms by considering the jointly determined variables. In order to address 
endogeneity and causality problems, three approaches were considered in the literature 
review—namely, fixed effects regression (Himmelberg et al., 1999), instrumental variables 
model with 2SLS (Abdullah, 2007), and the system of simultaneous equations (Agrawal & 
Knoeber 1996; Bohren & Odegaard 2001; Cho, 1998; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & 
Villalonga 2001; Earle, 1998; Lins, 2003). Table 2.7 presents the empirical studies that 
considered the endogeneity and causality issues from developed and developing countries. 
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Table 3.7 Empirical studies considered Endogeneity and causality issues 
Author(s) Country Method for testing 
endogeneity and 
causality 
Instruments test Variables 
S. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) 
US Piecewise regression Hausman test Ownership and board 
composition 
Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) 
US 2SLS Relationship among 
governance variables 
Several governance 
mechanisms 
Cho (1998) US 2SLS and 3SLS None Ownership structure 
Himmelberg et al. 
(1999) 
US Fixed effects and 2SLS 
with instrumental 
variables 
Found difficulty to find 
good instruments 
Ownership 
Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) 
US 2SLS None Ownership structure 
Bhagat and Black 
(2002) 
US 3SLS None Board independence 
Brick et al. (2006) US 2SLS and fixed effect Hausman and Sargan 
test 
Several governance 
variables 
Abdullah (2007) UK 2SLS Hausman test Board independence and 
board size 
Silveira and Barros 
(2007) 
Brasil 2SLS None Several governance 
variables 
Beiner et al. (2004) Swiss 3SLS Hausman and Sargan 
test 
Several governance 
variables 
Bohren and Odegaard 
(2004) 
Norway 2SLS No proper basis for 
choosing instruments 
Several governance 
mechanisms 
Black et al. (2006a) Korea 2SLS and 3SLS None Board independence 
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3.9  Corporate governance Index studies 
Measuring improvements in shareholder value and corporate performance attributable to 
good corporate governance mechanisms is complicated because of the absence of comparable 
worldwide data. Different studies have been utilising different indices which are constructed 
in dissimilar ways in order to compare these mechanisms at a firm-level and across country-
level. Although it is considered a recent phenomenon, these studies have gathered momentum 
on the impact of these mechanisms on corporate performance.  
Currently rating agencies and specialised financial institutions have maintained an interest in 
the corporate governance data to be utilised in ranking the large public firms. Klapper and 
Love (2004) state that firms with good governance mechanisms attract external finance, have 
better performance and an advantage of better market valuation. Several recent studies have 
utilised a broader measure of corporate governance based on a composite corporate 
governance rating. Gompers et al (2003) for the U.S., Drobetz et al (2003) for Germany, 
Klapper and Love (2004) for 14 emerging markets, Bauer et al (2004) for European 
Monetary Union (EMU) and the UK, Durnev and Kim (2002) for 27 countries, Black, (2001) 
for Russian firms, Bauer and Guenster (2003) for firms in Holland, Beiner (2004) for Swiss 
firms, Black et al (2006a) for Korean firms, Brown and Caylor (2006) for US listed firms, 
Daines et al (2008) for US listed, Garay and Gonzalez (2008) for listed Venezuelan 
Companies, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) for US firms, Larker et (2007) for US listed 
companies firms, Khanchel El Mehdi ( 2007) for listed Tunisian Companies, Selvagi and 
Upton (2008) for Association of British Insures in Britain, Renders et al (2010) for FTS 
Eurofirst 300,  and McGee (2008) for Asia. 
Gompers et al. (2003) construct a governance index to proxy for the level of shareholders’ 
rights for about 1500 large firms during the 1990s. They state that the governance means 
utilised in the US to solve the agency problems are the legal protection of minority 
shareholders, an active market for corporate control and the board of directors as monitors for 
the management team. They suggest that the strength of those provisions is initially 
referenced by: security regulations, charter provisions, corporate law and bylaws and other 
rules. The governance index used is mainly focused on the governance provisions relating to 
anti-takeovers. Three hypotheses are tested in this study: firstly, weak shareholder rights 
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causes additional agency cost; secondly, governance provisions cause no higher agency costs 
but rather were put in place by managers in the 1980s who expected a poor performance for 
their firms in the 1990s; and thirdly, governance provisions do not cause poor performance 
but rather are correlated with other characteristics that were associated with abnormal returns 
in 1990s  
Gompers et al (2003) used the data and the governance provisions for four years from the 
Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC). They added a point for each provision that 
restricts shareholder rights which could be interpreted as increases in managerial discretion. 
They formed two portfolios for shareholders’ rights, divided into two categories: Democracy 
portfolio for firms with the strongest shareholder rights and Dictatorship Portfolios with the 
weakest shareholder rights. The study shows that the governance index has a positive 
correlation with Tobin’s Q, book-to-market-ratio, dividend yield, S&P 500 inclusion, share 
price, firm size, percentage of institutional ownership and monthly trading volume. However, 
it is negatively correlated to past five-year stock returns. Also, it shows that corporate 
governance and stock returns are strongly correlated during the 1990s. It also indicates that 
the portfolio of strongest shareholder rights outperform the portfolio with the weakest 
shareholder rights and earn an abnormal return of 8.5 percent annually, based on investment 
strategy that purchased the democracy portfolio and sold the dictatorship portfolio. In 
addition, the study shows that firms within the democracy portfolio had higher profits, higher 
value using Tobin’s Q, higher sales growth, and more opportunity to make acquisitions, as 
well as lower capital expenditure. Also, they found that firms with weak shareholders’ rights 
are less profitable, have less sales growth than their peers, and have higher capital 
expenditures and more acquisitions than firms with stronger shareholders’ rights. Different 
control variables are used in their study, log firm value: log book value of asset, dummy 
variable for Delaware and non- Delaware firms and dummy variables for S & P 500 
inclusion. They explained the above results in two ways, agency cost is caused by poor 
governance, and otherwise the governance is related to other factors such as risk which 
affects the stock returns. However, their results for the impact of governance on performance 
do not achieve positive support and they conclude that some variables are omitted and could 
drive such results. Furthermore, the governance index used is mainly constructed on 
shareholder rights during the 1990s and the publication of corporate governance codes and 
shareholder activism has improved since.  
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Several studies recently have extended the index to include different new mechanisms such 
as auditing, board of director rights and disclosure which leads to significant governance 
impact on the value of the firm. Klapper and Love (2004) develop an index for 14 emerging 
markets; they used a combination of 57 qualitative binary questions provided by Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CSLA). The questions cover different categories of governance, 
independence, transparency, discipline, responsibility, accountability, social awareness and 
fairness. They add one point to the governance score for each answer based on yes, although 
the analysts were instructed strictly to answer with no if there was a controversy or they were 
doubtful regarding the minority shareholder rights. They used the governance rating provided 
by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia to study the relationship between governance and 
performance of 374 firms in 14 countries - Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, 
utilising multivariate regression analysis. They measured the market valuation of assets using 
Tobin’s Q and the operating performance by Return on assets (ROA). The control variables 
that are used to proxy for growth opportunity are: average growth in sales, size, and the rate 
of investment. They found that good governance mechanisms are more vital in countries with 
inefficient enforcement and weak shareholder rights. Also, they concluded that superior 
corporate governance is highly correlated with market valuation (as measured by Tobin’s Q 
and ROA) and better operating performance. 
 
The G- Index created by Gompers et al (2003) was used as a governance index for a study led 
by Core et al. (2006) to examine the association between governance and operating 
performance ( as measured by return on asset (ROA)). The initial sample consists of all firms 
that have a G-index, and is the sample from GIM (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s (2003)). The 
study is focused to test the following hypotheses: (1) shareholder rights are not linked with 
future operating performance, (2) shareholders’ rights are not related to analyst forecast 
errors, (3) shareholder rights are not associated with excess returns just around earnings 
announcement, and (4) shareholder rights are not connected with takeover probability. They 
found that firms which have weak shareholders’ rights have poorer operating performance. 
Exploiting earnings forecast of the analysts and returns around earning announcement as 
proxies for the expectations of the investors, they found investors and analysts are not 
surprised by the different outcome in the operating performance. Their findings regarding the 
last hypothesis indicate that the takeover rate is similar for the firms with strong governance 
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and firms with weak governance. Regarding the hypothesis that considers shareholders’ 
rights cause future abnormal returns, they show that their indication is not consistent.  
 
Bauer et al. (2004) examine the effect of the corporate governance index on stock returns, 
firm value and profitability. They use Deminor corporate governance ratings for firms 
included in the Eurotop 300 over two years. Deminor Ratings (hereafter, “Deminor”) bases 
its score on approximately 300 criteria, which can be subdivided into four categories: rights 
and duties of shareholders, range of takeover defences, disclosure on corporate governance 
and board structure and functioning. They apply the approach of Gompers et al (2003) in 
building two portfolios: well-governed and poorly governed firms. Their findings indicate 
that the governance provisions have a positive relationship with stock returns and firm value, 
and have a negative relationship with operating performance. However, the positive 
relationship is weak when the differences in the countries are adjusted.  
 
 Drobetz et al. (2004b) constructed a governance index based on 30 governance practices 
distributed into five categories: shareholders’ rights, transparency, corporate governance 
commitment, auditing and management and supervisory board matters. The objective in this 
study was to provide evidence for the hypothesized relationship between governance and 
expected rate of returns within a single jurisdiction. Thus, they conducted their study in a 
broad cross-section of German listed public firms to test the relationship between a large set 
of governance proxies and expected returns.  They used three different measures as a proxy 
for return on equity, historical stock return (RI) and fundamental valuation measures, such as 
Dividend Yield (DY) and Price-earnings ratios (PE). The sample period applied in this study 
covers the 50 months starting from, January 1, 1998 to March 1, 2002. Based on the proxies 
for firm-specific corporate governance, their results show that there are major differences in 
firm-specific governance across listed German firms. They hypothesized the following 
model: if existing ex ante governance provisions are not effective or not appropriate, there is 
a higher incentive for large shareholders and institutional shareholders to discipline and 
monitor more actively the incumbent management for not being successful. Because 
increasing monitoring activities increase the cost, shareholders require higher expected rate of 
return on equity as an adequate compensation for the occurring risk. The rationale is that the 
required return on equity decreases when firm-specific corporate governance mechanism 
improves and this implies higher valuation for the firm as the monitoring activities for 
investors are diminished.  
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They found a strong relationship between their corporate governance rating and firm value 
which aligned with the stated hypothesis. However, they report a negative relationship 
between corporate governance rating and dividend yields in a cross-section of listed German 
firms. They explain this observation with the predictions from agency theory. Also, their 
findings indicates that there is a significant positive relationship between average historical 
returns and the corporate governance rating  that suggests higher corporate governance firms 
have performed better in the past. They explain this suggestion rationally with lower 
unexpected agency costs or the exclusion of failure in particular governance mechanisms in 
high corporate governance rating firms. Finally, an investment strategy which bought high 
corporate governance rating firms and shorted low corporate governance firms will have 
gained abnormal returns of around 12 % on an annual basis within the sample period of the 
study. 
 
 Durnev and Kim (2002) used only the first six categories used by Klapper and Love (2004) 
to build a composite index for companies across 27 countries. They examined why firms 
practice high-quality governance when the law does not require it; firm attributes related to 
the quality of governance; how the attributes interact with the legal environment; and the 
relation between firm valuation and corporate governance. Using firm-level governance and 
transparency data on 859 firms in 27 countries, they  find that firms with greater growth 
opportunities, greater needs for external financing, and more concentrated cash flow rights 
practice higher-quality governance and disclose more. Moreover, firms that score higher in 
governance and transparency rankings are valued higher in the stock market. Equally 
importantly, all these relations are stronger in countries that are less investor friendly, 
demonstrating that firms do adapt to poor legal environments to establish efficient 
governance practices. 
 
Black (2001) examines the relationship between corporate governance behaviour and market 
value for a sample of 21 Russian firms. Black used September 1999 data to test the 
proposition which is based on firm’s corporate governance behaviour having an impact on 
their market value. He used corporate governance rankings for these firms, developed by a 
Russian investment bank, Brunswick Warburg. He used two data sets provided independently 
by two prominent Russian investment banks, Brunswick Warburg and Troika Dialog, to test 
whether inter-firm variation in corporate governance behaviour has a major impact on firms’ 
market value in Russia. The first data set is September 1999 corporate governance rankings; 
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Brunswick Warburg rated Russian firms on a scale from 0 to 60, where 0 indicates good 
governance while higher numbers shows poor governance. The second data set consists of 
value ratios for these firms in September 1999 (matching the date of the corporate 
governance rankings). The value ratio is computed as the ratio of (i) actual market 
capitalization, based on trading prices in the Russian stock market, to (ii) potential Western 
market capitalization, if the firm were operated and valued in an efficient western market. 
Actual market capitalization is based on trading prices, which are prices paid for minority, 
non-controlling shares. The private benefits of control in Russia are high, so for most firms, 
their economic value likely exceeds their market capitalization. 
He hypothesized that the correlation between high governance rankings (low governance 
quality) is negative with the value of the firms. He ran a simple regression of in (value ratio) 
as dependent variable and governance rankings as independent variable,   finding that the 
correlation between Ln(value ratio) and governance ranking is strong and statistically 
significant, Pearson r =0.90 (t-8.97). The results are considered tentative because the sample 
is small and they explained that the strong impact of corporate governance behaviour on 
market value is due to the situation of the country as legal and cultural constraints on 
corporate behaviour are weak. 
Beiner et al (2004) study the relationship between corporate governance and the valuation of 
listed companies in Switzerland. They used a broad corporate governance index and other 
added variables linked to board characteristic, ownership structure and leverage to provide a 
complete description of firm-level corporate governance for a sample of Swiss firms. They 
sent a broad survey to all listed firms on the Swiss Stock Exchange (SWX) but excluding 
investment companies to build a firm-specific Corporate Governance index (CGI). They used 
control mechanisms that are not included in the index, such as outside blockholdings, board 
size, stock ownership by officers and directors, and the proportion of outside directors on the 
board. Their results are similar to other studies which supports the widespread hypothesis of a 
positive relationship between corporate governance and firm value. The most important 
aspects in their results are based on an increase in the corporate governance index by one 
point (index ranges are from 1 to 100) causing an increase of the market capitalisation by 
approximately 8.52%, on average of a firm’s book asset value. They reported other 
significant results on the relationship between Tobin’s Q and different control mechanisms; 
for instance, firm valuation significantly increases with higher shareholdings of directors and 
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officers. Furthermore, higher shareholdings of officers and directors are linked with a lower 
proportion of outsiders on the board. 
Black, Jang, and Kim (2003), found a positive relation between their corporate governance 
index and Tobin’s Q for a sample of 526 Korean public companies, their index primarily 
based on responses to an extensive survey among Korean listed companies and consisting of 
six subindices for shareholder rights, board of directors in general, outside directors, audit 
committee and internal auditor, disclosure to investors, and ownership parity. To control for a 
possible endogeneity, they use a three stage least square (3SLS) simultaneous equations 
approach and show that a 10 point increase (out of 100) in the governance index results in a 
19.4% increase in Tobin’s Q. Table 2.8 highlights the empirical studies between corporate 
governance indices and firm performance. 
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Table 3.8 A number of prior Studies of Relationships between Corporate Governance Index and Firm Performance 
Name of the study  
 
Country Performance measures  
 
Control Variables  
 
Results  
 
Gompers et al, (2003)  
 
US Tobin’s Q  
 
Log book value of assets, log 
firm value, dummy variable 
for Dealware and non- 
Dealware firms, dummy 
variables for S & P 500 
inclusion 
 
Significant relationship 
between governance and 
valuation, poor governance 
causes agency cost 
 
Drobetz et al, (2004)  
 
Germany Historical stock returns, 
dividend yields, price-
earnings ratios   
 
log of book asset value, the 
average of sales and asset 
growth, the log of the years 
of listing, leverage, and 
industry dummy variables 
Significant relationship   
 
Baeur, et, al, (2004)  
 
EMU and the UK Net Profit Margin, Tobin’s 
Q, Return on Equity  
 
Return-on-Equity, firm age, 
book value of asset  
 
Strong relationship  
 
Klapper and Love (2004) 
 
14 Emerging 
markets 
Tobin’s Q and ROA Average growth in sales, size 
and the rate of investment. 
Better valuation 
 
Beiner et al (2004)  
 
Swiss Tobin’s Q Firm size Positive relationship between 
corporate governance and 
Tobin’s Q. 
Black et al (2006a) 
 
Korea Tobin’s Q, market to book, 
and market to sales  
 
Set of control variables Ln 
(asset s) Ln (years of listing 
Chaebol 30 Dummy 
Debt/Equity 
 
Board independence affect 
positively market valuation 
 
Rashid, K & Sardari,(2008)  Australia and Tobin’s Q  Market Capitalisation, Price Positive relationship between 
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 Malysia  to book value 
 
CG and Value of the Firm  
 
Foerster and Huen (2004) Canada Aggregate excess return  Standard deviation of stock 
returns, market value, 
market- to-book and year 
and industry factors 
Positive link between CG 
ranking  and return 
Black (2001) Russian Value ratio (actual/potential 
market capitalisation) 
Industry CG behaviour have a 
powerful impact on market 
value 
Selvaggi and Upton (2008) Britain Returns on assets, the 
market-to book value of 
assets, returns on the 
company’s share and the 
Sharpe ratio 
Size, growth prospects, 
profit margins, asset 
composition, leverage and 
market capitalisation. 
Strong links between good 
governance and strong 
performance across all these 
measures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
3.10  Relation between governance mechanism and firm performance 
Corporate governance deals with determining mechanisms that shareholders can use to 
control managers’ decisions to protect their investment. Increasing financial problems and 
deregulation as well as the integration of capital markets around the world can be used to 
examine theories about how to minimise the conflicts between managers and shareholders, 
between large shareholders and minority shareholders, and between debt holders and 
shareholders as well as how countries can design an effective corporate governance system to 
protect investors and the economy at the same time. In this context, this thesis will examine 
how the following internal governance mechanisms— board characteristics (size, 
independency, duality), managerial ownership, executive compensation and financial policies 
(Debt and Dividend) can help to minimise these problems. 
 
The review of the extensive body of existing governance research has identified mixed results 
for the relationship between governance mechanisms with the firm value. The following table 
provides the summary of results from previous studies investigating the link between board 
size, CEO duality, board independence, managerial ownership, executive compensation and 
financial policies (debt and dividend) with the firm value. 
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Table 3.9 Summary of previous findings 
Governance variables Author, date Result ( relation with firm value) 
Board size Yermack (1996)  Negative association 
Eisenberg et al. (1998)  Negative 
Conyon & Peck (1998)  
 
Inversely related 
 
Dalton et at. (1999)  
 
Small positive, but moderated by firm 
size. 
Brown and Caylor (2004)   
 
 
Board sizes between six and fifteen have 
better returns and net profit margin 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2004)  Positive association with Q (diversified, 
large and high leverage firms) 
Board Independence Fosberg (1989)  
 
Insignificant relationship 
 
Baysinger, Kosnik, Turk (199 1). 
 
Positive association with R&D 
investment 
 
Yermack (1996), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996)  Negative correlation 
 
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998)  
Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) 
No clear link 
Positive correlation 
 Bhagat and Black (2002),  Inverse correlation 
Brown and Caylor (2004), MacNeil and Li (2006) Inverse correlation 
 
Baysinger and Butler (1985)  
 
No significant same-year correlation 
Cotter and Silvester (2003)  No significant association 
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Dahya and McConnell (2005)  
 
 
Positive correlation with the 
appointment of  
Belden, Fister and Knapp (2005) 
 
Outside CEO 
Positive link with dividend payment 
Managerial ownership  Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Short and Keasey 
(1999), Lau (2004), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990)  
Non-linear relationship 
 
 
 
 
Chung and Pruitt (1996)  
 
 
 
CEO equity ownership positively 
influences Tobin's Q 
 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999)  Could not conclude the effect 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
 
Find no statistical significant 
relationship 
Davies, Hillier, and McColgan (2005) Interdependent with each other 
Financial policies 
 
Debt 
Dahya and McConnell (2005a) 
Brick et al. (2006) 
Positive relationship 
 
 
 
Debt 
 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) Negative relationship 
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Debt 
 
Holderness et al.(1999) Negative relationship 
 
Debt Morck et al. (1988) Negative relationship 
Dividend 
 
Dividend 
Thomsen (2004) 
La Porta et al. (2000) 
Negative relationship 
 
Better protectionhigher dividend and 
High growth 
CEO duality Dahya et al. (2002) 
 
 
Positive relationship with 
Cadbury recommendations 
Faccio and Lasfer (1999) No relationship 
Dahya and McConnell (2005a) 
 
splitting the roles—no relationship 
Weir et al. (2002) 
 
No relationship 
Executive compensation Florackis and Ozkan (2008 Negative relationship 
Conyon (1997) Positive relationship  
Cyert et al. (2002) 
 
Negative relationship 
 
Kamg et al. (2006) 
 
Positive relationship  
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The mixed findings of previous research indicate that further evidence is needed on a number 
of issues, thus further work is required to support corporate governance research. Differences 
in findings may arise from law and governance regimes, market conditions and research 
design and methodology.  Work can be extended to a different corporate governance regime 
(UK vs. US) and a later time period, where market conditions (declining or stable market), 
and the maturity of governance regime should find more evidence about the relationship of 
governance and performance. An exploration of methodological issues, including the 
importance of endogeneity among the selected variables and test of choice and instrumental 
variables, should improve the interpretability of previous research.  
 
The main objective of this work is to examine the relationship between firm performance and 
corporate governance in the UK. To achieve this objective, these internal mechanisms were 
selected in order to test this relationship. Other researchers (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; 
Denis & McConnel, 2003; Denis, 2001; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Jensen, 1986) have 
argued that internal control mechanisms include ownership structure, firm compensation, 
board of directors, and financial policies (dividends and debt), whereas external mechanisms 
include the market for corporate control, legal system, and the factor and product market. 
These mechanisms provide protection and checks in a firm’s operations, disciplining 
shareholders and management. This study includes the theoretical framework and empirical 
studies from developed countries that investigate the relationship between these mechanisms 
and firm performance. Consistent with these discussions, a number of research questions will 
be developed for all the corporate governance mechanisms discussed. 
3.11 Gaps identified in the literature review 
The UK corporate governance system has been improving since the publication of the 
Cadbury Report in 1992. The Cadbury Report has emphasised a number of corporate 
governance mechanisms in its code of best practice that should be followed by UK listed 
firms. Many corporate governance reviews and reports attempting to improve corporate 
governance system have been published in the UK. For example, the Greenbury Report 
(1995), the Higgs Review (2003), the Smith Review (2003) and a series of combined codes 
have been issued since 1998 to 2010, focusing on different aspects of corporate governance.  
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The Companies Act (2006) in the UK has been amended to reflect changes in the corporate 
governance system and adopt the changes of the updated combined codes. The Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance has been revised and updated, listed firms should follow the 
updated versions of the Code. For example, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance of 
1998 requires a third of the board of listed firms to be nonexecutive directors. This changed 
to more than half of the board in 2003 when the code was updated. Even though the adoption 
of these measures is optional, UK firms are expected to comply with them, as the London 
Stock Exchange requires all listed companies to clarify in their annual reports whether they 
have complied with the code and to provide justification if they have not done so (Vafeas and 
Theodorou, 1998, Weir et al., 2002, Financial Reporting Council, 2003, Financial Reporting 
Council, 2008, Financial Services Authority, 2008). Although it has been evident that the 
level of compliance by companies has increased, the relationship between firm performance 
and corporate governance has been mixed and inconclusive in previous research. Arguably, 
all these changes have an impact on both corporate governance mechanisms and, as a result, 
corporate performance. Thus, corporate governance seems to be continuously developing. 
A number of corporate governance measures have been proposed to mitigate the agency 
problems between owners and managers. Weir, Weir and Laing (2000) and Laing and 
McKnight (2002) showed that the recommendations of the Cadbury Report produced no 
significant effect on corporate performance. But there is an argument poisted by scholars that 
better firm performance is achieved in well-governed firms. A large number of empirical 
works found no clear link between firm performance and corporate governance and there is 
little consensus regarding the causal relationship between governance mechanisms and 
corporate performance. Therefore, it is very interesting to test whether a relationship exists 
between internal corporate governance mechanisms and performance. Thus, this signifies the 
need for further research in this area.  
Most of the studies have been using one or more governance mechanisms in one model such 
as independent directors, board size, managerial ownership and others to test it against 
corporate performance. Therefore, this study has used most of the governance mechanisms in 
one model to examine empirically its link and impact on performance: board characteristics 
(board size, independent directors, CEO duality and Audit committee), managerial 
ownership, executive remuneration and financial policies (Debt and Dividend). The majority 
of existing empirical studies on corporate governance have modelled corporate performance 
as a function of corporate governance mechanisms. These empirical studies often face several 
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serious methodological problems related to endogeneity (Guest, 2009, Wintoki et ai., 2012). 
Endogeneity and causality might exist between firm performance and corporate governance 
mechanisms. Therefore, when such problems are found it means the OLS estimates in the 
main model will be inconsistent and biased. Thus, to deal with such problems in an empirical 
work, 2SLS regressions and instrument variables methods were employed. Finally, few 
studies have used the most up-to date and comprehensive data after so many changes 
occurred since Cadbury Report which distinguishes this study from the existing studies on 
corporate governance in the UK. Also, few studies on UK corporate governance have used 
panel data to examine the relationship between corporate governance and corporate 
performance. This study uses data across six years from 2005 to 2010 for FTSE Non-
Financial firms. Furthermore, this study attempts to bridge these gaps by examining a six-
year period of time, from 2005 to 2010. 
3.12 Summary 
The literature chapter has suggested that firms use several governance mechanisms to reduce 
agency problems, thereby improving firm performance. Large shareholders can be an 
important potential monitoring device for solving the free-rider problem associated with 
small shareholders. However, empirical studies have suggested that the relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm performance is mixed, while the level of activism depends 
on the type of institution or shareholders. The board of directors was also discussed as a 
potential mechanism for controlling agency problems. Studies have documented the value of 
appointing outside (external) directors, separating the CEO and chairman, and having smaller 
boards. The evidence related to board characteristics on firm performance is mixed, 
highlighting the need for more research on such relationships. In addition, financial policies 
(Debts and Dividends) were determined to be internal mechanisms for reducing agency costs, 
thereby improving firm performance. Agency theory suggests that dividends help manage 
agency costs by reducing retained free cash flows; otherwise, managers can use them on 
unprofitable projects, thereby impacting firm performance. In short, previous studies have 
found that several mechanisms do not work as agency theory predicts, and the relationship 
between governance mechanisms and firm performance is more complex. Although we can 
assume that a relationship exists among governance variables, not all of them are related to 
higher firm performance. 
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4 Chapter three: Methodology 
4.1  Introduction 
There are five sections in this chapter. This chapter presents and discusses the methodology 
embraced in this thesis along with the data analysis exploited to provide answers for the 
research questions set and outlined previously. Section one sets out to define the study 
objectives and research questions. Section two covers the research paradigm which is 
primarily a positivist approach. Section three considers and evaluates the research 
methodology advanced to achieve the objectives of the study; it thus focuses on the 
quantitative methods mainly through the use of regression and secondary data gathered from 
a number of different sources. Section four introduces the sample selection, dependent and 
independent variables, control variables and the performance measure variables. Section five 
includes the proposed hypotheses which are premised on the conceptual framework of 
corporate governance in the literature chapter. The final section presents the analytical 
technique, mainly regression analysis, and the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) 
will be used to run the analysis.   
4.2  Study objectives and research questions 
As mentioned previously, results of the relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate performance are mixed and conflicting in previous studies. This study is focused on 
the UK and its primary objective is to examine the relationship between firm performance 
(measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA) and corporate governance internal mechanisms (Board 
characteristics, Financial Policies). Figure one on presents the conceptual framework of the 
study within the Governance Code and Agency Theory impact and effects. The study 
investigates the following proposed questions to inform the main objective. 
 
9 What impact does managerial ownership have on firm performance?  
10 What impact does the presence of independent directors have on firm performance?  
11 Does board size have an impact on firm performance? 
12  Does the separation of the CEO and chairman roles have any impact on firm 
performance? 
13 What impact does the presence of an Audit Committee have on firm performance? 
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14 What is the relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance? 
15 What is the relationship between debt levels and firm performance? 
16 What is the relationship between dividend policy and firm performance?  
4.3  Research paradigm 
The three main epistemological methodological assumptions are positivism, interpretive, and 
the realism approach. For the purpose of this study, the first former approaches were used to 
study the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance mechanisms in 
the UK.  
As demonstrated in Chapter Two, this research follows the quantitative method.  This method 
was utilised since most previous studies in the context of developed countries examined the 
relationship between firm performance and corporate governance mechanisms using 
quantitative data. Accordingly, the research adopts the positivist epistemology. 
4.3.1 Positivist approach 
Broadly speaking, the positivist method is applied when the research study is aimed to 
generate universal laws of specific social behaviour. In this view, a positivist approach 
suggests that social phenomena can be researched similar to natural phenomena; in other 
words, it assumes social reality such as attributes, beliefs, satisfactions, and behaviours can 
be subjected to traditional scientific study by independent observers that could be 
investigated empirically. Positivist research frequently uses quantitative and statistical 
analyses for analysing and interpreting their subject matter. It is widely used and defined as 
the approach of the natural sciences; people assume that this approach is the most scientific 
(Neuman, 2006). Neuman (2006, p. 82) argued that" researchers prefer precise quantitative 
data and often use experiments, surveys, and statistics. They seek rigorous, exact measures 
and objective research and they test hypotheses by carefully analysing numbers from the 
measures". Additionally, Sarantakos (1988, p. 38) defined this approach from the perspective 
of the purpose of social research as "a tool for studying social events and learning about them 
and their interconnections so that general causal laws can be discovered, explained, and 
documented. Knowledge of events and social laws allows society to control events and to 
predict their occurrence". 
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Therefore, the positivist approach was adopted in the research as it assumes that large 
amounts of comparable data can be objectively collected, analysed and reported. As 
previously mentioned, the aim is to compare the empirical findings derived from the study 
with the theoretical premises reviewed in the literature herein. Moreover, the positivist 
approach underpins a theoretical focus for the researcher while still being capable of 
controlling the research process. According to Laughlin (1995), positivist research is 
characterised by a high level of theorisation about the subject of research and a high level of 
formulisation of methods. Nevertheless, Laughlin argues that using the positivist research is 
explicitly unrealistic. This could be suggested when positivism is applied in the study of 
human behaviour where the complex and intangible traits of human nature as well as the 
intangible quality of social phenomena might contradict  the regularity and systematic 
characteristics of the natural world. Laughlin stated "Parsimonious assumptions are made 
and the theory‘s ability to provide meaningful predictions of outcomes is used to assess the 
theory‘s utility". For example, capital markets theory makes unrealistic assumptions about the 
completeness of markets, full information, and zero transactions costs but provides 
predictions about behaviour that fit empirical observations well. 
4.4  Research Methodology 
Consistent with the positivist approach in the previous section, accounting studies embrace 
quantitative methods, also known alternatively as market-based, mainstream, scientific and 
positivism. Recently, quantitative approaches followed in accounting studies have become 
more popular as a result of the increasing availability of electronic database sources such as 
DataStream, Bloomberg and Compustat and online annual reports which provide financial 
information and data. Researchers of quantitative studies are engaged with the 
operationalisation, prediction, manipulation, and testing of empirical variables, emphasising 
research design, procedure, and statistical measures of validity (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 1996). In short, the current study will use one type of data collection method 
which is quantitative data (Bloomberg and annual reports). An OLS regression model is the 
primary technique used to determine the variables’ influence on the relationship between 
corporate governance internal mechanisms and firm performance. Consistent with majority of 
studies in the developed world (e.g Dedman (2003), Lasfer (2006), Peasnell et al. (2000), 
Young (2000)) and public policy interest and concern surrounding large firms, and in order to 
investigate the research questions identified previously, it was decided to analyse a 
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substantial population of UK listed companies and concentrate solely on large non-financial 
companies, as the financial firms need to follow additional regulations.   
 
Alexander (2004) discusses the way that financial sectors and banking are subject to different 
corporate governance regulations to the non-financial sectors due to the higher risk that these 
financial institutions represent to the economy. Selecting large financial firms as well would 
obscure the ability to compare the findings of this study with the majority of other empirical 
studies in this field. In addition, econometric analysis is followed and applied to deal with 
large sample quantitative data of this sort.  
4.4.1 Sample selection, justification of the sample period and look-ahead bias  
Some variables are used as proxies for both firm performance and corporate governance 
internal mechanisms to investigate the relationship between them. Figure one presents the 
conceptual framework of this study and it shows that two measures— market measures 
(Tobin’s Q) and Accounting measures (Return on Assets) are selected for firm performance 
and board characteristics, ownership structure and financial policies for corporate governance 
mechanisms. Also, firm size and industry are the two control variables used in the current 
study that may have an impact on the relationship between corporate governance internal 
mechanisms and firm performance. The sample is considered the list of member companies 
of the FTSE All Share Index between two particular points: the end of December 2004 and 
the end of March 2011. FTSE All Share Index as defined by Bloomberg: The FTSE All-
Share Index is a capitalization-weighted index comprising of the FTSE 350 and the FTSE 
SmallCap Indices. This research studied the FTSE All Shares non-financial companies 
because all are concerned and governed with the same code; however the study excluded the 
financial firms due to significant differences in regulation and debt structures. The period of 
the study selected is from 2005 to 2010 which is over six years. This period falls after the 
main regulations arising from several key reports (Cadbury 1992, Greenbury Report 1995, 
Hampel Report 1998, The Combined Code 1998, Turnbull Report 1999, Myners Report 
2001, Smith Report 2003, Higgs Report 2003 and The Combined code 2003), where all the 
major recommendations suggested in these reports and reforms have been settled. Selecting 
the period of study across six years, recognizes and identifies the evolution and impact of 
internal corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance using both accounting and 
market measures (Tobin’s Q and ROA). 
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All the previous works in this area were widely used and focused on large companies, for 
instance past research in the USA has been mainly focused on big companies, and thus 
selecting the FTSE All Share is compatible, similar and comparable with these studies, as it 
includes the most influential listed companies both economically and financially. Moreover, 
in the UK the Corporate Governance Code is more applicable to large companies rather than 
smaller ones. The analysis period is between 30 June 2004 and 30 June 2010, with several 
reasons dictating this process. Survivorship bias is an important statistical problem as a 
recognizable part of the sample required to be chosen as at the start of the analysis period, but 
as the period of the study is over six years, some of these members which appear at the 
beginning of the analysis period disappear over the course and towards the end of the analysis 
period. Thus the sample was replenished in order to make up for the missing members and to 
make a representative view of the corporate governance evolution across the time tested in 
this study. It could have followed a simpler and straight-forward approach to include all the 
companies that were members at the index at any time within the period of the study between 
2005 and 2010. However, data cost and analysis demands would have increased greatly in 
this case, so an alternative approach was adopted where the companies are classified with 
regards to their survival on the index and the sample finally included all the companies 
survived for terms of 6, 5 and 4 years. After excluding the financial firms, the sample 
consisted of 363 companies which survived over 6, 5 and 4 years. Appendix Ch. 3.1 shows 
the process of finalising the sample and the final sample of 363 companies with its names, 
code, the industry of each company and number of years survived across the sample period, 
the following table 3.1 indicates with numbers how the sample was finalised. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of the sample of the study 
Total Number of FTSE All Shares as stated in Bloomberg 623 
   Minus   
  
Financial Companies 57 
Equal    
Non-Financial 
Companies 566 
 Companies survived 1 
year 83 
Companies survived 2 
years 66 
Companies survived 3 
years 54 
Companies survived 4 
years 39 
Companies survived 5 
years 48 
Companies survived 6 
years 276 
  
FTSE All Shares that survived over 3 years consist the sample of 
the study excluding Financial Companies   363 
 
In addition, the Bloomberg data has been validated to ensure its accuracy. 25 firms from the 
sample have been selected randomly; the Bloomberg data for these firms has been cross-
checked with the firm’s annual reports and found to reconcile precisely. This certifies the 
accuracy of Bloomberg data which has been used for the study 
 
Figure 3.1 displays the data related to the variables needed to test the hypothesis with the 
sources of these data. Table 3.2 presents the main sources of data and its specific information 
also table 3.3 shows the sample summary with regards to the industry classification.   
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Internal Corporate Governance mechanisms: In addition to the usual suspects, namely 
managerial ownership, ownership concentration and board structure, there is an emphasis on 
how Financial Policies (Debt and Dividend) and executive compensation have an impact on 
the performance of the firm. 
Figure 4 Model of the firm performance and corporate governance mechanisms  
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Performance measures (ROA and Tobin’s Q) 
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Managerial 
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The link between corporate 
governance and firm 
performance is mixed 
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Table 4.2 Main sources of data and its specific information 
Source of data Types of data Specific information 
Bloomberg and annual 
Reports 
Board characteristics, 
directors ownership and 
directors remuneration 
Board size, Independent 
directors, CEO Duality, Role, 
Audit Committee and number 
of shares owned by directors 
and executive and non-
executive remuneration 
Bloomberg and annual 
reports 
Financial Policies ( Debt and 
dividend), firm size 
Total debt, Earnings Per 
share, Dividend per share and 
Total assets  
 
Table 4.3 Industries classification based on the Bloomberg Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB) 
8 industries chosen in the sample Number included in the Sample 
Basic Materials 23 
Consumer Goods 38 
Consumer Services 103 
Health Care  19 
Industrial  111 
Oil and Gas 20 
Technology  38 
Utilities 11 
Total 363 
 
As discussed in the literature review chapter, firm performance measures in previous studies 
are divided into two groups: market-based and accounting measures. Take into consideration 
that no consensus has emerged concerning the selection of a dependent variable for 
measuring firm performance, where any measure selected has both disadvantages and 
advantages. Therefore, both performance measures from the two groups of studies are 
employed in this study, thus the robustness of the results are improved. The dependent 
variables are described in Table 3.4. 
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Table 4.4  Dependant variables Description   
Variables Bloomberg definition and 
measurement 
Previous studies Measured by advantages 
Tobin’s Q Definition: Ratio of the market 
value of a firm to the replacement 
cost of the firm's assets. The Q ratio 
is useful for the valuation of a 
company. It is based on the 
hypothesis that in the long run the 
market value of a company should 
roughly equal the cost of replacing 
the company's assets (Bloomberg, 
2014). 
 
Morck et al. 
(1988), Cho 
(1998), Hermalin 
and Weisbach 
(1991), 
McConnell and 
Servaes (1990), 
Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), 
Davies et al. 
(2005), Deb and 
Chaturvedula 
(2003), and 
Omran et 
al.(2008) 
The ratio is computed as follows: 
(Market Cap + Liabilities + Preferred Equity + 
Minority Interest) / Total Assets 
Where, 
Market Cap is, (Bloomberg Field Definitions), 
Historical _Market_Cap 
Liabilities is, BS_TOT_LIAB, 
Preferred Equity is, BS_PFD_EQY 
Minority Interest is, BS_MINORITY_INT 
Total Assets is, BS_TOT_ASSET 
 
This measure 
indicates what 
management will 
accomplish with 
assets. This 
measure is based 
on the investors’ 
perception and 
influenced by 
future events. 
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ROA Definition: Return on Assets 
(ROA, in percentage) is an 
indicator of how profitable a 
company is relative to its total 
assets. ROA gives an idea as to 
how efficient management is at 
using its assets to generate 
earnings. 
Calculated as: 
(Trailing 12M Net Income / 
Average Total Assets) * 100 
Where: (Bloomberg Field 
Definitions) 
Trailing 12M Net Income is, 
TRAIL_12M_NET_INC 
Average Total Assets is the average 
of the beginning balance and 
ending balance of, 
BS_TOT_ASSET 
 
Denis and Denis 
(1994), Lehmann 
and Weigand 
(2000), and Xu 
and Wang (1997) 
ROA= Net Income/ Total Assets (Bloomberg, 
2014). 
 
This measure 
indicates what 
management has 
accomplished 
with assets 
because usually 
managers use the 
firm’s assets for 
their interests. 
Therefore, less 
ROA means 
inefficiency. 
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4.4.2 Descriptions of Dependent Variables: Tobin’s Q and ROA 
The link between firm performance and other variables such as corporate governance 
variables has been the centre of a large number of empirical works. Both measures (market 
and accounting) of firm performance have been chosen differently and employed in different 
studies. Several studies such as Yermack (1996), Booth and Deli (1996), Cotter and Silvester 
(2003), Hayes, Mehran and Schaefer (2004) and Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2004) use market 
to book ratio (Tobin’s Q) as firm performance measure. Although these studies have used the 
market to book ratio which is the common measurement, the calculation is applied differently 
amongst these studies, for instance Yermak has utilised market value divided by the 
replacement value of assets, while Booth and Deli has only taken into consideration the given 
total value of the assets as its denominator in their calculation. As a consequence, considering 
that these two studies have chosen similar samples, the firm performance would be different 
due to the selection of the calculation where the value of the assets, issue of recognition and 
measurement of the Q components and methods of estimation are different.  
4.4.2.1 Tobin’s Q  
Tobin’s Q was first introduced by Tobin in 1969, but several articles have discussed the 
development of this measure. For instance, Perfect and Wiles (1994) compare 5 estimators of 
Q; taking their findings into account Chung and Pruitt (1994) noticed the computational 
difficulty in calculating Q after Lindenberg and Ross (1981). They changed the calculation of 
Q and simplified it assuming that the replacement values of assets like equipment, inventories 
and plants are similar to their book values. They tested Q values of their model and 
Lindenberg and Ross Tobin’s Q model by carrying out a study for ten-year cross-sectional 
comparisons and they found the same results under both models. 
 
A further study by DaDalt, Donaldson and Garner (2003), comparing the build of Q 
components between the simple approach represented by Chung and Pruitt (1994) model and 
the computationally costly approach used by Perfect and Wiles (1994), advocated that the 
simple approach is more preferable. They proposed that deviation in Q is possibly related to 
the variations within the firm in terms of financial characteristics like profitability, leverage 
and liquidity.  
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4.4.2.2 Return on Assets (ROA) 
The return on assets measure has faced some critics within the management literature such as 
Dalton et al. (1998, p. 274). But this ratio is still considered and viewed as a valid 
performance measure; it is important and has been broadly used within the governance 
research examples. The criticism is based on and due to the imperfect measurement with 
relation to assets and profits and preserve incentives on internal decision-making. It is 
believed that much of the imperfect measurement critics are likely to be linked to industry 
membership in cross-sectional analysis studies where the issue could be solved and controlled 
for by using industry membership as a control variable. The preceding table provides details 
of the firm performance measures chosen for this thesis.    
4.4.3  Independent variables 
Figure one in section 3.5.1 presented the corporate governance internal mechanisms that are 
identified as independent variables in this thesis. These variables are: managerial ownership, 
independent directors, executive remuneration, board size, role duality, Audit Committee, 
Debt, and Dividends. The following table 3.5 presents these variables with the theoretical 
context, definitions from Bloomberg and how they have been covered in some empirical 
works. 
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Table 4.5 Independent variables Descriptions 
Variable Bloomberg 
Definitions  
Measured by Theoretical Empirical 
Director Ownership 
(DIRW) 
Percentage of 
outstanding shares 
currently held by 
insiders. 
 
DIRW is the total 
shareholdings of directors 
over the total number of 
shares. 
 Hermalin and Weisbach(1991), 
Short and Keasey (1999), 
Lau(2004), Morck, Shleifer, 
andVishny(1988), and 
McConnell andServaes(1990) 
non-linear relationship 
 
Davies,Hillier, and McColgan 
(2005)interdependent with each 
Other Himmelberg, Hubbard 
and Palia (1999) could not 
conclude the effect 
 
Dermsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) find no statistical 
significant relationship 
 
Chung and Pruitt (1996) CEO 
equity ownership positively 
influences Tobin's Q 
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Independent directors 
(INDEP) 
Number of 
Independent 
directors on the 
company's board as 
reported by the 
company. 
Independence is 
defined according to 
the company's own 
criteria. The 
company has a 
Supervisory Board 
and a Management 
Board; this is the 
number of 
Independent 
Directors on the 
Supervisory Board. 
Independent 
directors as a 
percentage of total 
board membership 
Proportion of non-
executive directors to total 
number of directors 
Fama and Jensen (1983); 
Cadbury Committee 
(1992); 
Weisbach (1988); Jensen 
and Meckling(1976 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990); 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998); 
Agrawal and Koneber (1996); 
Choi et al. (2007) 
Audit Number of meetings 
of the Board's Audit 
Committee during 
the reporting period.  
Dummy variable; 1 if there 
is an audit committee, 0 
otherwise 
Menon and Williams 
(1994); (DeZoort et al 
(2002); Brodsky et al 
(2003); (Carcello and Neal 
2000) 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005); 
Abbott et al (2004); 
Archambeault and DeZoort 
(2001); Abbott and Parker 
(2000). 
Role duality 
(ROLE) 
Indicates whether 
the company's Chief 
Executive Officer is 
Dummy variable; 1 if the 
chairman is also the CEO, 
Cadbury Committee (1992) 
Jensen and Meckling 
(1976); Jensen (1986) 
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also Chairman of the 
Board as reported by 
the company. "N" 
indicates the two 
roles are separate.  
0 otherwise Rechner and Dalton (1991);  
Faccio and Lasfer (1999);  
Vafeas and Theodorou (1998); 
Haniffa and Hudaib(2006) 
Board size 
(BSIZE) 
Number of Directors 
on the company's 
board, as reported by 
the company; these 
are full time 
Directors only. 
Deputy members of 
the Board will not be 
counted. The 
company has a 
Supervisory Board 
and a Management 
Board; this is the 
number of Directors 
on the Supervisory 
Board. 
 
Total number of directors 
on the board 
Jensen (1993); Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992); Pearce and 
Zahra (1992) 
Bhagat and Black (2002); Coles 
et al. (2008); Kholief (2008); 
Yermack (1996); Conyon and 
Peck (1998); Haniffa and 
Hudaib(2006) 
Executive remuneration 
(EXCREM) 
The ratio of total 
cash compensation 
that is provided to 
executive directors 
to total assets 
 
 Harvey and Shrieves 
(2001);  Kamg et al. (2006); 
Perry (1999); Jiraporn et al. 
(2005). 
Conyon (1997); (Florackis and 
Ozkan (2008 
Debt (DEBT) Total debt to total 
assets (in 
percentage) is 
calculated as 
Total debt/total assets Jensen and Meckling 
(1976); Jensen (1986); 
Easterbook (1984) 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); 
Bohren 
and Odegaard (2001); Haniffa 
and 
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follows: 
 ST Borrowings + 
LT Borrowings 
 ------------------------
----- * 100 
 Total Assets 
Hudaib(2006); Aljifri and 
Mustafe (2007) 
Dividend 
(DPout) 
Returns the latest 
reported annual 
dividend per share  
Bottom-line 
Earnings per share.  
It includes the 
effects of all one-
time, non-recurring 
and extraordinary 
gains/losses. It uses 
Basic Weighted 
Average Shares 
excluding the effects 
of convertibles. 
Computed as Net 
Income Available to 
Common 
Shareholders divided 
by the Basic 
Weighted Average 
Shares outstanding. 
 
 
Dividend per 
share/earnings per share 
Jensen and Meckling 
(1976); Jensen (1986); 
Easterbook (1984) 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989); 
Bohren and Odegaard (2001); 
Aljifri and Mustaf2 (2007) 
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4.4.4  Control variables 
In addition to the independent variables, a number of control variables that have previously 
been important in determining firm performance are included in the analysis. Firm size and 
industry are the two control variables chosen for this thesis to control other potential impacts 
on firm performance. They have been used in several studies examining the relationship 
between firm performance and corporate governance mechanisms (See Table 3.6). Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) suggest that governance characteristics may differ, depending on firm size, 
and (Shivdasani, 1993) type of industry. 
 
Short and Keasey (1999) point out that firm performance could be affected by firm size in 
two ways, firstly large firms are able to generate funds internally and additionally have easier 
access to external sources for funds which could be available to support any investment in 
profitable projects. Secondly, large firms are able to make entry obstacles to improve the 
performance. Black, Jang and Kim (2006) argue that management and control of large firms 
are more difficult and they look for advanced corporate governance. The agency cost in large 
firms is more existent and obvious because managers in these firms have greater discretion 
which leads to higher monitoring costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, small size 
firms might have lower monitoring costs and lower relative investment in internal control 
mechanisms (disclosure and information systems). Thirdly firm size has been shown to have 
relationship with governance mechanisms, for example there is evidence that firm size affects 
firm's compensation policies. Results from Gaver and Gaver (1993) show significant positive 
association between level of cash compensation and firm size. While Jensen and Murphy 
(1990) findings indicate that large firms' CEOs tends to have less compensation based 
incentives than CEO in smaller firms. This could be due to large diversification of ownership 
in the large firms and the management being controlled by other mechanisms. Generally, the 
total compensation includes salary, bonus, value of restricted stock, savings and thrift plans, 
and other benefits. Jensen and Murphy (1990) in their study defined total compensation as the 
sum of salaries, bonuses, fringe benefits, the face value of deferred compensation unadjusted 
for the cost of restrictions on marketability and the time value of money, and restricted stock 
awarded during the year (valued at the end of- year stock price). Cyert et.al (2002) find a 
strong positive relationship between contingent compensation and firm size and that the level 
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of total CEO compensation is related to firm size. Fourthly, size of the firms may affect 
corporate governance structure in several ways. For example, the cost of complying with the 
Code's requirement will be relatively low for larger firms. On the other hand, following non-
compliance with the Code, larger firms are exposed to higher levels of media enquiry than 
smaller firms. Large firms would be able to attract candidates for non-executive directorships 
because of the esteem associated with being on the board of large corporation. 
The empirical work shows that firm size is a crucial variable with regards to the 
characteristics of the board of directors. There is a significant positive relation to the board 
size and to the external directors but with the CEO duality it is negatively correlated (Hossain 
et al., 2001). Welch (2003) studied the relationship between ownership structure and firm size 
for Australian listed firms and found a negative relationship. His findings support the idea 
that if firms become larger it leads to a reduction in ownership concentration, which means 
that shareholders may have to make more investment to be able to get a high level of 
shareholdings. Accordingly, he argued that the relationship between firm size and firm 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q is negative.  
 
Another study has found results consistent with Welch’s findings; Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
studied Malaysian firms and found that the market recognizes that small firms perform better 
than larger firms. In other words, small firms are perceived to have greater growth 
opportunity than the larger firms where it is possible for smaller firms to grow proportionally 
in size more than larger firms. Apparently, firm size possibly affects both ownership structure 
and board characteristics. Therefore, firm size is chosen to be a control variable in this thesis 
to examine how firm performance is affected by internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
 
The industry variable is the other variable selected to control any potential impact of other 
factors on firm performance which have not been controlled for. Firm performance could be 
affected by the sensitivity of the industries, macroeconomic and other political factors, thus 
industry sector is a key figure of firm performance (Short and Keasey, 1999). Also, an 
industry dummy variable is important as a control variable for the probable specious 
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, which could be originated 
from the industry influence (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Black et al (2006) argue that firms 
operating in highly competitive industries have an efficient performance. The following table 
3.6 presents control variables, their definitions and previous work. 
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Table 4.6 Control Variable Descriptions, definitions and previous work 
Variables Bloomberg 
definitions 
Measured by Previous Studies 
Firm size  The total of all 
short and long-
term assets as 
reported on the 
Balance Sheet.  
 
Total assets. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985); Morck et al. 
(1988); McConnell and 
Servaes (1990); 
Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991); Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006); Mura 
(2006); 
Wiwattanakantang 
(2001); Bhagat and 
Bolton (2008). 
Industry Industry 
Classification 
Benchmark 
(BICS). 
Dummy variables for 
each of the 8 
industries based on 
Bloomberg Industry 
classification standard 
(BICS).  
Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996); Bhagat and 
Black (2002); Choi et al. 
(2007); King and Santor 
(2007); Claessens et al. 
(2002); 
Wiwattanakantang 
(2001); Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006); Alford 
(1992). 
 
4.4.4.1 Total assets as a measure of firm size 
Total assets, market value, total sales and number of employees have all been used as firm 
size measures in different empirical works. However, there is no consensus in the literature 
about how to measure firm size. The following studies have used total assets as the firm size 
measure: Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Friend and Lang (1988), Morck et al. (1988); McConnell 
and Servaes (1990); Hermalin and Weisbach (1991); Comment and Schwert (1995), Harford 
(1999), Wiwattanakantang (2001), Gönenç and Arslan (2003), Carter, Simkins, and Simpson 
(2003), Blokdijk et al., (2003), Deesomsak, (2004), Moeller et al., (2004) Padron (2005), 
Barontini and Caprio (2005), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006); Mura (2006); Santalo´ and Diestre 
(2006), Bhagat and Bolton (2008), Chu (2009), Chen and Chang, 2010), Khatap et al. (2011) 
and Saliha and Abdessatar (2011). The main purpose behind choosing total assets as a 
measure for firm size in this study is for the findings to be comparable with the above studies. 
In addition, the Bloomberg data underlying this study uses total assets as a measure for a firm 
size. Every firm size measure exhibits advantages and disadvantages, and no measure can 
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capture all characteristics of firm size. Generally speaking, total assets measure total firm 
resources; market capitalization involves firm growth opportunities and equity market 
condition; total sales measure product market competition and is not forward looking. 
4.4.5 Mathematical expressions of the regression models 
The following simple linear regression has been used to examine the relationship between 
firm performance and its governance structure. 
 
Firm performance =f (board independence, board size, audit, CEO duality, managerial 
ownership, executive remunerations, debt, dividend pay-out, log firm size, and industry 
control)         
 
That is,  
 
Performance=α+β1INDEP + β2BSIZE+ β3AUD+β4ROLE+β5DIRW+β6EXCREM+β7DEBT 
+β8DPout +B9FSIZE + β10INDUS + ε    
 
Tobin’s Q = α + β1DIRW+ β2INDEP + β3BSIZE+ β4EXCREM+β5ROLE+β6DEBT +β7DPout 
+β8AUD+ β9INDUS +B10FSIZE + ε 
And 
ROA = α + β1DIRW+ β2INDEP + β3BSIZE+ β4EXCREM+β5ROLE+β6DEBT +β7DPout 
+β8AUD+ β9INDUS +B10FSIZE + ε 
4.5  Research Hypothesis  
The role of the board of directors is mainly to promote the interests of the shareholders of the 
firm. Shareholders of the firm elect the board to run their firm and to act on their behalf; 
consequently the board plays a monitoring role on the management team. Thus the role of the 
board is vital for the whole business. There are two categories of directors compromising the 
board: executive and non-executive directors. The executive directors are viewed as part of 
the management team and therefore it is rational to assume that their monitoring role, 
whether for their own performance or the performance of other members, would be difficult. 
But the non-executive directors are seen as outsiders in the firm due to their little or no 
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financial associations with the firm they work for, apart from directors’ fees. Thus the role of 
non-executive directors is important with respect to responsibility towards the monitoring 
role of firm performance and other members on the board.  
 
However, practically there are some serious questions regarding the effectiveness of the non-
executive role in monitoring the management. Firstly, some non-executive directors embrace 
multiple directorships where they are themselves executive and non-executive directors on 
other boards in other firms. Thus, their monitoring role as non-executive directors on the firm 
they serve in this purpose would be less effective due to the lack of time being spent with 
respect to the affairs of this firm. In addition, resulting from the multiple roles it is possible to 
have business or personal relationships with other directors on the board. Secondly, there 
could be an issue with respect to information asymmetry, where executive directors have 
prompt access to obtain the right, accurate and additional information, but non-executive 
directors might be unable to achieve the same. As a consequence, the information obtained by 
non-executive directors does not have the same quality as executive information and that 
could be uncertain to some extent. Moreover, as mentioned previously, their financial links 
with the firm are small or non-existent, thus there could be less motivation for them to work 
on increasing the financial performance of the firm, as there is no gain achieved on their side, 
and hence their monitoring role is less effective because their incentives are small. Agency 
theory clarifies the problem of information asymmetry between management as executive 
directors and shareholders and identifies the importance of aligning the interest and 
incentives between management and shareholders. 
There are seven variables hypothesised to impact firm performance which are examined in 
this quantitative study. The following section presents each of these variables. 
4.5.1  Independent directors  
The definition of board independence is that there are non-executives (independent directors) 
on the board of directors. The recommendations of the Code of Best Practice suggest that 
non-executive directors should be represented on the board and they are recommended to be 
independent. Independent directors are so defined:  “The board should determine whether the 
director is independent in character and judgement and whether there are relationships or 
circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, the director’s judgement. 
The board should state its reasons if it determines that a director is independent 
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notwithstanding the existence of relationships or circumstances which may appear relevant 
to its determination” (The Combined Code 2008, 8). From a theoretical point of view (Berle 
and Means, 1932, Fama and Jensen, 1983, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and Weisbagh, 1988), 
it has been proposed that agency problems are mitigated by boards dominated by external 
directors or non-executive directors (NEDs) who act to control and monitor the decisions of 
managers. The theory additionally proposes that NEDs’ presence secures informed evaluation 
to monitor and review the performance of managers, leading to the removal of non- 
performing CEOs (Weisbagh, 1988).  However, Cadbury Code (1992) recommends that non-
executive directors possess particular characteristics such as independence and experience, 
and they are aware of their reputation and keen to keep it credible in the external labour 
market (Fama and Jensen 1983); yet their impact on performance is not strongly evident and 
thus it is not supportive to this positive perspective. Several studies found that the 
independent directors’ presence on board could in fact affect negatively the performance of 
the firm, claiming that requisite skills are not brought to the job by these non-executive 
directors. This could be dependent on the view that non-executive directors are generally not 
provided with enough information about the company. Hence, they cannot play a major 
critical role in monitoring managers and prefer to be less confrontational (Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996 and Franks et al., 2001). Therefore, if there is a need to increase the 
representation of outside directors, it could be that there are not sufficient directors who are 
available and have the necessary qualities for the job. 
 
The evidence of the impact of the non-executive directors on firm performance has produced 
mixed results in several empirical works. Baysinger and Butler (1985), Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Rodriguez and Anson (2001), Brown and Caylor (2004), 
Dahya and McConnell (2005), Mura (2007), Black et al (2006), Abu-Tapanjeh (2006) and 
Choi et al (2007) found that NEDs role in monitoring management is useful and positively 
impacts firm performance. Thus, their role could help put some restrictions with regards to 
managerial discretion.  
However, other  studies did not find any evidence that additional independent directors 
increase firm performance—including Hermalin and Weisbacg (1991), Mehran (1995, 
Yermack (1996), Vafeas and Theodorou (1998), and Hossain et al (2001)—or that 
independent directors could have a negative impact on firm performance Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), Klein (1998),  Bhagat and Black, (2002), and Abdullah, (2007). Weir and 
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Laing (2000) examined the relationship between non-executive directors and firm 
performance in the UK and found a negative association. However, taking into account that 
the nature of relationship is possibly a simultaneous relationship, the rise of the presence of 
non-executive directors on board was thus due to the poor performance rather than the reason 
causing the poor performance. 
In the debate concerning governance in the UK and the U.S. the presence of NEDs 
(independent directors) has been attracting attention as one of the most influential 
recommendations. Independent directors have the power and capability to apply a monitoring 
process objectively and effectively on the actions of the managers. A minimum number of 
independent directors or percentages have been recommended by numerous codes on 
governance as boards need to be able to be influential on monitoring role on managers’ 
actions and decisions.  From the theoretical point of view and in consistency with the 
Cadbury Code (Cadbury committee, 1992), NEDs or outside directors could be desirable and 
effective for companies due to the act that they could assist in controlling opportunistic 
behaviour of the managers and in reducing the agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Therefore, the first hypothesis states: 
H1: A positive relationship exists between firm performance and the proportion of 
independent directors. 
4.5.2  Role Duality 
Duality occurs when the roles of chief executive officer (CEO) and chairman are combined 
and represented in the same person. It is considered another board structure control 
mechanism. Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that the agency model claims that boards are 
harder to be controlled when they are dominated by executive directors; this scenario is 
similar and applicable to role duality. It is claimed that having both positions occupied by the 
same person could be viewed as a potential advantage as they would have enough knowledge 
and better understanding of the operating environment in the company. The contrary view 
was supported by the Cadbury Committee as they regarded such practice as detrimental due 
to a single person being powerful and enjoying abundant power in the course of taking 
decisions (Cadbury 1992).  
Taking this issue on board, the Code of Best Practice clearly recommended that division of 
responsibility is needed, and if duality occurred, a balanced policy within the board should 
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show enough independence to deal comfortably and effectively with the case. However there 
is not enough evidence to back up the stance of Cadbury that duality is detrimental or 
undesirable based on the findings in the empirical work, as the findings and results are mixed. 
Rechner and Dalton (1991) studied 141 corporations in the USA for the 5 year period 1978-
1983; this study aimed to produce comparable results of financial performance for a number 
of years between firms that do not have duality roles and others with CEO duality. Sanda et 
al. (2005) examined the relationship between firm financial performance and the efficiency of 
corporate governance mechanisms. The sample of the study is comprised of 93 firms quoted 
on the Nigerian Stock Exchange from 1996 to 1999. Both studies found that duality causes 
the board to be less effective and efficient with respect to decision-making and dealing with 
CEOs. Within the same framework, Rechner and Dalton (1991) found that firms with role 
duality perform less well than firms without role duality. Other studies such as Baliga et al 
(1996) examined the relationship between duality and firm performance, using the Fortune 
500 companies in the US from 1980 to 1991. Brickley et al (1997) and Dalton et al (1998) 
have found no impact of duality on performance.  
However, Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe (2006) and Abu-Tapanjeh (2006) found that firms 
with role duality performed better than firms without role duality. Some other studies, such as 
Daily and Dalton (1992), Faccio and Lasfer (1999), Weir et al (2002), Dahya and McConnell 
(2005a) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found no significant relationship between firm 
performance and role duality. Studies in UK such as Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) and Weir 
and Laing (1999) found that role duality neither improves nor harms the performance. 
There are several reasons which suggest that the separation of role between chairman and the 
CEO is the best practice. From the theoretical point of view, combining all the decisions by 
the board of directors and management into one individual will ultimately decrease the 
effectiveness of the board in monitoring the managers. The Cadbury Report recommended a 
split between the roles of chairmen and CEO. A number of companies around the world that 
combined the roles of chairmen and CEO in one person have faced financial crisis and 
bankruptcy problems. Therefore, one of the main reasons for these two roles to be split is 
minimising the risk and improving performance. The current study predicts the relationship 
between firm performance and role duality to be negative.  
H2:  A negative relationship exists between role duality and firm performance 
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4.5.3 Audit  
The Cadbury Report did not only identify a specified structure of the board but also made 
some recommendations that all public listed companies should set up a number of internal 
board sub-committees. Consistent with the agency model, the Cadbury Report argued that 
audit committees were an added control mechanism that guaranteed the interest of 
shareholders was being protected. The promotion of effective financial management of the 
company and increasing accountability helped to achieve the protection of shareholders’ 
interests (Cadbury 1992). A number of potential benefits could be achieved by an effective 
audit committee. It helps the board to meet and maintain its statutory and fiduciary duties by 
establishing better links between the internal and external auditors and the board. Collier 
(1992) stressed that the credibility of financial statements therefore should be improved by 
the work of the audit committees. Additional to the recommendation for establishment of the 
audit committee, the Cadbury Report also proposed that the committee should have at least 
three members and should be comprised of non-executive directors, where the majority of 
whom should be independent. Therefore, the audit committee is considered another internal 
governance mechanism in which its impact should be an improvement in the quality of the 
financial management of the company and hence its performance.     
The impact of the audit committee on firm performance has received little attention. Vafeas 
(1999) found that the quality of board subcommittees and structure gives insights into those 
in charge of controlling and monitoring duties and roles within firms. Wild (1994) reveals 
that the reaction of the market was more favourable towards earning reports after an audit 
committee had been established. However, Klein (1998) found that neither the structure of 
the audit committee nor its presence had an impact on a range of market performance and 
accounting measures. Also, Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) reported that no proof is found to 
support the claim that the board subcommittees’ structure had any significant impact on 
performance. Therefore, the third hypothesis states: 
H3: A positive relationship exists between audit committee presence and firm performance.  
4.5.4 Debt financing 
Jensen (1986b) points out that another internal corporate governance mechanism is debt 
financing whereby free cash flow is decreased by increased debt and also increased debt 
limits managerial discretion. He argued that debt makes the managers use the excess funds to 
150 
 
service the debt of the firm rather than spend these funds on projects with negative present 
values. It is argued that agency problems in a firm are normally associated to asymmetric 
information and free cash-flow. It is broadly recognised that debt servicing obligations, in 
particular the privately placed ones, for instance bank debt, could assist in reducing such 
types of agency problems (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; and Ross, 1977). For example, 
announcing bank credit agreement transfers positive news to the stock market about the 
worthiness of the borrower and, thus, it reduces the asymmetric information between 
investors and borrowers. Furthermore, in comparison with publicly traded debt it is argued 
that bank debt has an advantage in monitoring the activities of a firm and in collecting and 
processing information. Consequently, Fama (1985) found that bank lenders gain a 
comparative advantage in reducing information costs and having an access to information 
unavailable to the public. 
To reiterate, it is argued that debt is considered another effective mechanism for reducing 
agency problems (Jensen and Meckling (1976). For instance, additional debt decreases the 
necessity for issuing external equity and reduces the existing problem between shareholders 
and managers, thus the alignment of interest between managers and shareholders is increased 
and established. Furthermore, Jensen (1986) added that debt represents the commitment of 
managers to pay out cash-flows to creditors; therefore, it helps in overcoming the free cash-
flow problem. In conclusion, the threat of bankruptcy is increased by debt as a risk for 
stopping the debt interest and repayment of principal. As a consequence of such existing 
threat, the managers fear the potential loss of their reputations and thus they are more likely 
to work harder and strive to improve the performance of the firm and increase the profit.      
The effect of debt on firm performance has been mixed, based on a number of empirical 
studies. Several studies such as Dahya and McConnel (2005a); Beiner et al. (2003); Al-
khouri (2006); and Javed and Iqbal, (2007) have found a positive relationship between firm 
performance and debt ratio. They argued that firms could use debt policy as a good 
mechanism to reduce any conflict with shareholders and increase the performance of the firm. 
However, several other studies have found a significant negative relationship between firm 
performance and debt (Aljifri and Moustafe, 2007, Bohren and Odegaard, 2001; Haniffaa and 
Hudaib, 2006; McConnell and Serveas, 1995; Short and Keasey, 1999, and Weir et al, 2002). 
In summary, while debt leads to bigger bankruptcy costs or debt agency costs, it also has an 
ability to lead to better performance for different reasons. 
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From a theoretical point of view, debt could put a limit on the misbehaviour of the managers 
and decrease the interest problem between shareholders and managers, as it decreases the 
opportunistic perspective of the managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Debt can be used to 
alarm the firms to pay out cash-flows to creditors, thus it is assisting in overcoming free cash-
flow issues (Jensen, 1986). Finally, debt increases the bankruptcy threat that could affect the 
reputation of the managers; it is thus more likely that the managers of the firms will be more 
encouraged to work hard, improve performance and increase profit. This understanding leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
H4: Firms with a higher level of debt have a higher level of performance 
4.5.5  Dividend 
There are a number of studies that have suggested managers could utilise a substantial 
amount of retained equity funds to make an investment in negative NPV projects rather than 
delivering this money to the shareholders, thereby causing growth in firm size (for instance, 
Easterbook, 1984 and Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, it is argued that high-dividend 
pay-out guarantees that the largest part of the cash is given to the shareholders, where the 
managers were left only with a small amount which could finance risky projects or the firm is 
forced to the market in order to attract new equity (Jensen, 1986). Additionally, Easterbook 
(1984) argued that managers have to make the public aware of the future plans to catch 
attention and attract new investors. Moreover, it is believed that a negative relationship exists 
between dividend policy and shareholders’ rights based on the general consensus. In simple 
terms, studies have argued that shareholders are more likely to accept the cash being used by 
the firm for good projects when they perceive that their rights are strongly protected, whereas 
when their rights are poorly protected, they look rather for dividends regardless of the growth 
opportunities the firms could miss. Several empirical studies have found results consistent 
with this perspective and have reached such a conclusion (Alwi, 2009; Bohren & Odegaard, 
2001; La Porta et al., 2000 and Mitton, 2004). However, a positive relationship exists 
between firm performance and dividend policy from a theoretical perspective. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is: 
H5: A positive relationship exists between firm performance and dividend pay-out 
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4.5.6 Board size 
As a corporate governance mechanism, board effectiveness is largely dependent on its 
composition and size. Smaller boards are generally less powerful than larger boards and 
hence it is considered that large boards are necessary for organizational effectiveness. Large 
powerful boards are able to strengthen the association between firms and their surroundings; 
they help to provide counselling and advice with regards to strategic decisions for the firms 
and play an essential role in making corporate identity (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). However, 
other studies examine the effectiveness of board size and reveal that small boards are more 
effective. This argument is underlined by the fact that smaller boards are  less cumbersome 
with regards to coordination, communication and decision-making processes (Jensen, 1993; 
and Lipton and Lorsch, 1992)).This view is supported empirically by Yermack (1996), 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) and Beiner et al. (2006). 
 
Although the results are mixed from previous empirical studies with regards to the 
relationship between firm performance and board size, the general consensus of researchers 
tends to the smaller boards. Even though some studies like  Zahra and Pearce (1989), Klein 
(1998), and Bathula (2008) have argued that large boards provide resources to firms and 
provide more experience and discussion and offer effective control for management, 
Yermack (1995) and Conyon and Peck (1998) found a negative relationship between firm 
performance and board size. Empirical studies argue that directors’ behaviours may be 
managed more effectively by small boards and that they are able to improve firm 
performance. In addition, given that the board size is small, every member could be easily 
monitored and decisions could be made quicker.  Thus, the following hypothesis is drawn: 
H6: A negative relationship exists between board size and firm performance 
4.5.7  Director ownership 
The arguments on the relationship between performance and ownership structure have been 
identified in the literature review in chapter two. There are a few arguments which have been 
presented and discussed: monitoring argument (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Denis, Denis 
and Sarin, 1997), incentive alignment argument (Mura, 2007), entrenchment argument 
(Hutchinson, Gul and Leung, 2005; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Short and Keasey, 1999) 
and takeover premium argument (McWilliams, 1990; Bradbury and Mak, 2002; Cosh, Guest 
and Hughes, 2006).  
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The effects of the separation of ownership and control on firm value are mitigated by the 
presence of shareholders who holds a high percentage of the capital of the firm. It is very 
costly for small shareholders to form a coalition in order to remove the manager who is 
engaged in value reducing activities in a firm where each small shareholder has only a small 
fraction of the capital of the firm. A shareholder who only possesses a small percentage of 
stakes does not have very strong incentives to get engaged in the monitoring process of 
managers because he will concede all the costs involved in this process while only receiving 
a small portion of the overall benefits gained. In contrast, in another ownership structure there 
is a huge potential for discouraging managers from getting involved in opportunistic 
behaviour when one or more shareholders possess a large stake of the shareholding. 
 
The suggestion in the incentive argument is that when the management owns more equity it 
could lead to an improvement in firm performance because it means a better alignment of 
interest or goals have been achieved between other equity owners and management. Directors 
on the board whose own wealth is connected to the value of the firm will have the incentive 
as well to align their interest with other shareholders and act to maximize shareholder value. 
If other shareholders cannot assess in a costless way the extent to which an owner-director 
imposes agency costs on them, the market value of the firm's stock will be reduced, 
decreasing therefore the owner's wealth. Increasing stock ownership by directors and 
managers is considered an effective control mechanism to decrease the moral hazard 
behaviour of companies’ managers in a large amount of literature. Therefore, if this is proven 
as an effective control mechanism, then it is likely an increase in its use would persuade a 
reduction upon other costly monitoring mechanisms like appointing non-executive directors 
or outside directors on board. The entrenchment argument proposes that with more equity 
ownership, the managers are likely to be more powerful and therefore they have fewer 
incentives to work in other stakeholders’ interests. However, taking into account the common 
level of board ownership achieved in FTSE 350 companies and the active nature of the 
takeover market in UK, entrenchment may not occur unless higher levels of board ownership 
are achieved, so that the incentive effect is likely to dominate any entrenchment (Cosh et al, 
2006). The takeover premium argument expects that management with more equity 
ownership would give them the power to oppose a takeover threat from the market for 
corporate control. Therefore, the raiders have to pay higher takeover premiums because of the 
entrenchment of management. Thus, the related hypothesis is:  
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H7: A positive association exists between the proportion of shares owned by directors and 
firm performance 
4.5.8 Executive remuneration 
Incentives contracts are certainly common in practice (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)). The large 
number of empirical studies on incentive contracts generally and in particular management 
ownership, report that a positive relationship exists between performance and pay, and 
therefore dismisses the extreme hypothesis of total separation of control and ownership. 
Denis and McConnell (2003) comment on the compensation issue that it is vital that from the 
perspective of corporate governance the amount to which executives’ pay combines or aligns 
the interests of both shareholders and top executives.  It is argued that for determining 
executive compensation, the pay-for performance methodology is a result of a definite 
assumption about the incentives and actions of executives in firms. The assumption is based 
on the argument that the agent and the principal are not truly aligned (McConvill, 2006). In 
order to find a solution for this non-alignment assumption, it is stated that managerial 
compensation plays a crucial role in mitigating agency cost (Florackis, Ozkan and Kostakis 
2009).  
 
Core et al. (2004) suggested that managers could be motivated to take decisions and apply 
actions that aim to maximize the wealth of the shareholders. Also, Murphy (1999) supports 
this view and concludes that compensation contracts can help the managers align their 
interest with the shareholders’. In the case where asymmetric information is absent, 
shareholders are directly capable of observing the actions of the managers and, thus, there is 
no need for incentive mechanisms to align shareholders’ interest with those of managers. 
However, in practice, firms in a real life framework face stark asymmetric information and 
managerial agency costs, which eventually bring the need of both compensation and equity 
related incentives. It is proposed that with a rise in managerial compensation the managerial 
agency costs might be reduced such that managers would be satisfied and would be unlikely, 
ceteris paribus, to exert unsatisfactory effort, expropriate wealth and, in this manner, lead the 
risk of losing their jobs and ruining their careers. Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Mehran 
(1995), consistent with the previous view, found that there is a statistically strong relationship 
between corporate performance and managerial pay. In a similar view, Hutchinson and Gul 
(2004) reported that the negative association between growth opportunities and firm value is 
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moderated by managerial compensation, and Chen (2003) found that there is a strong 
association between annual stock bonuses and the firm's contemporaneous performance but 
did not find the same with future performance. 
 
Within the empirical evidence, pay increasing with firm size is found to be the most 
consistent element on the determinant of CEO compensation (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). The 
level of director pay and the use of various forms of performance-based compensation 
packages are increasing with growth prospects and are lower in regulated industries (Smith 
and Watts, 1992), (Yermack, 1995), and (Kole, 1997). With growth prospects, it is required 
that the managers hold top skills and talent levels and there is a need for executives to be 
given incentives to make decisions on risky investment projects.    
 
The pay slice given to CEOs of public companies in the US has been rising over the last 
decade and has an association with various governance variables, including CEO turnover 
and performance (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer, 2007). The association is inversely related 
between the CEO’s slice of total board pay and the company performance (measured by 
Tobin’s Q), but the proportion of pay is positively associated to the CEO’s entrenchment and 
an absence of a large outside shareholder (blockholder). This shows that when the 
performance is poor, dominant CEOs are common and the circumstances for entrenchment 
occur. 
Main, Bruce and Buck (1996) studied the pay of the board in Britain for a sample of 70 
companies from 1981 to 1989. They found a strong relationship between directors’ 
remuneration and company performance. Others, such as Ezzamel and Watson (1997) did not 
find this relationship. They examined the process by which executive cash pay in large 
publicly listed U.K. companies is determined by isolating the influence of prior-period pay 
anomalies. The sample comprised all the listed companies in the 1992 Times 1,000, but after 
elimination they finally studied some 199 companies.  The situation is cogently explained by 
Barkerma and Gomez-Mejia (1998) who stated: “In short, after at least six decades of 
research ... the failure to identify a robust relationship between top management 
compensation and firm performance has led scholars into a blind alley”.  
 
Ozkan (2007) studied the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the level of CEO 
compensation. The sample chosen comprised of 414 large UK firms for the fiscal year of 
2003 to 2004. The findings showed that both board and ownership structure explained the 
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variation in the total CEO compensation. CEOs are paid higher compensation in firms with 
larger board size and which have a higher percentage of non-executive directors. Conyon 
(1997) tested the influence of corporate governance innovations on the compensation of top 
directors. She studied the period between 1988 and 1993 for a sample of 213 large UK firms. 
Her findings showed that current shareholders return and directors’ compensation are 
positively correlated. Also, there is evidence that top director pay is shaped by governance 
variables. Firms that embrace remuneration committees are perceived to not be causing 
higher growth rates in the compensation of top directors and the separation of the roles of the 
chairman and CEO seem to not be playing a role in the shaping of directors' pay. 
 
Conyon and Leech (1994) studied the prediction of agency theory that CEO compensation is 
positively linked to corporate performance. They tested large UK listed companies between 
1983 and 1986.  They found a statistically significant positive relationship between 
executives’ pay and company performance. In addition, they found that there is a mixed role 
played by corporate governance. Weir and Laing (2000) analysed to what extent governance 
structures influence performance.  They studied large UK companies between 1994 and 1996 
and found mixed results. But they found that the presence of a remuneration committee has a 
positive impact on firm performance.  Rankin (2007) examined the relationship between firm 
performance and executive remuneration. Rankin studied 300 Australian companies in 2005 
and found a link between executive remuneration and firm performance due to enhancement 
in corporate governance procedures. 
 
Stathopoulus, Espenlaub and Walker (2005) studied the composition of the pay of the top 
executive directors. They use hand-collected data on the compensation for 698 CEO years 
and 2,609 other-executive years over the period 1995–2000. Their findings show that good 
performing companies are linked with executive remuneration, while worse performing 
companies have a weak link with executive remuneration. Gregg, Jewell and Tonks (2005) 
studied the relationship between executive cash compensation and company performance for 
a sample of large UK companies over the period from 1994 to 2002. They found the link 
between executive remuneration and company performance to be weak. 
 
Eichholtz, Kok and Otten (2008) examined the drivers of executive compensation in the 
listed UK property sector. The final study sample comprised of 39 companies over the period 
1998–2003, and a total of 217 observations. Their findings showed that company size is the 
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most crucial variable and that executive shareholdings offer a stronger link between 
performance and compensation. Conyon and Murphy (2000) studied the CEO pay and 
incentives in the UK and US. The analysis was based on 1997 fiscal-year data. The UK data 
is for the 510 largest companies (ranked by market capitalisation) and the fiscal 1997 US 
compensation and company data are extracted from Standard and Poor's (S&P's) Compustat's 
‘ExecuComp’ database, which includes proxy-statement data for 1,666 top executives in the 
S&P 500, the S&P Mid-Cap 400, the S&P Small-Cap 600, and other supplemental S&P 
indices. After controlling for size, sector and other firm and executive characteristics, they 
found that CEOs in the US earn 45% higher cash compensation and 190% higher total 
compensation. 
 
Crespi-Clader and Gispert (2003) examined the relationship between performance and board 
remuneration of selected large public Spanish firms for the period of 1990 to 1995. Their 
findings showed that there is a positive relationship between company performance and board 
remuneration, which is weaker for stock markets measures but stronger for book values. Firth 
et al (2007) studied whether the firm’s performance has an impact on the CEO’s pay in 
Chinese public companies. The findings show that there is a positive relationship between the 
CEO’s pay and performance when it is measured by return on assets (ROA). Therefore, when 
there are good operating profits firms reward their CEOs with higher pay. Also, Kato and 
Long (2005) studied Chinese listed firms and provided evidence on the positive relationship 
between executive compensation and firm performance. They collected a broad accounting 
and financial data set of Chinese listed firms for the period of 1998 to 2002. They found 
statistically significant sensitivities, and of annual cash compensation for top executives. 
Additionally, they found that executive compensation and sales growth are significantly 
linked. Furthermore, the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies has a significant 
impact on the relationship between pay and performance for these firms. Consequently the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H8: A positive relationship exists between directors’ remuneration and firm performance. 
4.6 Analysis of the data 
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to process the gathered 
quantitative data mainly from Bloomberg and annual reports; more details about these 
analyses are discussed and explained in the following sections. 
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4.6.1  Quantitative data (Bloomberg and Annual report) 
4.6.1.1  Appropriateness of regression 
This study uses regression analysis. Taking into account that all the previous studies have 
focused on the OLS regression, OLS regression is thus chosen to be used in this study. 
Generally, in social science OLS is considered a common language for regression analysis, 
thus showing and interpreting the OLS results means that all the studies are using the same 
language. Furthermore, Stock and Watson (2003) point out those OLS formulas are built into 
statistical software which means they can be used easily. 
 
 Before conducting the analysis, several tests were used to assess the data compatibility for 
the classical linear regression model assumptions (CLRM), as suggested by Brooks (2002): 
2 No relationship exists between independent variables. 
3 The relationship between dependent and independent variables is linear. 
4 The error is assumed to be normally distributed and errors have zero mean. 
5 The variance of the errors is constant over all values of xt. 
6 The errors are statistically independent of one another. 
 
This study tested the assumptions of multicollinearity, normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, 
outliers, and autocorrelation; if any of these conditions exist in the regression, it may indicate 
that: 
2 The OLS estimates are no longer BLUE and will be inefficient (The OLS regression is 
best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE). This means that OLS estimators are the best 
(B in BLUE), unbiased (U in BLUE), linear (L in BLUE), and estimators (E in 
BLUE). 
3 The estimated variances coefficients will be biased and inconsistent. 
4 Tests of hypothesis are invalid. 
 
Few extreme observations commonly influence the estimates of regression parameters. In 
most samplings of data, it is found that some data points will be further away from the sample 
mean than would be expected from the properties of commonly used statistical distributions. 
This can be due to systematic error or it can simply be the case that some observations 
happen to be a long way from the centre of the data. Outlier points can therefore indicate 
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faulty data or the existence of effects not covered by the theory under consideration. 
However, a small number of outliers are to be expected in the usual pattern of a distribution. 
OLS assumptions and outlier tests for assessing data for the regression were conducted. In 
this research, outliers were inspected to eliminate gross data errors. Outliers were examined 
through the use of box plots as well as measures of the mean and standard deviation. All 
outliers found with respect to the variables needed to be removed from each analysis in order 
to ensure that the assumption of linearity was not violated, and that no influential outliers 
remained in the analysis. As a rule of thumb, measures that were three standard deviations 
above or below the mean or more extreme were considered outliers and need be removed 
from the analysis. Regression analysis was applied in different manners, with and without 
outliers and after Winsorising of the data; the results indicated an improvement in the overall 
model without after Winsorising by replacing the outliers with the mean plus (or minus) three 
standard deviations. The study’s overall F-value and R2 increased comparing to the results 
using different methods. All these previous econometrics problems discussed with testing and 
treatment are presented in the following table (table 3.7). More details about these techniques 
are used when any problems found will be provided and discussed in the next chapter.   
160 
 
Table 4.7  Appropriateness Tests for the data, Definitions and conditions, and Detecting 
Procedures 
The problem Definition Detecting test 
Multicollinearity Multicollinearity occurs in 
the model if the independent 
variables are related to one 
another (more than 80%) 
The Pearson correlation 
matrix 
Normality The relationship between 
dependent and independent 
variables should follow a 
normal distribution 
The data are normal if 
standard skewness is within 
±1.96 and standard kurtosis 
within ±3. 
Linearity The relationship between 
dependent and independent 
variables must be linear 
Standardised residuals as a 
function of standardised 
predicted values, the 
histogram, and normal plot of 
regression standardised 
residuals for dependent 
variables 
Heteroskedasticity If errors have a constant 
variance, they are 
homoscedastic; otherwise, 
they are heteroscedastic 
 
Autocorrelation This problem occurs in the 
model if the error terms of 
the models for consecutive 
observations are related to 
one another 
 
Outliers Data that have a standard 
deviation of more than ±3 
These outliers are removed 
from the data to determine if 
any difference exists in the 
R
2
 in the results. 
 
4.6.2 Analytical procedures 
After completion, all the appropriateness tests for the data compatibility for regression are 
built into the model for this study; the relationship between firm performance and corporate 
governance mechanisms was examined using data of 363 listed firms for the period 2005 to 
2010. Several studies in the literature such as Agrawal and Knoeber (1995), Brick et al. 
(2006), Silveira and Barros (2007), Omran et al. (2008) and Jaafar and El-Shawa (2009) used 
the regression model where  performance measures are the dependent variables and the 
corporate governance mechanisms are the independent variables, thus consistent with these 
studies this thesis used the following regressions: 
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Firstly, OLS regressions where the performance measures (Tobin’s Q and ROA) are 
considered as dependent variables and the internal governance mechanisms and control 
variables are considered as independent variables, both individually (bivariate) and jointly 
(multivariate). Secondly, as discussed in the literature review, endogeneity and causality 
might exist between firm performance and corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, 
when such problems are found it means the OLS estimates in the main model will be 
inconsistent and biased. Thus, 2SLS regressions and instrument variables methods are used to 
deal with such problems. 
4.7 Summary  
In this chapter, the study objectives and research questions are presented, the research 
paradigm is considered and the research method used is described (mainly a quantitative 
method (archival data from Bloomberg and annual reports of listed firms)), sample selections 
and all the dependent and independent variables with the control variables are introduced, 
research hypotheses are presented and data analysis techniques with the analytical procedures 
are explained.  The next chapter will analyse the research findings and present the discussion 
of the results from quantitative data (Bloomberg and annual report data). 
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5 Chapter Four: Results and Discussion 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the analyses conducted for this study using 
the quantitative data (extracted from Bloomberg and Annual Reports). Firstly, it provides a 
test for assumptions of regression analysis. This consists of an initial series of descriptive 
statistics; it then presents the results of hypothesis testing regarding the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance.  These results are based on the 
ordinary least square (OLS) for market and accounting measures. Finally, Durbin–Wu–
Hausman tests of endogeneity are considered, followed by a summary of the study. 
5.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Initially, a series of descriptive statistics these were conducted on these data in order to 
present an indication of these measures and their distribution. First, the following two tables 
4.1 and 4.4 summarize descriptive statistics conducted on both outcomes as well as all 
predictors separately for each year from 2005 through 2010, before and after transformation 
for normality. The descriptive reported consist of the mean, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis, as well as minimum and maximum data points. As indicated in the following table, 
very substantial non-normality was found with respect to these figures along with the 
presence of substantial outliers. As discussed later in this chapter, these outcomes were first 
normalized along with all outliers being removed before conducting the multivariate analyses 
included in this study. 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics table before transformation for normality 
Variables   2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
  N= 325 342 358 358 352 335 
Tobin's Q Mean 2.220 2.438 1.925 1.345 1.600 1.714 
  ST 2.915 3.616 1.287 0.787 0.989 1.266 
  Min 0.839 0.850 0.558 0.431 0.512 0.533 
  Max 45.442 60.847 18.845 10.648 12.104 18.069 
  Skewness 11.670 13.191 6.992 5.787 5.116 7.345 
  Kurtosis 159.876 204.203 83.687 57.637 43.302 85.148 
  N= 331 341 354 357 351 338 
ROA Mean 7.194 7.293 8.372 4.546 4.124 5.330 
  ST 10.899 10.251 10.913 12.163 7.798 13.446 
  Min -38.172 -52.018 -60.236 -68.185 -37.251 -122.912 
  Max 88.701 66.173 72.034 70.247 58.533 111.024 
  Skewness 1.166 -0.657 0.435 -0.528 0.116 -1.633 
  Kurtosis 13.523 9.744 12.240 10.059 9.768 39.919 
  N= 335 347 363 363 358 345 
BSIZE Mean 8.540 8.611 8.587 8.647 8.439 8.351 
  ST 2.563 2.574 2.425 2.394 2.279 2.463 
  Min 2.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 0.000 
  Max 19.000 18.000 19.000 19.000 17.000 17.000 
  Skewness 0.768 0.836 0.942 0.973 1.076 0.803 
  Kurtosis 0.909 0.580 1.179 1.253 1.348 2.204 
  N= 328 342 355 359 360 357 
AUD Mean 0.982 0.985 0.992 0.997 0.986 0.947 
  ST 0.134 0.120 0.092 0.053 0.117 0.225 
  Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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  Skewness 1.299 2.166 2.180 2.586 2.205 1.565 
  Kurtosis 5.244 9.687 11.029 12.222 12.012 10.065 
  N= 331 343 358 360 360 356 
ROLE Mean 0.054 0.047 0.031 0.042 0.033 0.034 
  ST 0.227 0.211 0.173 0.200 0.180 0.181 
  Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  Skewness 3.948 4.318 5.461 4.607 5.221 5.189 
  Kurtosis 13.670 16.747 27.983 19.327 25.403 25.069 
  N= 335 347 363 363 358 343 
INDPDIR Mean 48.678 49.639 51.134 51.899 52.399 51.765 
  ST 14.279 12.220 12.656 12.846 12.690 14.644 
  Min 10.526 11.111 10.526 10.000 11.111 0.000 
  Max 150.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 
  Skewness 1.254 0.562 0.239 0.067 0.081 0.048 
  Kurtosis 7.583 1.734 0.972 0.850 0.608 1.322 
  N= 336 350 361 362 355 339 
DIROWNR Mean 5.481 5.491 5.499 5.607 5.343 5.478 
  ST 12.712 12.688 12.178 12.103 11.659 12.546 
  Min 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 
  Max 88.030 87.880 72.798 64.404 64.468 88.844 
  Skewness 3.612 3.536 3.087 2.933 2.922 3.275 
  Kurtosis 14.870 13.534 9.633 8.425 8.477 11.980 
  N= 321 345 356 355 351 336 
DIRREMN Mean 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 
  ST 0.062 0.013 0.015 0.010 0.008 0.007 
  Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Max 1.097 0.143 0.248 0.163 0.129 0.085 
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  Skewness 17.090 6.447 12.488 10.848 10.069 6.237 
  Kurtosis 300.279 54.875 191.711 159.179 139.433 55.775 
  N= 339 353 359 357 354 343 
DEBT Mean 21.319 21.628 22.062 23.904 22.749 20.794 
  ST 18.806 19.541 18.044 18.413 18.112 16.970 
  Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Max 104.843 133.094 113.912 113.116 106.910 85.395 
  Skewness 1.204 1.571 0.985 0.803 0.791 0.850 
  Kurtosis 1.994 4.542 1.787 1.113 0.741 0.603 
  N= 339 353 358 356 355 344 
FSIZE Mean 3709.635 3571.874 4013.844 5147.912 5210.194 5816.120 
  ST 14707.503 13379.732 14152.251 19116.759 18919.016 21635.058 
  Min 4.828 19.007 22.341 23.524 21.832 17.458 
  Max 147197.000 126738.000 135910.627 193757.118 180939.435 206888.590 
  Skewness 7.906 7.786 7.468 7.779 7.323 7.344 
  Kurtosis 66.777 65.428 61.787 67.734 59.761 59.884 
  N= 322 340 350 350 346 328 
DPOUT Mean 0.647 0.691 1.285 1.097 0.425 0.353 
  ST 3.159 4.157 13.436 10.138 4.419 2.214 
  Min -16.106 -11.000 -5.700 -5.067 -33.214 -35.846 
  Max 46.688 58.383 244.963 147.000 55.000 9.319 
  Skewness 10.452 11.297 17.354 13.240 5.258 -12.902 
  Kurtosis 150.266 143.592 312.875 177.204 86.652 221.405 
Dependent variables include: Tobin’s Q—and ROA (Return on Assets). Independent variables include DIRW: directors’ ownership; INDEP: percentage of independent 
directors to total number of directors; EXCREM: executive remunerations, BSIZE: board size; AUD: Audit Committee; ROLE: role duality; DEBT: total debt divided by 
assets; DPOUT: dividend payout; FSIZE: firm size measured by total assets; SD: Standard deviation; Min and Max: the minimum and maximum value. 
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Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics table after transformation for normality 
        Variables   2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
  N= 322 339 357 357 351 334 
Tobin's Q Mean 1.981 2.173 1.876 1.319  1.570 1.663 
  ST 0.892 1.145 0.926 0.614 0.816 0.895 
  Min 0.839 0.850 0.558 0.431 0.512 0.533 
  Max 6.212 8.542 5.747 5.917 8.418 7.575 
  Skewness 1.981 2.561 1.770 2.529 3.116 2.558 
  Kurtosis 4.703 8.693 3.704 11.263 17.921 10.176 
  N= 331 341 354 357 351 338 
ROA Mean 7.194 7.293 8.372 4.546 4.124 5.330 
  ST 10.899 10.251 10.913 12.163 7.798 13.446 
  Min -38.172 -52.018 -60.236 -68.185 -37.251 -122.912 
  Max 88.701 66.173 72.034 70.247 58.533 111.024 
  Skewness 1.166 -0.657 0.435 -0.528 0.116 -1.633 
  Kurtosis 13.523 9.744 12.240 10.059 9.768 39.919 
  N= 335 347 363 363 358 345 
BSIZE Mean 8.540 8.611 8.587 8.647 8.439 8.351 
  ST 2.563 2.574 2.425 2.394 2.279 2.463 
  Min 2.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 0.000 
  Max 19.000 18.000 19.000 19.000 17.000 17.000 
  Skewness 0.768 0.836 0.942 0.973 1.076 0.803 
  Kurtosis 0.909 0.580 1.179 1.253 1.348 2.204 
  N= 328 342 355 359 360 357 
AUD Mean 0.982 0.985 0.992 0.997 0.986 0.947 
  ST 0.134 0.120 0.092 0.053 0.117 0.225 
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  Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  Skewness -7.222 -8.124 -10.785 -18.947 -8.342 -5.738 
  Kurtosis 50.470 74.370 114.972 359.000 67.971 14.059 
  N= 331 343 358 360 360 356 
ROLE Mean 0.054 0.047 0.031 0.042 0.033 0.034 
  ST 0.227 0.211 0.173 0.200 0.180 0.181 
  Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
  Skewness 3.948 4.318 5.461 4.607 5.221 5.189 
  Kurtosis 13.670 16.747 27.983 19.327 25.403 25.069 
  N= 335 347 363 363 358 343 
INDPDIR Mean 48.678 49.639 51.134 51.899 52.399 51.765 
  ST 14.279 12.220 12.656 12.846 12.690 14.644 
  Min 10.526 11.111 10.526 10.000 11.111 0.000 
  Max 150.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 
  Skewness 1.254 0.562 0.239 0.067 0.081 0.048 
  Kurtosis 7.583 1.734 0.972 0.850 0.608 1.322 
  N= 336 350 361 362 355 339 
DIROWNR Mean 5.481 5.491 5.499 5.607 5.343 5.478 
  ST 12.712 12.688 12.178 12.103 11.659 12.546 
  Min 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 
  Max 88.030 87.880 72.798 64.404 64.468 88.844 
  Skewness 3.612 3.536 3.087 2.933 2.922 3.275 
  Kurtosis 14.870 13.534 9.633 8.425 8.477 11.980 
  N= 321 345 356 355 351 336 
DIRREMN Mean 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 
  ST 0.062 0.013 0.015 0.010 0.008 0.007 
  Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Max 1.097 0.143 0.248 0.163 0.129 0.085 
  Skewness 17.090 6.447 12.488 10.848 10.069 6.237 
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Dependent variables include: Tobin’s Q—and ROA (Return on Assets). Independent variables include DIRW: directors’ ownership; INDEP: percentage of independent 
directors to total number of directors; EXCREM: executive remunerations, BSIZE: board size; AUD: Audit Committee; ROLE: role duality; DEBT: total debt divided by 
assets; DPOUT: dividend payout; FSIZE: firm size measured by total assets; SD: Standard deviation; Min and Max: the minimum and maximum value. 
  Kurtosis 300.279 54.875 191.711 159.179 139.433 55.775 
  N= 339 353 359 357 354 343 
DEBT Mean 21.319 21.628 22.062 23.904 22.749 20.794 
  ST 18.806 19.541 18.044 18.413 18.112 16.970 
  Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  Max 104.843 133.094 113.912 113.116 106.910 85.395 
  Skewness 1.204 1.571 0.985 0.803 0.791 0.850 
  Kurtosis 1.994 4.542 1.787 1.113 0.741 0.603 
  N= 339 353 358 356 355 344 
FSIZE Mean 3709.635 3571.874 4013.844 5147.912 5210.194 5816.120 
  ST 14707.503 13379.732 14152.251 19116.759 18919.016 21635.058 
  Min 4.828 19.007 22.341 23.524 21.832 17.458 
  Max 147197.000 126738.000 135910.627 193757.118 180939.435 206888.590 
  Skewness 7.906 7.786 7.468 7.779 7.323 7.344 
  Kurtosis 66.777 65.428 61.787 67.734 59.761 59.884 
  N= 322 340 350 350 346 328 
DPOUT Mean 0.647 0.691 1.285 1.097 0.425 0.353 
  ST 3.159 4.157 13.436 10.138 4.419 2.214 
  Min -16.106 -11.000 -5.700 -5.067 -33.214 -35.846 
  Max 46.688 58.383 244.963 147.000 55.000 9.319 
  Skewness 10.452 11.297 17.354 13.240 5.258 -12.902 
  Kurtosis 150.266 143.592 312.875 177.204 86.652 221.405 
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The sample in the current study comprised 363 non-financial firms in the FTSE All share 
index. The data sample was collected for six years from 2005 to 2010. Two performance 
measures were used in this study Tobin’s Q and ROA where a higher value indicates that the 
level of performance is high. Firstly a discussion of the dependent variables, the mean of 
Tobin’s Q for the all observations is 1.85, the minimum is 0 and maximum is 61. Abdullah 
(2007) studied large pubic listed companies in UK and found that Tobin’ s Q ranged from 1.5 
to 3.35 for large listed companies, thus the argument that firms in developed countries 
generate more value for shareholders and markets. With regards to ROA, the mean ROA is 
6.14%, ranging from a minimum of -123% to a maximum of 111%, thus it shows similar 
trends. Secondly the independent variables, the mean value for the directors’ ownership is 
5.48%. The mean board size of the sample is 8.53, in the UK, the mean board size dropped 
from 10 to 9 from 1999 to 2004 (Abdullah, 2007).Weir and Laing (2001) found that the 
average of board size is 10.7 members. But Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) found a mean 
board size of 8.07. However, Bhagat and Block (2002) found that the mean size in the United 
States is 11.45 which indicate that firms in the US have larger board size than the firms in the 
UK.  
 
In terms of board composition, the mean percentage of Independent directors (INDEP) on 
boards is 50.9 per cent, suggesting that independent directors make up half of the boards in 
the sample selected. However, Weir & Laing, (2001) found that in the United Kingdom, the 
mean for the proportion of NEDs was about 47 per cent.  In the United States, this percentage 
has been found to be 60 per cent (Bhagat & Black, 2002) and 78 per cent (Coles et al., 
2008).The mean of companies with role duality (share role of chair and CEO) is 4 per cent 
which confirms that the great majority of companies complied with  the recommendations in 
the governance reports. But Vafeas and Theodorou (1998) found that role duality in the 
United Kingdom averaged 66 per cent in 1994. However, O’Sullivan (2000) and Weir and 
Laing (2001) found it to be 15 per cent in 1995 and 17 per cent from 1995 to 1996, 
respectively. Such data supports studies that have found reduced rates of role duality 
following the Cadbury recommendation in the United Kingdom. Kiel and Nicholson (2003) 
found that role duality among Australian firms was approximately 23 per cent; The mean for 
the debt ratio is 22.09 per cent, which is much less than that found by Al-Anezy (2006) this is 
because he used different measurements to define the debt for total debt/total shareholders’ 
equity; the mean dividend pay-out is about 75 per cent, the mean for the executive 
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remuneration is 0.6 per cent while the mean for Audit committee is 3.71per cent and firm size 
was measured based on total assets. 
 
Next, the following table 4.3 summarizes the categorical measures included in this study, 
which consisted of a measure relating to industry of the company, as well as CEO duality, 
which was dichotomous. These results indicate that slightly above 30% of cases were 
industrials, with close to 30% being within the consumer services industry. Additionally, 
CEO duality was found to be rare, occurring in only approximately 3% to 6% of cases. 
 
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics: Categorical Variable  
 
Measure N % 
Industry   
Basic Materials 23 6.3 
Cons. Goods 38 10.5 
Cons. Service 103 28.4 
Health Care 19 5.2 
Industrials 111 30.6 
Oil & Gas 20 5.5 
Technology 38 10.5 
Utilities 11 3 
Total 363 100 
CEO Duality   
2005 18 5.4 
2006 16 4.7 
2007 11 3.1 
2008 15 4.2 
2009 12 3.3 
2010 12 3.4 
 
5.3 Appropriateness of models 
The analysis of the data related to skewness and kurtosis (see Table 4.1) suggests that the 
dependent variables are not normally distributed in the current study. In addition, scatter plots 
of residuals against predicted values, histogram, and normal plot of regression-standardised 
residuals for dependent variables indicated that the multicollinearity, normality, outliers, and 
heteroskedasticity need to be tested before conducting the analysis. The data set was analysed 
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for its appropriateness based on the assumptions of multi-regression, as suggested by Brooks 
(2002).  
Diagnostics were also conducted on all 12 OLS regressions in order to ensure a lack of 
multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity, as well as the presence of normally distributed 
residuals, linearity, and the lack of outliers. Multicollinearity was not found to be present in 
these analyses due to all tolerances being below 0.20 and all variance inflation factors being 
below 5. Appendix Ch. 3.1 and Ch. 3.2 show the tables for multicollinearity test. Appendix 
Ch. 3.3 and 3.4 shows the figures for Homoscedasticity test. Homoscedasticity was verified 
in all analyses through the construction of scatterplots of the regression standardized residuals 
and regression standardized predicted values. Also Appendix CH. 3.5 and 3.6 shows the 
Histograms of the residual errors as well as probability-probability plots were also 
constructed in order to ensure the normality of these residual errors, which was found to be 
the case in these analyses. Furthermore, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
multicollinearity may be a problem if the correlation between two independent variables 
exceeds 80 percent (Gujarati, 1999). In the current study, the presence of multicollinearity 
was tested using the Pearson correlation matrix to confirm whether significant collinearity 
exists across the independent variables of the study. The highest correlation existed between 
independent directors and board size (29.9 percent); otherwise, no correlation was found to 
impact the regression results. Appendix Ch. 4.1 shows the tables for correlation between 
explanatory variables. 
 
Initially, diagnostics were conducted in order to determine the distribution of these outcomes, 
which consisted of measures of skewness and kurtosis, histograms, and one-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests. As these measures were found to be significantly and 
substantially non-normal, the Johnson family of distributions was applied to these data in 
order to produce more normally distributed measures. Johnson's distributions incorporate a 
series of functions which are used in order to transform a variable into a normally distributed 
measure (Hill, Hill, & Holder, 1976; Johnson, 1949; see also Hoyle, 1973; Polansky, Chou, 
& Mason, 1999). Out of these four functions, a single function is chosen based upon the 
distribution of the measure being transformed. The following series of equations are applied 
to the data during this process. In all cases, z is distributed N(0,1) (Hill, Hill, & Holder, 1976; 
Johnson, 1949). 
        y = (x - xi) / lambda 
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        where x is the original measure. 
 
        SN (Normal distribution) 
            z = y 
 
        SL (Log-normal distribution) 
            z = gamma + delta * ln(y) 
 
        SU (Unbounded distribution) 
            z = gamma + delta * asinh(y) 
 
        SB (Bounded distribution) 
            z = gamma + delta * ln(y / (1 - y)) 
 
In the initial SN case, no transformation is made as the variable in question is already 
normally distributed (Hill, Hill, & Holder, 1976; Johnson, 1949). The SL case is used among 
measures that are bounded only on one side. When using this distribution, the parameter xi 
represents the value of the bound, whereas lambda is either equal to one, representing 
positive skew, or is equal to -1, representing negative skew. The SU case is used to transform 
a measure with an unbounded distribution, whereas the SB case is used for variables having 
distributions which are bounded on both ends. In this final case, xi is slightly below the 
minimum of the untransformed variable, while lambda is calculated such that lambda - xi is 
slightly above the maximum of the untransformed variable (Hill, Hill, & Holder, 1976; 
Johnson, 1949). 
 
Following the completion of these transformations, outliers were examined through the use of 
box plots as well as measures of the mean and standard deviation. All outliers found with 
respect to the variables included in these analyses were removed from each analysis in order 
to ensure that the assumption of linearity was not violated, and that no influential outliers 
remained in this analysis. As a rule of thumb, measures that were three standard deviations 
above or below the mean or more extreme were considered outliers and were removed from 
these analyses. Homoscedasticity was verified in all analyses through the construction of 
scatterplots of the regression standardized residuals and regression standardized predicted 
values. As these scatterplots all displayed a diffuse cloud of data with no distinct pattern, this 
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indicates that the assumption of homoscedasticity was not violated in these regression 
analyses. Histograms of the residual errors as well as probability-probability plots were also 
constructed in order to ensure the normality of these residual errors, which was found to be 
the case in these analyses. The assumptions of linearity and the lack of outliers were both 
verified through the use of partial regression plots which were constructed for each predictor 
included in each regression analysis. These plots indicated that linearity was present, and 
furthermore that no influential outliers were present in these analyses. 
5.3.1 Ordinary least square (OLS) results 
In this section, results from ordinary least square regressions (OLS) will be discussed. The 
following simple linear regression has been used to examine the relationship between firm 
performance and its governance structure. 
 
Firm performance =f (board independence, board size, audit, CEO duality, managerial 
ownership, executive remunerations, debt, dividend payout, log firm size, and industry 
control)        (1) 
 
That is,  
 
Performance=α+β1INDEP + β2BSIZE+ β3AUD+β4ROLE+β5DIRW+β6EXCREM+β7DEBT 
+β8DPout +B9FSIZE + β10INDUS + ε   (2) 
 
Firm performance is measured alternatively using Tobin's Q and Return on Assets. Board 
size, board independence, audit and CEO duality are used as dimensions of board structure. 
The results of the study are depicted in the Tables 4.3 and 4.3 showing the overall results on 
the full sample; 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. In performing the analysis, three 
performance measures have been used; Tobin’s Q and ROA. For clarity, the sign of 
coefficients and significance together with R
2
, an adjusted R
2
 and F statistics are reported in 
the tables. 
 
A series of 12 OLS regressions were conducted in order to test this study’s hypotheses, which 
focused upon whether a series of predictors significantly relate to Tobin’s Q as well as Return 
on Assets. These 12 regressions are based on testing the relationship between Firm 
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performance measured by Tobins’ Q and ROA for each year across the six year period from 
2005 to 2010. The regression equation utilized in these analyses took the following form: 
 
PERM = α + β1DIRW+ β2INDEP + β3BSIZE+ β4EXCREM+β5ROLE+β6DEBT +β7DPout 
+β8AUD+ β9INDUS +B10FSIZE + ε 
 
Where: 
α = Intercept 
PERM = Tobin’s Q and ROA (normalized scores)  
DIRW= Director’s ownership percentage  
INDEP= Percentage of independent directors 
BSIZE = Board size, number of directors on board 
EXCREM = Natural logarithm of total board remuneration (both remuneration 
executive and non-executive); 
ROLE= Role duality, dummy variable where 1 if the chairman is also the CEO, 0 
otherwise 
DEBT = Debt ratio, Total debt/total assets 
DPout = Dividend payout, Dividend per share/earnings per share 
AUD = Number of Audit Committee Members, dummy variable where 1 if there is an 
audit committee on board, 0 otherwise 
INDUS = Seven Dummy variables for eight industry sectors 
FSIZE = Firm size, the natural logarithm of total assets 
ε = Random error term 
 
The hypotheses included in this study consist of the following, and are tested through the use 
of the regression analyses: 
 
H1: A positive relationship exists between directors’ ownership and firm performance. 
 
H2: A positive relationship exists between Executive remuneration and firm performance. 
 
H3: A negative relationship exists between board size and firm performance. 
 
H4: A positive relationship exists between firm performance and the proportion of 
independent directors. 
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H5: A positive relationship exists between firm performance and Audit Committee. 
 
H6: A negative relationship exists between role duality and firm performance. 
 
H7: Firms with a higher level of debt have a higher level of performance. 
 
H8: A positive relationship exists between firm performance and dividend payout. 
5.3.2 Performance measured by Q 
Tobin’s Q overall results are presented in the following table 4.4.  The relationship between 
Tobin’s Q and board independence is positive, and it is significant for the whole sample 
period (2005 to 2010) with (10%) for 2005, 2006 and 2009, with (5%) for 2008 and 2010 and 
with (1%) for 2007. The association between board size and firm performance is positive 
across the six years apart from 2006 and significant only for 2005 and 2007 with (10%). 
There is a positive association between CEO duality with firm performance across the six 
years, which is significant at 5% for the year 2005 and at 10% for 2006 and 2007. There is a 
negative association between audit with Tobin’s Q across the whole sample period (2005 to 
2010) apart from 2007 and 2010 which have a positive coefficient sign, but is only significant 
for the year 2005 with 10%. There is a positive association between managerial ownership 
and firm performance for the whole sample period apart from 2008, which has a negative 
coefficient sign, but is only statistically significant for 2005 and 2007 at 10%. Executive 
remuneration is found to be statistically positively related to Q. There is a positive association 
with firm performance for all the sample period (2005 to 2010) apart from 2005 which has a 
negative coefficient sign, but it is only significant at 10% for the year 2008. There is a 
negative association between dividend and firm performance for the years 2005, 2007 and 
2008, while for the years 2006, 2009 and 2010 there is a positive association. There is a 
negative significant association between firm size and Q for the whole sample period.  
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Table 5.4 OLS Regression of Tobin's Q on Governance and Control Variables  
The dependent variable is measured by Tobin‘s Q, which is measured by (Market Cap + Liabilities + Preferred Equity + Minority Interest) / Total Assets. The independent 
variables include DIRW: Director ownership= the total shareholdings of directors over the total number of shares, INDEP: Independent directors= Proportion of non-
executive directors to total number of directors; BSIZE: board size = Total number of directors on the board; AUD: Audit Committee = Dummy variable; 1 if there is an audit 
committee,0 otherwise; ROLE: role duality = Dummy variable—1 if the chairman is also the CEO, 0 otherwise; EXCREM: Executive Remuneration= Natural logarithm of 
total board remuneration( both remuneration executive and non-executive); DEBT: total debt = Total debt /total assets; DPOUT: dividend payout = Dividend per 
share/earnings per share; FSIZE: firm size = the natural logarithm of total assets. All OLS regression includes seven dummy variables for each of the eight industries based 
on Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB)  
Model          Dependent variables Tobin’s Q  
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Observation 273 306 337 335 326 306 
Constant -5.682*** -8.078*** -6.033*** -5.542** -6.449** -4.542** 
INDEP 0.011* 0.009* 0.016*** 0.014** 0.01* 0.012** 
BSIZE 0.049* -0.005 0.07* 0.052 0.038 0.051 
ROLE 0.754** 0.452* 0.494* 0.257 0.321 0.286 
AUD -0.623* -0.207 0.224 -0.827 -0.482 0.013 
DIRW 0.01* 0.002 0.008* -0.004 0.006 0.006 
LGEXCREM 0.556*** 0.687*** 0.44*** 0.49*** 0.514*** 0.335** 
DEBT -0.003 0 0.004 0.005* 0.002 0.002 
DPOUT -0.032 0.018 -0.007 -0.003 0.018 0.036 
LGFSIZE -0.384*** -0.367*** -0.334*** -0.289*** -0.206** -0.138** 
Industry: Cons. Goods -0.262 0.294 0.229 -0.041 0.053 0.176 
Industry: Cons. Serv. 0.013 0.134 0.184 0.076 0.087 -0.227 
Industry: Health Care -0.254 0.007 0.021 -0.152 -0.251 -0.262 
Industry: Industrials -0.344 0.161 0.27 0.026 0.061 -0.154 
Industry: Oil & Gas -0.306 0.015 0.047 -0.113 -0.053 -0.152 
Industry: Technology -0.542 -0.022 -0.119 -0.232 -0.224 -0.134 
Industry: Utilities -0.092 0.215 0.049 -0.212 -0.235 -0.297 
R-sq 0.282 0.141 0.137 0.111 0.082 0.084 
Adj. R-sq 0.237 0.228 0.09 0.066 0.035 0.034 
F  6.308*** 5.354*** 3.862*** 2.48*** 1.732** 1.664* 
 
The excluded dummy variable for industry classification is basic materials 
*** Significant at the 1% level **Significant at the 5% level *Significant at the 10% level. 
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5.3.3 Performance measured by ROA 
ROA overall results are presented in the following table 4.5. The percentage of independent 
directors is again positive across the whole sample period (2005 to 2010) apart from 2010 
which has a negative coefficient sign, but is only significant for the year 2008 at 5%. A 
negative association is observed for all the sample period from 2005 to 2010 between ROA 
and board size, but is significant only for 2007 at 5%. There is a positive association between 
CEO duality with ROA across the six years apart from 2006 which shows a negative 
association. The association between managerial ownership and ROA is positive across the 
whole sample period (2005 to 2010), but is only statistically significant for the years 2006, 
2007 and 2008 with 10%. Executive remuneration is found to be statistically positively 
related to ROA. The association between debt and ROA is negative across all years from 
2005 to 2010, which is significant only for the years 2005, 2009 and 2010 at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. There is a negative association for three years (2007 and 2008 and 2010), 
while there is a positive association for the years 2005 2006 and 2009, which is only 
significant for 2009 at 10%. There is a negative association between firm size and ROA for 
the entire sample period which is only significant at 10% for the years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 
2008. 
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Table 5.5 OLS regression of ROA on Governance and Control Variables 
The dependent variable is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) = Earnings before interest and taxes over total assets for each year. The independent variables include 
DIRW: Director ownership= the total shareholdings of directors over the total number of shares, INDEP: Independent directors= Proportion of non-executive directors to 
total number of directors; BSIZE: board size = Total number of directors on the board; AUD: Audit Committee = Dummy variable; 1 if there is an audit committee,0 
otherwise; ROLE: role duality = Dummy variable—1 if the chairman is also the CEO, 0 otherwise; EXCREM: Executive Remuneration= Natural logarithm of total board 
remuneration( both remuneration executive and non-executive);; DEBT: total debt = Total debt /total assets; DPOUT: dividend payout = Dividend per share/earnings per 
share; FSIZE: firm size = the natural logarithm of total assets. All OLS regression includes seven dummy variables for each of the eight industries based on Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB)  
Model          Dependent variables ROA 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Observation 274 304 335 342 331 308 
Constant -5.802*** -5.72*** -6.459*** -4.277* -2.947 -2.965 
INDEP 0.003 0.007 0.004 0.015** 0.007 -0.003 
BSIZE -0.038 -0.029 -0.079** -0.034 -0.023 -0.003 
ROLE 0.207 -0.239 0.389 0.057 0.327 0.132 
AUD -0.674* -0.608 -0.276 -0.077 -0.126 -0.038 
DIRW 0.006 0.008* 0.008* 0.009* 0.007 0.01 
EXCREM 0.538*** 6.109*** 0.512*** 0.309** 0.244 0.268** 
DEBT -0.007* -0.008 -0.002 -0.004 -0.01 -0.008*** 
DPOUT 0.006 0.036 -0.007 -0.008 0.01 0.032 
FSIZE -0.126* -0.098* -0.098* -0.119* -0.008 -0.03 
Industry: Cons. Goods -0.364 0.143 0.686* 0.482 -0.155 -0.071* 
Industry: Cons. Serv. -0.079 0.085 0.506* 0.203 -0.431 -0.431** 
Industry: Health Care -0.159 0.013 0.31 0.16 -0.574 -0.568 
Industry: Industrials -0.569 -0.66 -0.081 -0.06 -0.814 -0.72** 
Industry: Oil & Gas -0.212 0.044 0.445 0.265 -0.31 -0.442* 
Industry: Technology -0.337 -0.215 0.014 -0.065 -0.316 -0.505* 
Industry: Utilities -0.209 0.077 0.169 0.307 -0.454 -0.468 
R-sq 0.157 0.126 0.146 0.099 0.093 0.106 
Adj. R-sq 0.105 0.078 0.103 0.055 0.047 0.057 
F  3.012*** 2.604*** 3.396*** 2.246*** 2.021** 2.168*** 
 
The excluded dummy variable for industry classification is basic materials 
*** Significant at the 1% level **Significant at the 5% level *Significant at the 10% level. 
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5.4 General discussion to link the findings with previous studies 
In this study the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is 
examined using Ordinary Least Square regression (OLS). The analysis is carried out on a 
sample of UK listed companies on the London Stock Exchange (FTSE). All shares non-
financial companies for the period 2005-2010. The selection method of the sample is widely 
used, and covers the economically most important companies, comparable with others in the 
USA. Furthermore the UK Corporate Governance Code is generally more applicable to the 
larger companies rather than smaller ones. Agency theory was utilised as a basis to develop 
the hypothesised relationships in which it will help to understand the impact or the effect of 
each variable. Two well-known performance measures commonly applied to the existing 
literature were used, which are market measure (Tobin’s Q) and accounting measure (ROA). 
Internal governance mechanisms such as percentage of independent directors on board, 
managerial ownership, executive remuneration, audit committee, debt and dividend were 
linked with improvement in firm performance, while role duality and board size, on the other 
hand, were linked with decrease in firm performance. It is suggested that corporate 
governance mechanisms have an impact on firm performance and causal relationships 
occurred from corporate governance to firm performance. 
5.4.1 Independent directors 
With respect to the percentage of independent directors on the board, and based on the market 
measures (Tobin’s Q), a positive association was found with firm performance across the six 
year period and is significant for the whole period 2005 to 2010 at 10% level for 2005, 2006 
and 2009, 5% level for 2008 and 2010, and at the 1% level for 2007. This finding supports 
the Cadbury view, and consistent with the expectations of many corporate governance codes 
which promote the inclusion of more independent directors on the board, and it suggests that 
independent directors can impact firm performance and overall could be regarded as a 
substitute for other governance mechanisms (Weir et al., 2002). Also this finding suggests 
that a board with a higher proportion of independent directors is more effective due to the 
added experience and skills they have to monitor the board decision making process and to 
improve the board effectiveness. This result is consistent with other prior studies such as 
Pearce and Zahra (1992), Daily and Dalton (1992), Yermack (1999), Rodriguez and Anson 
(2001) and Ho and Williams (2003).  
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In terms of accounting measures (ROA), the percentage of independent directors is again 
positive across the whole period for six years apart from 2010 which has a negative 
coefficient sign but is only significant for the year 2008 at 5 % level. The finding of 
independent directors and firm performance apart from in 2008 is inconsistent with Bhagat 
and Black (2002) who found that board independence shows a significant negative 
association with both measures. Also, apart from 2010 the finding does not support previous 
empirical work on corporate governance studies which found that the association between the 
percentage of NEDs and ROA is negative,  such as Weir and Laing (2000); Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) and Fich and Shivdasani, (2006). One of the recommendations of the 
Combined Code in 1998 required firms to have at least one-third of independent directors on 
the board. There are different studies which failed to find a relationship between the 
proportion of NEDs and firm performance such as Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), 
Mehran(1995), and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006). However, other studies found a negative 
relationship between board independence and firm performance such as Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), Weir et al. (2002), Bhagat and Black (2002) and Abdullah (2007). 
Moreover, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) did not find any relationship between the proportion of 
outside directors and firm performance and this finding is supported by Klein (1998). 
5.4.2 Board size 
Based on the market measure Tobin’s Q, the association between board size and firm 
performance is positive across the six years apart from 2006 and significant only for 2005 
and 2007 with 10%. This finding apart from 2006 is inconsistent with several past studies that 
examined the relationship between firm performance and board size such as, Yermack 
(1996); Conyon & Peck (1998);  Klein (1998); Vefeas (1999a); Bhagat & Black, (2002); 
Ferris et al., 2003); Haniffa and Hudaib (2006); Sakawa & Watanabel (2007); Cheng et al. 
(2008); Coles et al. (2008); and Guest (2009). However, it supports previous studies which 
found a positive association between firm performance and board size such as Adams and 
Mehran (2005); Beiner et al. (2006); Henry (2008); and Mangena and Tauringana (2008). It 
is explained theoretically as the market perceives the larger board more effective than the 
smaller board due to the greater access provided by the larger board to the external 
environment of the firm which decreases uncertainty and facilitates the guaranteeing of major 
resources such as finance (Goodstein et al., 1994). However, with the accounting measure 
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(ROA), a negative association is observed for all the period from 2005 to 2010, significant 
only for 2007 at the 5% level  The negative coefficient is consistent with other studies such as 
Eisenberg et al., (1998); Ho and Williams (2003); Kiel and Nicholson (2003); Shabbir and 
Padget, (2005); Mangena and Chamisa (2008) and Guest (2009). However, this finding 
contradicts others which found a positive association between board size and accounting 
returns such as Sanda et al., (2005); Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Mangena and Tauringana 
(2008). In theory, it means that larger boards are less effective. 
5.4.3 Role Duality 
Based on both the market measure (Tobin’s Q) and the accounting measure (ROA), there was 
found a positive association between CEO duality with firm performance across the six years, 
apart from 2006 in ROA which showed a negative association,  significant at  the 5 % level 
or the year 2005 and at 10% for 2006 and 2007 with Q only. This result is found contrary to 
the expectation of role duality that it would lead to agency problems which in that way 
impacts on poor performance for the firm; also empirically it does not support the 
recommendations of corporate governance codes that the roles of CEO and chairman should 
be separated.  It is similar to other past studies such as Faccio and Lasfer (1999) and Dahya 
and McConnell (2005a).  However, other studies found that when the CEO and chairman are 
split the firms are more valuable and it strengthens the monitoring ability of the board, for 
example Rechner and Dalton (1991);  Jensen (1993);  Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), 
Yermack (1996); Vefeas and Theodorou (1998); Sanda et al., (2005); and Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006). The discussion in the literature review showed that different empirical studies 
have reported conflicting results in developed countries, especially from the United Kingdom 
and the United States. However, Daily & Dalton (1992) argue that CEO duality is more 
common in poorly performing firms than well performing firms. Contrary to expectations the 
absence of duality has no significant impact on firm performance based on accounting 
measures but it was found to have a significant impact on firm performance on market 
measures in 2005, 2006 and 2007, which is supported by Donaldson and Davis (1991) and 
Boyd (1995). In theory, the suggestion is that role duality gives the CEO who has charisma 
and vision the opportunity to have a stronger view on the objectives of the firm without 
interference from the excessive board (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, p.321). Also, it facilitates 
decisions which could be made quicker and that could improve firm performance. Regarding 
the negative association found in 2006 for ROA, it is suggested that the market identifies role 
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duality as not a good practice because one person with too much power can get engaged in 
opportunistic activities.  
5.4.4 Audit committee 
With respect to the Audit committee, based on the market measure (Tobin’s Q), the finding 
shows that there is negative association with Tobin’s Q across the period 2005 to 2010 apart 
from 2007 and 2010 which have a positive coefficient sign, but only significant for the year 
2005 at 10%. It indicates that Audit has no impact on performance and this result is 
consistent with other studies such as Vefeas and Theodorou (1998); Weir and Laing (2000); 
Weir et al. (2002) and Mangena and Chamisa (2008).  For the year 2005, it is consistent with 
other studies which found statistically significant positive or negative association between 
audit committee and Tobin’s Q such as Vefeas (1999a) and Karamanous and Vefeas (2005). 
 
Based on accounting measures (ROA), the finding shows that the coefficient signs are 
negative across the six years between Audit and firm performance but are only significant for 
the year 2005 at 5 % Level. Based on Cadbury claims, if Audit committees assist to offer 
high effective financial monitoring and to be able to align the interest between managers and 
shareholders, then firm performance would be expected to be influenced by the 
characteristics of Audit committees (Weir et al. 2002). Agency theory suggests that the mere 
presence of audit committee contributes towards reducing the predominant agency costs 
(Mendez and Garcia, 2007) and thus, enhances firm’s survival chances. In this respect, audit 
committee presence is linked to better governance quality and reduced information 
asymmetries. Taking into account the high adoption rate of the Audit committee, empirically 
its insignificance in explaining ROA is not highly unexpected as this particular mechanism is 
mostly used by the majority of firms and a very small number that do not have an Audit 
committee. 
5.4.5 Managerial ownership 
It is expected that there is a convergence between shareholders and managers when these 
managers own some of the shares in the company. The hypothesis states that as managerial 
ownership increases above zero, performance of the firm improves because managers are 
expected to be less motivated to pull away resources from value entrenchment until a 
particular point, when the board becomes entrenched and performance is likely to decline.  
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With respect to managerial ownership, based on the market measure (Tobin’s Q), the findings 
show there is a positive association between managerial ownership and firm performance for 
the whole period apart from 2008, which has a negative coefficient sign, but is only 
statistically significant for 2005 and 2007 at the 10 % level As for 2008, managerial 
ownership association with Q is negative. This effect may be time specific - the period was 
one of stock market decline and it may be that firms with large managerial ownership were 
hit the hardest. Generally, large firms survive in the index, and the correlation between 
directors' ownership and firms’ size is shown as negative in Appendix 3. 
 
Based on the accounting measure (ROA), the association between managerial ownership and 
firm performance is positive across the whole period 2005 to 2010, but is only statistically 
significant for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 at 10% level. The significant and positive 
relationship between director ownership and the ROA is consistent with a number of prior 
studies that found director ownership improves the corporate performance (See for example, 
Mehran, 1995, Holderness et al., 1999, Core and Larcker, 2002). However, Faccio and Lasfer 
(1999) found a weak association between firm performance and managerial ownership and 
this is supported as well by other studies such as Short and Keasey (1999); Ho and Williams 
(2003) Beiner et al.(2006), and Mangena and Chamisa (2008). In theory, the entrenchment 
hypothesis could explain the negative coefficient sign. This hypothesis points out that with 
higher levels of shareholdings’ directors; these directors could gain sufficient voting power 
and use it as a protection against any disciplinary decisions taken by minorities’ shareholders. 
Such a situation encourages managers to become engaged in opportunistic behaviour, 
including the consumption of more perquisites, which could have an effect on firm 
performance financially. Generally, statistically insignificant and negative coefficients as 
such in 2008 and 2009 on director shareholding mean that the director entrenchment 
hypothesis is supported. The implication of such finding is that at high levels of shareholding, 
directors tend to concentrate on maximising their own utility, such as guaranteed employment 
with attractive salaries to the disadvantage of other shareholders. 
5.4.6 Executive remuneration 
With respect to executive remuneration, based on both measures market measure (Tobin’s Q) 
and accounting measure (ROA), executive remuneration is found to be statistically positively 
related to firm performance. This finding is consistent with other studies which found a 
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positive association between executive remuneration and firm performance such as Conyon 
and Leech (1994); Main, Bruce and Buck (1996); Benito and Conyon (1999); O’Neill and 
Lob (1999); Crespi-Cladera and Gispert (2003) and Stathopoulus, Espenlaub and Walker 
(2005). However, this finding fails to offer empirical support for past studies such as Ezzamel 
and Watson (1997); Gregg, Jewell and Tonks (2005) and Girma, Thomson and Wright (2007) 
which found a weak link between executive remuneration and firm performance. In theory, 
studies have been carried out to examine if executive remuneration is an effective mechanism 
to align shareholders’ interest with their managers (Scholtz and Smit, 2012). Barber, Ghiselli 
and Deale (2006) found that the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders led to 
the perception that the executives have personal goals and that there might be a weak 
association between the compensation of the CEO and firm performance. Their conclusion is 
that the problem could be solved by the alignment of interests between shareholders and the 
incentives of the managers through the pay-performance link, therefore maximizing 
shareholder values. Jensen and Meckling (1976) found that the remuneration package of the 
agent plays an effective role in monitoring the manager. Other studies found that there is a 
relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance as a result of  the 
improvement of corporate governance measures such as Conyon and Leech (1994); Conyon 
(1997) and Weir and Laing (2000) and Rankin (2007). This finding is expected following the 
adoption of a series of corporate governance reforms throughout the last two decades to find 
an increase in this pay-performance elasticity over time, since a common theme in these 
reforms was that executive pay should be related to company performance 
5.4.7 Debt 
With regards to the debt ratio, based on the market measure (Tobin’s Q) there is a positive 
association with firm performance for the whole period 2005 to 2010 apart from in 2005 
which has a negative coefficient sign but is only significant at the 10% level or the year 2008. 
Based on accounting measure (ROA), the association between debt and firm performance is 
negative across all years from 2005 to 2010, significant only for the years 2005, 2009 and 
2010 at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. It seems that even with more debt there is no 
impact on firm performance and on its value. Agency theory suggests that debt is considered 
a good mechanism to make the managers more disciplined, so it is not supported here based 
on such a relationship between debt and firm performance. Contrary to the free cash flow 
hypothesis, leverage is negative, similar studies found such a result by Agrawal and Knoeber 
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(1996), Dowen (1995), McConnell and Servaes (1995) and Short and Keasey (1999), Bohren 
and Odegaard (2001), Tam and Tan (2007) and Aljifri and Mustafa (2007). McConnell and 
Servaes (1995) explained the situation as one where projects with positive net present values 
declining in availability due to the existence of excessive debt. 
5.4.8 Dividend 
With regard to dividend, there is a negative association between dividend and firm 
performance for the years 2005, 2007 and 2008, while for the years 2006, 2009 and 2010 
there is a positive association based on the market measure (Tobin’s Q). Focused on the 
accounting measure (ROA), there is a negative association for three years 2007, 2008 and 
2010, while a positive association for the years (2005 2006 and 2009), which is only 
significant for 2009 at 10%.There are some studies which found a negative association 
between dividend and firm performance, such as Bohren and Odegaard (2001) and Aljifri and 
Moustafe (2007), but which are inconsistent with La Porta et al. (1999) who claim that 
shareholders with weak protection want to get more dividends irrespective of the availability 
of any investment opportunities. Therefore, when there is ineffective protection it is possible 
for the dividend to be used as a substitute mechanism. It is argued that in a country where the 
protection of the shareholders is strong, firms who have high pay-out dividends tend to use 
the cash to reinvest in upcoming projects because their shareholders could delay the receipt of 
dividends. Given that, retained earnings are less when there are strong shareholders’ rights 
along with higher dividends, and thus there is a lower growth rate. The positive relationship 
between dividend and firm performance supports the agency theory where dividends are 
considered a good mechanism to discipline managers.  
5.4.9 Control Variables 
With respect to control variables, based on the market measure (Tobin’s Q), there is a 
negative significant association between firm size and firm performance for all the variables. 
This finding is consistent with studies finding  a negative association between firm size and 
firm performance such as Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Al-Khouri (2006), Durnev and Kim 
(2005), Weir et al. (2002) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). But this finding contradicts 
studies that found a positive association such as Yermack, (1996) and Carter et al., (2003). 
Regarding the industry dummies, there is not any significant association in this study and this 
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finding is inconsistent with previous studies which suggest that industry and year of operation 
has an effect on Tobin’s Q such as  Durnev and Kim (2005) and Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), 
With respect to the accounting measure (ROA), there is a negative association between firm 
size and firm performance for all the variables but is only significant at the 10% level or the 
years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. This finding contradicts previous studies which found that 
ROA and firm size are positively linked such as Weir and Laing (2000) and Bozec (2005). 
Moreover, the results indicate that a mixed relationship exists between firm performance and 
industry dummies. Industry consumer goods, industry consumer services, industry oil and 
gas, industry utilities and industry healthcare shows a positive association with ROA for the 
years 2006, 2007 and 2008, which is only significant at 10% for the years 2007 and 2010 for 
the first two industries and for 2009 for healthcare. These industry dummies have a negative 
association for the years 2005, 2009 and 2010. Industry industrials and technology show a 
negative association for the whole period 2005 to 2010 apart from 2008 for technology 
industry, which is significant at 10% for the year 2010, while industrial is significant at 10% 
and 5% for the years 2009 and 2010 respectively. The positive coefficient of the above 
industry dummies is consistent with prior studies such as Shabbir and Padgett (2005) and 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) which found that accounting returns are different through 
financial years and different industries.   
5.5 Endogeneity 
The analysis in the previous sections will be extended in this section as all the reported results 
were based on the analysis using the ordinary least square regressions. By doing that, it is 
supposed that corporate performance is affected by corporate governance structure. The 
discussion in chapter two highlights that there is a prospect where the corporate governance 
structure is affected by corporate performance, and there is another possibility is that the 
explanatory variables are endogenous. Vogt. W. Paul (1999, 101) stresses that “[An] 
endogenous variable is a variable that is an inherent part of the system being studied and the 
value of which is determined within the system. This variable is caused by other variables in 
a causal system. It is contrasted with an exogenous variable. An exogenous variable is a 
variable entering from and determined from the outside of the system being studied". Vogt. 
W. Paul differentiates the exogenous and endogenous variable in a causal system. Green 
(2003) points out that in such conditions, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) provides inconsistent 
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and biased estimates of the casual effect of the explanatory variables on the dependent 
variables.  
 
The endogeneity problem occurs when there is a correlation between at least one or more 
explanatory variable with the error term. Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) is used to extend 
the analysis where additional variables are needed and added to the equation, and these 
additional variables are called “instrumental” variables. There is a condition in which 
dependent variables and these selected instrumental variables should have no correlation with 
each other but instrumental variables are correlated with the endogenous variables, yet there 
is no correlation with the error terms. Lagged endogenous variables and other predictor 
variables were used as instrumental variables in the analysis. The selection of the lagged 
variables as instrumental variables for this analysis is because of the type of research data 
collected for this study, which consisted of a set of observations prepared at diverse points in 
time on a big number of firms. Therefore, there is a propensity that there is a correlation for 
the data across observations but it seems less possible that the values at an early point in time 
of the variables are directly affecting current values of dependant variable.  
5.5.1 Previous studies 
A list of research studies in governance that have taken into consideration the endogeneity 
problem are provided in the following table 4.6. 
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Table 5.6 List of Studies Using Simultaneous equations 
Author(s) Method Instrumental variables Issue Justification IV and 
extents of endogeneity 
problem 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, 
& Palai (1999) 
2SLS Use log sales, use log 
sales squared, std 
deviation and std 
deviation dummy as 
instrumental variables  
Ownership and firm 
performance  
Discuss the difficulty in 
determining the 
instrument variables for 
managerial ownership   
S. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) 
OLS & 2SLS Lagged variables  Board composition, 
ownership structure and 
performance 
Use Hausman test 
Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) 
3SLS Firm performance (Q) 
and control mechanisms  
Governance and 
performance 
Not available 
Palia ( 2001)  2SLS, estimates three 
different specifications 
for the simultaneous 
system, first 
specification does not 
CEO experience, quality 
of education, firm 
volatility and CEO age. 
These variables are 
expected to be related to 
Managerial 
compensation and firm 
Hausman and Taylor 
(1981) test. Check for 
insignificant correlation 
between IVS and error 
term. In addition, Palia 
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include any control 
variables, second 
specification includes 
the control variables, 
third specification is 
expanded to include 
other variables that have 
been found statistically 
significant   capital 
intensity, free cash flow, 
board & ownership 
structure, CEO founder)  
compensation. These 
variables are chosen as 
instrumental variables 
because other studies 
indicate that these 
variables to be related to 
the structure of 
managerial 
compensation      
value  provides an explanation 
on why other 
governance variables 
was used as control 
variables instead of as 
IVs  
Cho (1998) 2SLS, 3SLS. But report 
only 2SLS because 
2SLS and 3SLS give the 
same result qualitatively. 
Three specifications on 
simultaneous equations    
Use lagged value of 
leverage to control for 
the possibility that 
financial leverage is 
endogenously 
determined. Lagged Q 
was also used ( Lagged 
values)  
Ownership structure and 
corporate value 
Not available. Cho noted 
that 2SLS and 3SLS 
regression provide 
qualitatively similar 
results. His primary 
results suggest that 
endogeneity affects the 
results of OLS 
regressions 
Barnhart & Rosenstein 
(1998) 
2SLS Four sets of instruments 
are developed for three 
endogenous variables 
(Q, OUT, bard 
composition, and OWN) 
Board composition, 
managerial ownership 
and firm performance.   
Logit transformation is 
used when ownership 
and board independence 
is the dependent variable   
Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) 
OLS & 2SLS Ownership structure is 
assumed to be 
endogenous  
Ownership structure and 
firm performance  
Not avilable 
Bhagat and Black (2002) 3SLS Normalised earnings per 
share, fraction of 
independent  directors 
Board independence and 
long term firm 
performance 
Not available  
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over the board size, and 
share ownership by all 
directors and officers    
Vafeas ( 2006) 2SLS Use univariate and 
multivariate tests  
Board meeting 
frequency and firm 
performance  
Not available  
Young (2000) Consider three 
endogenous variables; 
the number of executive 
board members, the 
level of managerial 
equity ownership and 
the level of dividend 
payments.    
IV not used. Univariate 
tests of sensitivity to 
changes in endogenous 
variables. 
UK board structure and 
governance 
arrangements   
Not available  
Lasfer (2006) 2SLS Firm size (In(ME)) 
growth opportunities 
(Q), R & D/sales, capital 
intensity ( fixed assets 
over total assets), and 
standard deviation of 
stock returns.   
Managerial ownership 
and board structure  
Not available. However, 
he noted that the 
endogeneity issue may 
not be directly 
accounted for in his 
research owing to 
unavailability of data 
that is specific to 
managers and /or the 
board.   
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Choosing instrumental variables have been discussed by several studies, for example   
Larcker and Rusticus (2005) and Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) identified problems in 
selecting instrumental variables. They particularly identified a potential problem when using 
an instrument which has only a weak correlation with the endogenous independent variable. 
The Hausman test is recommended to be carried out to test the suitability of using OLS and 
the presence of the endogeneity problem (Larcker & Rusticus, 2005) 
5.5.2 Appropriateness of Instrumental Variables 
In this study, 2SLS was carried out using a set of instrumental variables consisting of lagged 
endogenous variables and other predictor variables. The correlation between the instrumental 
variables and error term was obtained from the main equation in order to determine the 
appropriateness of the instrumental variables. Error term and the instrumental variables 
should have no correlation with each other. The correlation results between these 
instrumental variables and error term indicate that there is no correlation and thus based on 
this correlation these instrument variables are valid to be used. If the correlation between the 
endogenous variables and the instrumental variables is between moderate to high the 
instrumental variables are considered exogenous. Appendix Ch. 4.2 illustrates the 
correlations of these variables. 
In this study, independent directors (INDEP) and board size (BSIZE) are the explanatory 
variables that are endogenous while the instrumental variables will be considered more 
exogenous than the endogenous variables (INDEP and BSIZE) when its correlation to the 
endogenous variables is moderate to high (Larcker & Rusticus; 2005). Appendix Ch. 4.1 
provides the correlation of the explanatory variables to their lagged values. Correlation 
between INDEP, and INDEPn-1 is about 72% to 75%, while for BSIZE is about 86% to 87%.  
5.5.3 Results of Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Regression 
The results of 2SLS regressions for firm performance measures Tobin’s Q and ROA against 
the corporate governance mechanisms and financial policies (debt and dividend) will be 
discussed in this section. As mentioned in the previous section, running 2SLS regressions 
analysis will use instrumental variables. To run 2SLS, there are two ways: the first way is 
about using two steps of ordinary least squares (OLS), and the second way is about more 
directly using the availability of the 2SLS method in the SPSS software. The two steps of 
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OLS contains running of the OLS twice for each endogenous variable. The steps involved are 
described in the following section.  
5.5.4 Two Steps OLS 
In this thesis, INDEP (board independence) and BSIZE (board size) are assumed as 
endogenous variables. As discussed in the previous section, lagged endogenous variables are 
appropriate instrumental variables, thus 2SLS regression will use the lagged value of 
endogenous variables INDEP and BSIZE. As INDEP and BSIZE are being considered as 
endogenous, the two step OLS is run twice; one for each variable. 
In the first OLS, each endogenous variable is taken up as the dependent variable and 
regressed against its lagged value, board size, executive remuneration, managerial ownership, 
dividend, debt, firm size and the industry control variable. 
 
The first OLS regression is; 
 
INDEPn = INDEPn-1 + BSIZEn + DIRWn, + EXCRn+ DEBTn+ DPOUTn+ FSIZEn + IC 
 
The predicted value of INDEP is obtained after running the above regression. This obtained 
predicted value of INDEP will replace INDEP in which it will be regressed with other 
explanatory variables against Tobin’s Q using the following equation; 
 
Q= predictedINDEP + BSIZEn + DIRWn + EXCRn+ DEBTn+ DPOUTn+ FSIZEn + IC 
 
As discussed earlier, both INDEP and BSIZE are being considered endogenous, thus the 
same procedure of INDEP was repeated for BSIZE. This is illustrated in Appendix Ch. 4.3. 
Since the predicted value of INDEP and BSIZE are obtained, using a new OLS equation as 
shown below for these predicted values to be regressed with Q as dependent variable. The 
new equation is as follows. The results using the following equation are reported in Appendix 
Ch. 4.3. 
 
Q= predicted INDEP+ predicted BSIZE+ DIRWn + EXCRn+ DEBTn+ DPOUTn+ FSIZEn + 
IC 
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5.5.5 2SLS results using SPSS 
The second way of running 2SLS in SPSS is also employed here to confirm the results 
obtained in the above section. After using 2SLS, the significance level of the explanatory 
variables is reported in the following table 4.7. 
Table 5.7 2SLS; Q regressed against board, directors’ ownership, executive 
remuneration, dividend and debt, board structure is assumed to be endogenous 
Model                                                  Dependent variables Tobin’s Q  
 Years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Observation 299 323 335 326 307 
Constant -8.952*** -7.526*** -5.749** -7.241** -6.081** 
INDEP 0.021** 0.02** 0.022** 0.018* 0.019** 
BSIZE 0.007 0.076* 0.104* 0.048 0.031 
ROLE 0.439* 0.505* 0.268 0.324 0.287 
AUD -0.029 0.34 -0.517 -0.373 0.024 
DIRW 0.005 0.007 -0.003 0.01 0.012* 
LGEXCREM 0.719*** 0.532*** 0.453*** 0.539*** 0.431** 
DEBT 0.027 0.004 0.005* 0.002* -0.002 
DPOUT 0.03 -0.006 -0.014 0.053 0.11* 
FSIZE -0.393*** -0.37*** -0.344*** -0.24*** -0.213** 
Industry: Cons. Goods 0.294 0.21 -0.085 0.079 0.19 
Industry: Cons. Serv. 0.112 0.205 0.056 0.125 -0.168 
Industry: Health Care 0.004 -0.021 -0.167 -0.205 -0.215 
Industry: Industrials 0.178 0.237 -0.042 0.095 -0.105 
Industry: Oil & Gas -0.019 0.021 -0.128 -0.03 -0.081 
Industry: Technology 0.019 -0.092 -0.207 -0.16 -0.073 
Industry: Utilities 0.212 -0.043 -0.215 -0.198 -0.23 
R-sq 0.231 0.153 0.119 0.095 0.092 
Adj. R-sq 0.188 0.109 0.074 0.048 0.043 
F  5.137*** 3.475*** 2.682*** 2.037** 1.853** 
The dependent variable is measured by Tobin‘s Q, which is measured by (Market Cap + Liabilities + Preferred 
Equity + Minority Interest) / Total Assets. Instruments are the lagged values of board structure (INDEP AND 
BSIZE) and other exogenous variables, and control variables. The independent variables include DIRW: 
Director ownership= the total shareholdings of directors over the total number of shares, INDEP: Independent 
directors= Proportion of non-executive directors to total number of directors; BSIZE: board size = Total number 
of directors on the board; AUD: Audit Committee = Dummy variable; 1 if there is an audit committee,0 
otherwise; ROLE: role duality = Dummy variable—1 if the chairman is also the CEO, 0 otherwise; EXCREM: 
Executive Remuneration= Natural logarithm of total board remuneration ( both remuneration executive and 
non-executive); DEBT: total debt = Total debt /total assets; DPOUT: dividend payout = Dividend per 
share/earnings per share; FSIZE: firm size = the natural logarithm of total assets. All OLS regression includes 
seven dummy variables for each of the eight industries based on Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), the 
excluded dummy variable for industry classification is basic materials,  ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively. 
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The results of Q being regressed against board structure and other explanatory variables using   
two-stage least square regression (2SLS) are presented in table 4.7. To reiterate, in running 
regression board size (BSIZE) and board independence (INDEP) are assumed to be 
endogenous. The instrumental variables are the lagged values of INDEP and BSIZE, and 
other explanatory variables. Generally, executive remuneration (apart from in 2008) and firm 
size consistently show impact on the firm performance. Comparing the results obtained from 
2SLS regression in the above table and OLS regression (table 4.4), a similar pattern of 
coefficients for the variables is shown, but is shifted by one year which is not unexpected as 
the dependent variable is the same for the different year's explanatory variables. The signs of 
INDEP in table 4.7 are similar to the signs for INDEP in table 4.4, but the significance levels 
of INDEP in table 4.7 where it is significant at 5% for 2006, 2007 and 2008, while it is 
significant at 10% for 2009 and 2010. But Table 4.4 shows INDEP is significant for the years 
2005, 2006, 2009 with 10%, 2007 with 1% and 2008 and 2010 at 5%. However, this is not 
the case for board size, where there is a change in the coefficient sign of BSIZE for the year 
2006 from positive to negative and it shows there is association between BSIZE and Tobin’s 
Q for the years 2010 and 2007 with 10%, while BSIZE is positively associated with Tobin’s 
Q for the year 2008 with 5%. Also by using two steps OLS, the same result was produced as 
above.  
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Table 5.8 2SLS; ROA regressed against board, directors’ ownership, executive 
remuneration, dividend and debt, board structure is assumed to be endogenous 
Model                                                  Dependent variables ROA 
 Years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Observation 299 323 335 326 307 
Constant -6.61*** -6.727*** -3.337* -4.511* -4.278** 
INDEP 0.014* 0.006 0.009 0.015* 0.01* 
BSIZE -0.042 -0.086* -0.019 -0.068 -0.008 
ROLE -0.103 0.395 0.078 0.307 0.119 
AUD -0.468 -0.223 -0.255 -0.032 -0.016 
DIRW 0.015** 0.009* 0.008 0.009 0.011* 
LGEXCREM 0.507*** 0.521*** 0.262* 0.348** 0.328** 
DEBT -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 -0.01** -0.008** 
DPOUT 0.006 -0.026 -0.007 0.01 0.028 
FSIZE -0.102* -0.106* -0.103* -0.015 -0.081 
Industry: Cons. 
Goods 
0.164 0.63* 0.519 -0.171 0.043 
Industry: Cons. 
Serv. 
0.078 0.446 0.22 -0.44 -0.32 
Industry: Health 
Care 
0.004 0.243 0.185 -0.587* -0.458 
Industry: 
Industrials 
-0.632* -0.159 -0.048 -0.793* -0.657* 
Industry: Oil & 
Gas 
0.04 0.392 0.294 -0.331 -0.319 
Industry: 
Technology 
-0.19 -0.006 -0.034 -0.349 -0.383 
Industry: Utilities 0.077 0.118 0.321 -0.473 -0.352 
R-sq 0.133 0.132 0.066 0.104 0.109 
Adj. R-sq 0.084 0.087 0.02 0.059 0.06 
F  2.714*** 2.929*** 1.442 2.293*** 2.23*** 
The dependent variable is measured by Return on Assets (ROA) = Earnings before interest and taxes over 
total assets for each year. Instruments are the lagged values of board structure (INDEP AND BSIZE) and 
other exogenous variables, and control variables. The independent variables include DIRW: Director 
ownership= the total shareholdings of directors over the total number of shares, INDEP: Independent directors= 
Proportion of non-executive directors to total number of directors; BSIZE: board size = Total number of 
directors on the board; AUD: Audit Committee = Dummy variable; 1 if there is an audit committee,0 otherwise; 
ROLE: role duality = Dummy variable—1 if the chairman is also the CEO, 0 otherwise; EXCREM: Executive 
Remuneration= Natural logarithm of total board remuneration ( both remuneration executive and non-
executive); DEBT: total debt = Total debt /total assets; DPOUT: dividend payout = Dividend per share/earnings 
per share; FSIZE: firm size = the natural logarithm of total assets. All OLS regression includes seven dummy 
variables for each of the eight industries based on Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB), the excluded 
dummy variable for industry classification is basic materials,  ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level respectively. 
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The results of ROA regression (table 4.8) show clear evidence supporting the obtained results 
of OLS reported in Table 4.5. INDEP is constantly showing a positive association with ROA, 
which is significant at 5% for the years 2006, 2009 and 2010. BSIZE is constantly showing a 
negative association with ROA, which is significant at 5% for the year 2007. 
5.6 Summary and conclusion 
The relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance is evaluated and 
examined in this study. The literature on corporate governance and previous studies 
examined the relationship between performance and governance produced mixed results.  
Board characteristics (board size, independent directors, CEO duality and Audit committee); 
managerial ownership, executive remuneration and financial policies (Debt and Dividend) are 
chosen to proxy corporate governance structure for the company. Tobin’s Q and Return on 
Assets (ROA) are chosen to proxy firm performance. The sample is considered the list of 
non-financial members’ companies of the FTSE All Share Index between two particular 
points: the end of December 2004 and the end of March 2011. OLS results for Tobin’s Q and 
ROA regressed against corporate governance variables and control variables were reported.  
The endogeneity issue in regression was examined in this chapter, instrumental variables 
selection were highlighted and the results of 2SLS regression for corporate performance 
Tobin’s Q and ROA on corporate were analysed and discussed. As reported by Himmelberg 
et al (1999), it is recognised that selecting appropriate instrumental variables for regression is 
difficult. Larker and Rusticus (2005) suggested that lagged values are appropriate as 
instrumental variables and were employed in this study. As it has  been discussed that 
choosing instrumental variables is difficult and that its justification differs, some studies do 
not include the justification on the selection of these instrumental variables, for instance: 
Agrawal and Knoeber( 1996),Cho (1998),Bhagat and Black (2002) and Lasfer (2006)). 
However, a simple justification of the instrumental variables was given in this study. 
Moreover, the technical approach to the Stage Least Square regressions is provided which 
help to clarify and understand better the operationalisation of the endogeneity issue and 
regression. Finally, the results of the 2SLS regression discussed above showed that no 
evidence was found of a causal association which goes from the firm performance to the 
board or corporate governance structure. But, seemingly, if any causal link is found between 
board structure and other corporate governance mechanisms, it is from the governance 
structure to firm performance. 
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6 Chapter five: Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance has emerged over the past two decades as a fundamental problem in 
financial regulation. Generally, from 1990, the corporate governance subject has increasingly 
been scrutinised and public listed companies have made an attempt to put some procedures in 
action for the operations of the company, to be managed and controlled in order to increase 
performance, encourage disclosure and achieve maximisation of shareholders’ return; thus 
their interests are protected. This chapter presents the conclusion of the thesis. This chapter 
mainly focuses on putting together the previous chapters, summarising and discussing the 
overall results, explaining the initial contribution of this research through the issues 
examined, summarising the main findings resulting from the analysis using the methods 
discussed in chapter four. Moreover, it includes a section to display the limitations facing this 
study in some areas and it identifies some potential avenues for further suggestions, for future 
research and areas of improvements.    
6.2 Key points in this study 
As mentioned at the start of this study, several studies on the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance have provided mixed results. All the empirical work 
concentrates on the association between firm performance and corporate governance 
structure. Generally, the main objective of this thesis is to explore and examine the 
relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance.  The 
selection of FTSE All Shares listed companies from the period of 2005 to 2010 forms the 
population of this thesis, excluding the financial firms, as they are entitled to a particular 
code. Choosing public listed companies is compatible with all the other previous work which 
makes it comparable and suitable for the recommendation of governance codes. Based on the 
main general objective, this study addresses several questions which are able to present an 
association between the study and the potential findings. As the topic is still widely debated 
and the main arguments are still valid, so this study is important in adding some contributions 
to the existing literature and providing results to be comparable with other studies in a 
different time setting, using a set of data collected from Bloomberg financial database for the 
period of 2005 to 2010. The study follows the majority of other studies in applying OLS 
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regressions as the main method to analyse the data and produce the results. In order to answer 
the major questions which address the relationship between firm performance and corporate 
governance mechanisms, a series of eight hypotheses are tested as mentioned in chapter 
three. Furthermore, two –stage least square regression (2SLS) was employed in this study 
also to look at the possibility that firm performance may affect the corporate governance 
structure. 
 
The literature chapter in this study drew the related theories to this topic, reviewed the 
literature linked to corporate governance and discussed it, concentrating on the previous and 
current literature testing how firm performance and value is affected by corporate governance 
mechanisms and highlighting all the mains arguments resulting from such relationship in 
some empirical work, conducted mainly in developed world such as the UK and the US.      
The methodology chapter presented the research paradigm, design and approach, and the 
main methods followed and applied in this research to explore the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm performance in the UK, detailing the main 
research questions and objectives and data collection methods.  The analytical procedures 
followed in this study were also presented. The analysis chapter included all the results 
obtained from OLS and 2SLS regressions for the annual reports data; also a general 
discussion section showing all the main results with regards to the main questions in this 
study were provided.     
6.3  Summary of research findings  
This thesis has employed UK data to examine the relationship between internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance. Generally, although the results are mixed as 
in previous empirical work, some interesting findings have arisen from the research. The 
findings will be presented in accordance with the research hypothesis and some previous 
work, either supporting or not supporting the findings, will be included. Finally overall 
implications will be discussed, followed by a summary table showing the outcome of the 
hypothesis.  
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6.3.1 Managerial ownership 
The first hypothesis tested is that there is a positive relationship exists between directors’ 
ownership and firm performance. The OLS regression finding of the relationship between 
managerial ownership and firm performance based on Tobin’s Q shows a positive 
relationship but 2008 has a negative coefficient; but only statistically significant for 2005 and 
2007 at (10%). Also the findings are positive with ROA across the whole sample period 2005 
to 2010, but only statistically significant for the years 2006, 2007 and 2008 with 10%. These 
findings are consistent with other previous works such as Faccio and Lasfer (1999), Short and 
Keasey (1999); Ho and Williams (2003) Beiner et al. (2006), and Mangena and Chamisa 
(2008). The entrenchment hypothesis explains that directors with high shareholdings levels 
are capable of using it as a protection against any disciplinary actions taken by minority 
shareholders.  
6.3.2 Executive remuneration 
The Second hypothesis investigated is that there is a positive relationship existing between 
executive remuneration and firm performance. The OLS regressions findings of the 
relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance for both measures 
Tobin’s Q and ROA shows a significant positive  relationship for the whole period of six 
years.  These studies have found similar results to the finding of this study, Conyon and 
Leech (1994); Main, Bruce and Buck (1996); Benito and Conyon (1999); O’Neill and Iob 
(1999); Crespi-Cladera and Gispert (2003) and Stathopoulus, Espenlaub and Walker (2005). 
However, some studies have found a weak link between executive remuneration and firm 
performance, such as Ezzamel and Watson (1997); Gregg, Jewell and Tonks (2005) and 
Girma, Thomson and Wright (2007). 
6.3.3 Board size 
The third hypothesis examined is that there is a negative relationship existing between board 
size and firm performance. The findings of board size based on Tobin’s Q showed that there 
is a positive association for the whole sample period of six years apart from 2006 but it is 
only a significant association for two years 2005 and 2007 with (10%). This finding is 
consistent with past studies that show there is a positive association between board size and 
firm performance such as Adams and Mehran (2005); Beiner et al. (2006); Henry (2008); and 
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Mangena and Tauringana (2008). However, it is inconsistent with  the agency theory 
perspective, and other previous studies examined the impact of board size on performance,  
arguing that smaller board size is more effective and finding  a negative relationship between 
board size and performance such as Yermack (1996); Conyon and  Peck (1998);  Klein 
(1998); Vefeas (1999a and b); Bhagat & Block, (2002); Haniffa and Hudaib (2006); Sakawa 
and Watanabel (2007); Cheng et al. (2008); Coles et al. (2008); and Guest (2009). Also, there 
is a general perspective that a smaller board is better for performance and can make the 
company more valuable (Beiner et al., 2003; Kholief, 2008). Lipton and Lorsh (1992) 
recommended that board size to be consisted of 8 or 9 members or 10 as a maximum, while 
Jensen (1993) recommended 7 or 8 members on board. The findings of board size based on 
the accounting measure (ROA), a negative association is observed for all the period from 
2005 to 2010, but significant only for 2007 at (5%).The negative coefficient is consistent with 
other studies such as Eisenberg et al., (1998); Ho and Williams (2003); Kiel and Nicholson 
(2003); Shabbir and Padget, (2005); Mangena and Chamisa (2008) and Guest (2009). 
However, this finding contradicts others which found a positive association between board 
size and accounting returns such as Sanda et al., (2005); Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and 
Mangena and Tauringana (2008). In theory, it means that larger boards are less effective. 
 
6.3.4 Independent directors 
The fourth hypothesis tested is that there is a positive relationship existing between firm 
performance and the proportion of independent directors. The finding from the OLS 
regression of the relationship between independent directors and firm performance based on 
Tobin’s Q measures shows that there is a positively significant association across the six 
years (2005 to 2010) with (10%) for 2005, 2006 and 2009, with (5%) for 2008 and 2010 and 
with (1%) for 2007.  This finding is consistent with the recommendation of the Cadbury 
report and with other corporate governance codes. Also, this finding is similar to other past 
studies such as Pearce and Zahra (1992), Daily and Dalton (1992), Rodriguez and Anson 
(2001) and Ho and Williams (2003). The relationship between independent directors and firm 
performance under ROA measure shows again that there is a positive association across the 
whole period for six years apart from 2010 which has a negative coefficient sign but only 
significant for the year 2008 at (5%). However it is not similar to the significant negative 
association found by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Klein (1998), Bhagat and Black (2002), 
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Weir et al. (2002), Beiner et al. (2003), Abdullah (2007), Bhagat and Bolton (2008), Coles et 
al. (2008) and Toledo (2010). This positive relationship indicates that the market sees the 
presence of independent directors on the firm board as positive corporate governance practice 
due to the fact that their presence has the potential to improve the board’s decisions.    
6.3.5 Audit Committee 
The fifth hypothesis analysed is that a positive relationship exists between firm performance 
and audit committee. The OLS regression finding of the relationship between audit 
committee and firm performance shows a negative association across the period from (2005 
to 2010) apart from 2007 and 2010 which have a positive coefficient sign, but only 
significant for the year 2005 with (10%). This finding means that there is no impact for this 
variable on firm performance and it is consistent with other studies such as Vefeas and 
Theodorou (1998); Weir and Laing (2000); Weir et al. (2002) and Mangena and Chamisa 
(2008).  Based on ROA as a performance measure; the finding shows that the coefficient 
signs are negative across the six years between Audit and firm performance but are only 
significant for the year 2005 with 5%. This finding is explained as that there is a high 
adoption of audit committees as a mechanism amongst firms. Vefeas (1999a) and 
Karamanous and Vefeas (2005) found a significant positive or negative relationship between 
audit committees and Tobin’s Q.  
6.3.6 Role duality 
The sixth hypothesis tested is that a negative relationship exists between role duality and firm 
performance.The findings of both measures Tobin’s Q and ROA for role duality shows a 
positive association between CEO duality and firm performance, in particular a significant 
association with Tobin’s Q in 2005, 2006 and 2007, but in 2006 the ROA measure showed a 
negative sign. Regarding the significant association of role duality in 2005 and 2006 for 
Tobin’s Q it is consistent with Donaldson and Davis (1994) and Boyd (1995). 
This finding shows that there is no significant relationship found between CEO duality and 
firm performance based on the ROA measure which shows a contradiction of the main 
argument of agency theory and of the recommendation of Cadbury Report in 1992. Other 
previous studies have found the same findings such as Daily and Dalton (1992), Faccio and 
Lasfer (1999), Dahya and McConnell (2005a), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Toledo 
(2010). It is argued that both the recommendations of Cadbury Report (1992) and the 
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arguments of agency theory believe that CEO duality affects negatively the role of the boards 
in monitoring and assessing managers. The empirical work reviewed in the literature with 
regards to role duality showed conflicting results in UK and US.    
6.3.7 Role of debt 
The seventh hypothesis examined is that firms with a higher level of debt have a higher level 
of performance. Based on Tobin’s Q measure, there is a positive association with firm 
performance for the whole period 2005 to 2010 apart from in 2005 which has a negative 
coefficient sign but is only significant at 10% for the year 2008.With regards to ROA as a 
performance measure, there is a negative association across all years from 2005 to 2010, 
significant only for the years 2005, 2009 and 2010 at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. This 
finding is consistent with a number of studies such as McConnell and Servaes (1995), 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Bohren and Odegaard (2001), Aljifri and Mustafa (2007), and 
Tam and Tan (2007). Generally, as the relationship between debt and performance is negative 
it means this mechanism is not effective in reducing the agency problems and is not 
supporting the hypothesis of free cash flow. McConnell and Servaes (1995) explained the 
situation as one where projects with positive net present values are declined due to the 
existence of excessive debt. 
6.3.8 Role of dividends 
The eighth and final hypothesis analysed is that a positive relationship exists between firm 
performance and dividend payout. Based on Tobin’s Q measure, there is a positive 
association for three years, 2006, 2009 and 2010, while for the rest - 2005, 2007 and 2008 - 
there is a negative association but both sets are not significant. Based on ROA, there is a 
positive association for the years 2005, 2006, and 2009 but is significant only for 2009 at 
10%, while for 2007, 2008 and 2010 there is a negative association. The positive significant 
association indicates that dividend policy is a good mechanism in reducing agency problems 
and it is consistent with the agency theory perspective, hypothesis of cash flow and consistent 
with other empirical work such as Jensen (1993), Odegaard (2001) and Alwi (2009). It is 
argued that shareholders with less protection are keen to gain more dividends irrespective of 
investment opportunities (La Porta et al., 1999). Based on that, dividends could be the 
substitute mechanism when there is poor protection. While in advanced countries where the 
shareholders’ protection is strong, firms which pay high dividends tend to invest their monies 
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in future projects because the shareholders are happy to wait for receiving the dividends. For 
the years where there is a negative association between dividend and performance, but not a 
significant one, they are consistent with these two studies Bohren and Odegaard (2001) and 
Aljifri and Moustafa (2007).  
6.4 Overall implications of the study and summary table showing the outcomes for the 
hypothesis 
 
Recent corporate governance recommendations require UK listed firms to comply with a 
number of corporate governance mechanisms. These mechanisms aim to improve corporate 
performance and ensure that directors act in the best interests of shareholders. A review of the 
current empirical literature suggests that most prior corporate governance studies have 
focused on US firms, which have different characteristics to firms in different countries. For 
example, unlike the US, corporate governance recommendations in the UK adopt a voluntary 
approach which requires listed firms to comply or justify, while in the US corporate 
governance recommendations are legal requirements which have to be followed by listed 
firms. Arguably, the UK corporate governance framework represents a different environment 
in which to explore the relationship between corporate governance recommendations and 
corporate performance. This study has employed UK data to investigate the relationship 
between company performance and internal corporate governance mechanisms. Although the 
findings are mixed, a number of interesting results have emerged from the study.  
 
The results show that the relationship between governance mechanisms and performance is a 
complex one. They therefore raise questions about the efficiency of a policy that imposes 
prescribed internal governance structures on firms because such an approach creates 
difficulties when trying to assess the effectiveness of those mechanisms. The results have 
added to the policy debate concerning the appropriateness of different governance 
mechanisms and the extent of their substitutability. It seems that the widespread compliance 
with the Code of Best Practice makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the Code's 
governance mechanisms. Greater flexibility and a recognition that the mix of governance 
mechanisms may vary according to a firm's specific circumstances offer a possible solution. 
It may be that a greater understanding of the process of the governance mechanisms is one 
way forward. 
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Based on the results of Chapter four, several implications can be discussed. First, the findings 
suggest that, regardless of the corporate performance measure used, percentage of 
independent directors has a significant impact on corporate performance in UK listed firms. 
This finding is consistent with the recommendation of the Cadbury report and the Combined 
Code on corporate governance or the general trend in the UK to include more independent 
directors on corporate boards. This positive relationship indicates that the market sees the 
presence of independent directors on the firm board as positive corporate governance practice 
due to the fact that their presence has the potential to improve the board’s decisions. As has 
been mentioned above, empirically this is not a surprise given the number of prior empirical 
studies that have reported a positive relationship between independent directors and corporate 
performance. The appointment of independent directors on corporate board contributes to the 
decision-making process and to the monitoring role in the board meetings. It may also be 
possible that independent directors’ knowledge and skills improve the effectiveness of the 
board and subsequently the corporate performance. 
 
Second, the findings suggest that managerial ownership has a significant impact on corporate 
performance measured by Tobin's Q and ROA. Higher directors' ownership seems to be 
associated with director entrenchment. The entrenchment hypothesis explains that directors 
with high shareholdings levels are capable of using it as a protection against any disciplinary 
actions taken by minority shareholders. The implication of this finding is that at high levels of 
shareholding, directors tend to concentrate on maximising their own utility, such as 
guaranteed employment with attractive salaries to the disadvantage of other shareholders. 
This is because they hold enough voting power to effectively insulate themselves against any 
disciplinary action. This also suggests that director ownership is assessed differently by 
different parties. As has been mentioned before, the ROA is preferred by directors and 
reflects the current values, whereas Tobin's Q predicts the future growth opportunities and is 
preferred by perspective and current investors. 
 
Third, evidence was found of a strong relationship between executive remuneration and company 
performance measures Tobin’s Q and ROA. Following the adoption of a series of corporate 
governance reforms it is expected to find an increase in this pay-performance elasticity over 
time, since a common theme in these reforms was that executive pay should be related to 
company performance. The potential link between executive remuneration and company 
performance is supported by the proposal that firms have a common goal in maximizing 
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shareholder wealth which is achieved and affected by management decisions and that directly 
influences their rewards depending on the output. 
 
Fourth, it has been suggested that a large board of directors is likely to be related to the 
development of corporate performance. In addition, a large board of directors is likely to be 
associated with more experience and knowledge, which makes the board able to make 
decisions based on worthy advice. Theoretically, this indicates that the market perceives 
larger boards as more effective. This is because larger boards offer greater access to their 
firms’ external environment, which reduces uncertainties and facilitates securing of critical 
resources, such as finance, raw materials and contracts. 
 
Fifth, evidence was found of a negative relationship between audit committee and company 
performance measures Tobin’s Q and ROA. This finding is explained as that there is a high 
adoption of audit committees as a mechanism amongst firms. Audit committee effectiveness 
has no significant influence in the firm performance. The explanation behind these may 
probably due to the effect of adopting an audit committee was not detected due to its long-
term influence. Sixth, in theory, the suggestion is that role duality gives the CEO who has 
charisma and vision the opportunity to have a stronger view on the objectives of the firm 
without interference from the excessive board and it facilitates decisions which could be 
made quicker and that could improve firm performance. But the empirical work reviewed in 
the literature with regards to role duality showed conflicting results in UK and US. The 
finding is contrary to the expectation of role duality that it would lead to agency problems 
which in that way impact on poor performance for the firm; also empirically it does not 
support the recommendations of corporate governance codes that the roles of CEO and 
chairman should be separated. The negative coefficient, however, suggests that the market 
perceives CEO duality as a bad practice. It is argued that both the recommendations of 
Cadbury Report (1992) and the arguments of agency theory believe that CEO duality affects 
negatively the role of the boards in monitoring and assessing managers. Seventh, it seems that 
even with more debt there is no impact on firm performance and on its value. Agency theory 
suggests that debt is considered a good mechanism to make the managers more disciplined, 
so it is not supported here based on such a relationship between debt and firm performance. It 
implies that firms forego projects with positive net present values because they have 
excessive debt. This underinvestment means that firms with growth opportunities will exhibit 
a negative relationship between debt and firm value. Eighth, the agency cost theory suggests 
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that, dividend policy is determined by agency costs arising from the divergence of ownership 
and control. Managers may not always adopt a dividend policy that is value-maximizing for 
shareholders but would choose a dividend policy that maximizes their own private benefits. 
Making dividend pay-outs which reduces the free cash flows available to the managers would 
thus ensure that managers maximize shareholders’ wealth rather than using the funds for their 
private benefits (DeAngelo et al., 2006). The finding showed a positive significant for just 
one year with ROA.  
The results show that there is a relationship between governance mechanisms and 
performance but it is a complex one. They illustrate the importance of the influence of some 
of governance mechanisms. These governance mechanisms seem to be substitutes. They 
therefore raise questions about the efficiency of a policy that imposes prescribed internal 
governance structures on firms because such an approach creates difficulties when trying to 
assess the effectiveness of those mechanisms. Given these results, it is not clear how far 
compliance with the UK Governance benefits shareholders' interests, particularly as this 
study did not examine the external governance mechanisms where for example the market for 
corporate control could be an effective governance mechanism. It may be, however, that the 
board governance structures recommended in the Code are appropriate but, because of a lack 
of information about the non-executive directors regarding their expertise and independence, 
inappropriate appointments are being made. 
 
If general rules are inappropriate, it may be that a system that reflects the company-specific 
situation should be adopted. In other words, a particular governance structure may be 
appropriate for one firm but not for another. For example, duality may have a positive impact 
on a company if the person is dynamic and talented but a negative one if the person is 
autocratic. How shareholders are supposed to differentiate between the two situations is not 
clear. Nevertheless an alternative more flexible approach, based on recognition that 
governance mechanisms may vary according to specific circumstances may be appropriate, 
Short et al. (1999). Although the UK Governance Code recognises that flexibility should be a 
part of the governance system, the prescriptive nature of the Code does little to encourage 
such an approach. These results lend weight to the need for greater flexibility in 
understanding how governance control mechanisms impact in particular circumstances. 
 
Given that some of the corporate governance mechanisms are crucial in improving firm 
performance, such as independence and executive remuneration, the London Stock Exchange 
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and the Financial Conduct Authority may further increase their observation of the level of 
compliance among listed firms. The Financial Reporting Council may, for instance, establish 
a special committee to check periodically the level of compliance, and make its 
recommendations accordingly. 
 
 
As mentioned in chapter three, the hypotheses included in this study consist of the following, 
and are tested through the use of the regression analyses: table 5.1 presents the outcomes of 
these hypotheses.  
 
H1: A positive relationship exists between directors’ ownership and firm performance. 
 
H2: A positive relationship exists between Executive remuneration and firm performance. 
 
H3: A negative relationship exists between board size and firm performance. 
 
H4: A positive relationship exists between firm performance and the proportion of 
independent directors. 
 
H5: A positive relationship exists between firm performance and Audit Committee. 
 
H6: A negative relationship exists between role duality and firm performance. 
 
H7: Firms with a higher level of debt have a higher level of performance. 
 
H8: A positive relationship exists between firm performance and dividend payout. 
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Table 6.1 Shows the outcomes of the hypotheses  
Measure 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Tobin’s Q       
DIRW Supp.  Supp.    
INDEP Supp. Supp. Supp. Supp. Supp. Supp. 
AUD Unsupp.      
ROLE Unsupp. Unsupp. Unsupp.    
BSIZE Unsupp.  Unsupp.    
DEBT     Supp.   
DPout       
EXCREM Supp. Supp. Supp. Supp. Supp. Supp. 
       
Return on 
Assets 
      
DIRW  Supp. Supp. Supp.   
INDEP    Supp.   
AUD Unsupp.      
ROLE       
BSIZE   Supp.    
DEBT Unsupp.     Unsupp. 
Dpout     Supp.  
EXCREM Supp. Supp. Supp. Supp.  Supp. 
 
In addition, this thesis also investigates the causal relationship between corporate governance 
and corporate performance. Two-stage least squares regression was used to test whether 
corporate governance affects corporate performance or vice versa. The results reported in 
section 4.5.5 provide the same evidence as the ordinary least square regressions for all 
performance measures. That is, board or ownership structure is not endogenous and rather the 
link, if any, between the governance and performance is from the governance to performance. 
6.5 Research limitations 
Although the findings of any empirical research are important, and this thesis is no different, 
it might still be restricted by some limitations which should be addressed.   
 The selection of the sample size and procedure over the period was not straight 
forward as some companies get taken over or dropped out across the years. Although 
control for different biases in sample design has been taken, it is still not perfect and 
different approaches could have given different results.   
 This research includes only internal corporate governance mechanisms and does not 
include the external mechanisms. Also it is limited to large UK companies. 
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 Some of the corporate governance variables might have suffered definitional 
problems, for example, shareholding ownership was not split clearly into shares 
owned by executive and non- executive directors, and independent directors were not 
distinguished into non-executive directors and independent directors.  
 The variation in the governance of companies is not observable due to Combined 
Code and other regulations. 
 Industry sectors were defined as Bloomberg benchmark and grouped accordingly into 
eight sectors excluding any financial or banking sector. 
 OLS and 2SLS regressions were applied in this research to produce the results but 
other regressions such as 3SLS and fixed effects estimation could be used. 
The findings of this research have therefore been interpreted based on the above 
limitations. These limitations could be potential research avenues in the future, which will 
be discussed in the next section.   
6.6 Future research avenues and improvements 
In this section of the conclusion chapter, potential avenues for future research and 
improvements need to be pointed out. First, as has been mentioned throughout the work the 
study has mainly examined the association between internal corporate governance structures 
and firm financial performance. Future studies and further work could investigate the impact 
of external corporate governance mechanisms, such as the market for corporate control, the 
managerial labour market, and the law, amongst others, affect firm financial performance. 
Also, the interaction or interdependence between external and internal mechanisms and their 
effect on firm performance could be an area for further analysis. Second, the majority of the 
studies in this field mainly focused on listed companies so extending the studies to smaller 
companies is another area for investigation, as more variation in governance is likely within 
smaller firms than larger companies complying with the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
Third, given the current international financial crisis and its association with director pay and 
bonuses, it will be interesting for future research to focus on the relationship between director 
(i.e., CEO, executive, non-executive and independent) pay and company performance among 
UK listed firms. Fourth, more research is needed on boards of directors and not only the 
effects of board structure and composition on firm performance need to be investigated. More 
contentious, however, is the question of what determines board effectiveness in large 
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corporations. Which are the most important factors that drive the adoption/operation of 
specific board structures, mechanisms and practices? How can we develop measures of board 
effectiveness that incorporate the operations/processes which characterise boards?, to what 
extent do factors such as ownership configuration (executive/board ownership, concentration, 
institutional ownership, etc. ), organisational characteristics (type, industry, age, leverage, 
growth, etc. ), board member characteristics (education, experience, reputation, etc. ) and 
general board characteristics (leadership, experience, diversity, etc. ) also influence board 
effectiveness? A satisfactory answer to these questions will enhance our understanding of 
several board practices and dynamics and, also, help identify any 'gaps' in governance. The 
results from such an investigation could be important for firms themselves when seeking to 
better understand/design their governance arrangements. Additionally, the research will be 
useful for external monitors (e.g., as part of their own appraisals of companies' governance), 
auditors (e.g., for governance/compliance risk analysis), fund managers (e.g., for voting 
decision analysis) and regulators (e. g., as part of developing governance standards/policies 
and listing requirements). 
More broadly, in the context of the mixed governance-performance evidence mentioned 
above, the results will foster a richer characterisation of the linkage(s) between corporate 
governance and firm financial performance to the extent that they provide a broader and more 
rigorous analysis of what 'good' governance involves and what its determinants might be. 
Fifth, and in terms of improvement to this study, future research can re-examine the corporate 
governance-firm financial performance relationship by expanding the sample size and over a 
longer period of time to include the period after 2010. Such a study can estimate both 
balanced and un-balanced panels to avoid survivorship bias. Furthermore to improve this 
study, different control variables in the model other than industry and firm size such as debt 
and dividend, could be used. Also firm size could be measured differently as book to value 
rather than using total assets. In addition, could compose the sample of all the companies 
throughout the period even the dropped out, merged, disappeared and taken over companies 
to test the role of corporate governance in these failure companies. It can also examine only 
financial firms or both financial and non-financial firms to ascertain whether the current 
findings are sensitive or robust to different sample specifications. Finally, future studies can 
adopt different research methodology, such as qualitative and event study research designs to 
examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm financial performance. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Appendix Ch.3.1 Table shows the process of finalising the sample and List of companies survived over three years with its industry 
Process of finalising the sample Final Sample 
# Company Key Company Name 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Decision 
Survived 
before 
2005 
Nbr of 
yes 
more 
than 3 
Company code  8 industries 
General 
Industry 
Code 
Companies: 
Number of 
years survived 
( between 
2005-2010)  
1 BRGE LN 
BLACKROCK GREATER EUROPE 
INV 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 888 LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
2 PCT LN POLAR CAPITAL TECHNOLOGY TR Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes AGS LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
3 AAL LN ` Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes AGA LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
4 ANTO LN ANTOFAGASTA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes AGK LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
5 APF LN ANGLO PACIFIC GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes AMEC LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
6 AQP LN AQUARIUS PLATINUM LTD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes AAL LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
7 BLT LN BHP BILLITON PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes APF LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
8 BOC LN BOC GROUP LTD/THE Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No AEP LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
9 CGS LN CASTINGS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes AIE LN Equity Technology 6 6 
10 CRDA LN CRODA INTERNATIONAL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes ASM LN Equity Financials 2 4 
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11 CS/ LN CORUS GROUP PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
Yes 2 No ANTO LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
12 DLTA LN DELTA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes AQP LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
13 ELM LN ELEMENTIS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes ARE LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
14 ENN LN ENNSTONE PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No AKT LN Equity Health Care 3 5 
15 FLTR LN FILTRONA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes ARM LN Equity Technology 6 6 
16 FOSE LN FOSECO LTD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No 
9408593Q LN 
Equity 
Industrials 4 5 
17 ICI LN IMPERIAL CHEMICAL INDS PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No ALY LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
18 JMAT LN JOHNSON MATTHEY PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes AHT LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
19 KAZ LN KAZAKHMYS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes ABF LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
20 LMI LN LONMIN PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes AGR LN Equity Financials 2 6 
21 RIO LN RIO TINTO PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes AZN LN Equity Health Care 3 6 
22 RRS LN RANDGOLD RESOURCES LTD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes ATK LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
23 SMDS LN DS SMITH PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes AU/ LN Equity Technology 6 6 
24 VCT LN VICTREX PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes AVV LN Equity Technology 6 6 
25 VED LN VEDANTA RESOURCES PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes AVE LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
26 XTA LN XSTRATA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes ASD LN Equity Health Care 3 6 
27 YULC LN YULE CATTO & COMPANY PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BAB LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
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28 2290657Q LN INCISIVE MEDIA PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No BA/ LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
29 AGS LN AEGIS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes BBY LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
30 AMT LN AMSTRAD LTD Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No BAG LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
31 BLZ LN EMBLAZE LTD Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Died in 
2008 
  5 Yes BDEV LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
32 BMY LN BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BVC LN Equity Technology 6 6 
33 BSY LN BRITISH SKY BROADCASTING GRO Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BBA LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
34 BT/A LN BT GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes BWY LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
35 BVC LN 
BATM ADVANCED 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BRSN LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
36 CAU LN CENTAUR MEDIA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BKG LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
37 COLT LN COLT GROUP SA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BG/ LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
38 CWC LN CABLE & WIRELESS COMMUNICATI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BLT LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
39 DMGT LN DAILY MAIL&GENERAL TST-A NV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BRGE LN Equity Financials 2 6 
40 EMA LN EMAP INTERNATIONAL LTD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No BMY LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
41 ERM LN EUROMONEY INSTL INVESTOR PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BOY LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
42 ERT LN ENTERTAINMENT RIGHTS PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No BVS LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
43 ESY LN EASYNET GROUP LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No BP/ LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
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44 FTC LN FILTRONIC PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
Yes 3 No BPP LN Equity Consumer Services 2 4 
45 FUTR LN FUTURE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
Yes 5 Yes BMS LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
46 GCAP LN GLOBAL RADIO LTD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No BRAM LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
47 HNT LN HUNTSWORTH PLC Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Died in 
2008 
  4 Yes BATS LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
48 INF LN INFORMA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BGY LN Equity Utilities 7 4 
49 ISAT LN INMARSAT PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BPI LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
50 ITV LN ITV PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes BSY LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
51 JPR LN JOHNSTON PRESS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes BVIC LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 5 
52 KCOM LN KCOM GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BWNG LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
53 LRD LN LAIRD PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BTSM LN Equity Consumer Services 2 5 
54 MTLB LN METAL BULLETIN PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No BT/A LN Equity Telecommunications 6 6 
55 OOM LN TELEFONICA EUROPE PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No BGC LN Equity Health Care 3 6 
56 PSON LN PEARSON PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes BNZL LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
57 REL LN REED ELSEVIER PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes BRBY LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
58 SPT LN SPIRENT COMMUNICATIONS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BPTY LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
59 STVG LN STV GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Died in 
2009 
  4 Yes CWC LN Equity Telecommunications 6 6 
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60 TEP LN TELECOM PLUS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes CBRY LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 5 
61 THUS LN THUS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
Yes 3 No CNE LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
62 TLNT LN TELENT PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No CAM LN Equity Financials 2 6 
63 TMW LN TIMEWEAVE PLC Yes No No No Yes No 
Died in 
2006 
  2 No CPI LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
64 TNI LN TRINITY MIRROR PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
8275783Q LN 
Equity 
Health Care 3 5 
65 TNS LN TAYLOR NELSON SOFRES PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
Yes 3 No EAGA LN Equity Utilities 7 4 
66 TRAD LN TRADUS PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No CLLN LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
67 TRIL LN THOMSON REUTERS UK LTD Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Died in 
2009 
  4 Yes CCL LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
68 UBM LN UBM PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes CPR LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
69 UTV LN UTV MEDIA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
3572335Q LN 
Equity 
Consumer Services 2 5 
70 VAN LN VANCO PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No CGS LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
71 VOD LN VODAFONE GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes CAU LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
72 WIL LN WILMINGTON GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes CNA LN Equity Utilities 7 6 
73 WPP LN WPP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes CHTR LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
74 YELL LN YELL GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes CHG LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
248 
 
75 3572335Q LN 
CARPHONE WAREHOUSE 
GROUPOLD 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes CHW LN Equity Consumer Services 2 5 
76 786560Q LN WH SMITH PLC/OLD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No CHLD LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
77 888 LN 888 HOLDINGS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes CHS LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
78 AAP LN AUTOGRILL HOLDINGS UK PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No CINE LN Equity Consumer Services 2 4 
79 AB/ LN ALLIANCE BOOTS HOLDINGS LTD Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No CTO LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
80 AGA LN AGA RANGEMASTER GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes CKN LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
81 ALY LN ASHLEY (LAURA) HOLDINGS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes CC/ LN Equity Consumer Services 2 5 
82 ARE LN ARENA LEISURE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes COB LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
83 AXN LN ALEXON GROUP PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No COLT LN Equity Telecommunications 6 6 
84 BDEV LN BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes CMS LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
85 BKG LN BERKELEY GROUP HOLDINGS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes CPG LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
86 BOS LN BODY SHOP INTERNATL PLC/THE Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No CCC LN Equity Technology 6 6 
87 BPTY LN BWIN.PARTY DIGITAL ENTERTAIN Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes CNT LN Equity Consumer Services 2 4 
88 BRAM LN BRAMMER PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes CSRT LN Equity Health Care 3 6 
89 BRBY LN BURBERRY GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes CKSN LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
90 BSLA LN BLACKS LEISURE GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No COST LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
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91 BTSM LN BSS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes CWK LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
92 BVS LN BOVIS HOMES GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes CRDA LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
93 BWNG LN BROWN (N) GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes CSR LN Equity Technology 6 6 
94 BWY LN BELLWAY PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes DMGT LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
95 CC/ LN CLINTON CARDS PLC Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Died in 
2008 
  5 Yes DCG LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
96 CCL LN CARNIVAL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes DNX LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 5 
97 CFN LN CAFFE NERO GROUP PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No DLAR LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
98 CHS LN CHRYSALIS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes DEB LN Equity Consumer Services 2 5 
99 CPG LN COMPASS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes DPH LN Equity Health Care 3 6 
100 CPK LN CENTER PARCS (UK) GROUP PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No DLTA LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
101 CPR LN CARPETRIGHT PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes DVO LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
102 CRST LN CREST NICHOLSON PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
Yes 2 No DGE LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
103 DPLM LN DIPLOMA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes DTY LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
104 DVR LN DE VERE GROUP PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
Yes 1 No DDT LN Equity Technology 6 5 
105 DXNS LN DIXONS RETAIL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes DPLM LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
106 EMH LN EUROPEAN MOTOR HOLDINGS PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No DXNS LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
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107 EMI LN EMI GROUP LTD Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No DNO LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
108 ETI LN ENTERPRISE INNS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes DRX LN Equity Utilities 7 5 
109 EZJ LN EASYJET PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes SMDS LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
110 FCCN LN FRENCH CONNECTION GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
Yes 5 Yes DNLM LN Equity Consumer Services 2 5 
111 FCD LN FIRST CHOICE HOLIDAYS PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
Yes 2 No E2V LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
112 FDL LN FINDEL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes EZJ LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
113 FRS LN FIRST TECHNOLOGY PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No EID LN Equity Technology 6 4 
114 GAW LN GAMES WORKSHOP GROUP PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No ECM LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
115 GKN LN GKN PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes ELM LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
116 GMG LN GAME GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes BLZ LN Equity Technology 6 5 
117 GND LN GONDOLA HOLDINGS LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No EEN LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 4 
118 GNK LN GREENE KING PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes ETI LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
119 HAR LN HARVARD INTERNATIONAL PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No ERM LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
120 HBR LN HOLIDAYBREAK PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes EXPN LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
121 HDYS LN HARDYS & HANSONS LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No FENR LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
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122 HEAD LN HEADLAM GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes FXPO LN Equity Basic Materials 0 4 
123 HFD LN HALFORDS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes FDSA LN Equity Technology 6 6 
124 HME LN HOMESTYLE GROUP PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No FLTR LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
125 HMV LN HMV GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes FDL LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
126 HOF LN HOUSE OF FRASER LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No FGP LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
127 HWDN LN HOWDEN JOINERY GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes FSJ LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
128 IAG LN INTL CONSOLIDATED AIRLINE-DI Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes FPT LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
129 IHG LN INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROU Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes FCCN LN Equity Consumer Services 2 5 
130 INCH LN INCHCAPE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes FSTA LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
131 INST LN INSTORE LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No FUTR LN Equity Consumer Services 2 5 
132 JD/ LN JD SPORTS FASHION PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes GFS LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
133 JDW LN WETHERSPOON (J.D.) PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes GFRD LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
134 JJB LN JJB SPORTS PLC Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Died in 
2008 
Yes 5 Yes GMG LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
135 KESA LN KESA ELECTRICALS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes GEMD LN Equity Basic Materials 0 4 
136 KGF LN KINGFISHER PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes GNS LN Equity Health Care 3 4 
137 LAD LN LADBROKES PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes GKN LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
138 LAN LN LAND OF LEATHER HOLDINGS PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No GSK LN Equity Health Care 3 6 
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139 LCI LN LONDON CLUBS INTL PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No GLE LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
140 LMR LN LUMINAR GROUP HOLDINGS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes GOG LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
141 LOOK LN LOOKERS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes GPRT LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
142 LWB LN LOW & BONAR PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes GSD LN Equity Health Care 3 4 
143 MAB LN MITCHELLS & BUTLERS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes GNK LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
144 MKS LN MARKS & SPENCER GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes GRG LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
145 MLC LN 
MILLENNIUM & COPTHORNE 
HOTEL 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes HFD LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
146 MNZS LN MENZIES (JOHN) PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes HLMA LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
147 MOSB LN MOSS BROS GROUP PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No HAMP LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
148 MT/S LN MYTRAVEL GROUP PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
Yes 2 No HAS LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
149 MTC LN MOTHERCARE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes HEAD LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
150 MTN LN MATALAN LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No HHR LN Equity Financials 2 6 
151 NXT LN NEXT PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes HIK LN Equity Health Care 3 6 
152 OKR LN OTTAKAR'S PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No HILS LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
153 PDG LN PENDRAGON PLC Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Died in 
2008 
Yes 5 Yes HFG LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 4 
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154 PEA LN PEACOCK GROUP PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No HMV LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
155 PIC LN PACE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes HOC LN Equity Basic Materials 0 5 
156 PSN LN PERSIMMON PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes HRG LN Equity Industrials 4 4 
157 PUB LN PUNCH TAVERNS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes HBR LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
158 PWS LN PINEWOOD SHEPPERTON PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No HOME LN Equity Consumer Services 2 5 
159 RDW LN REDROW PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes HSV LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
160 REG LN REGENT INNS PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No HRN LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
161 RNK LN RANK GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes HWDN LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
162 RTN LN RESTAURANT GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes HTG LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
163 SHI LN SIG PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes HNT LN Equity Consumer Services 2 4 
164 SIG LN SIGNET JEWELERS LTD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No HYC LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
165 SLY LN GENTING UK PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No IMG LN Equity Technology 6 6 
166 SUY LN SCS UPHOLSTERY PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No IMI LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
167 SVC LN SALVESEN (CHRISTIAN) LTD Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No IMT LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
168 TED LN TED BAKER PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes INCH LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
169 TPK LN TRAVIS PERKINS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes INF LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
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170 TPT LN TOPPS TILES PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes ISAT LN Equity Telecommunications 6 6 
171 TW/ LN TAYLOR WIMPEY PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes TIG LN Equity Technology 6 5 
172 UMB LN UMBRO PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No ITL LN Equity Technology 6 5 
173 VDY LN VARDY (REG) PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No IHG LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
174 WAGN LN WAGON PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No IFL LN Equity Basic Materials 0 4 
175 WBY LN WESTBURY LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No IPR LN Equity Utilities 7 6 
176 WGC LN WYEVALE GARDEN CENTRES PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No IRV LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
177 WIN LN WINCANTON PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes ITRK LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
178 WLB LN WILSON BOWDEN PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
Yes 2 No IAG LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
179 WLW LN WOOLWORTHS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
Yes 3 No ISYS LN Equity Technology 6 6 
180 WMH LN WILLIAM HILL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes ITE LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
181 WMPY LN GEORGE WIMPEY LTD Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No ITV LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
182 WOS LN WOLSELEY PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes JD/ LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
183 WTB LN WHITBREAD PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes JJB LN Equity Consumer Services 2 5 
184 3014039Q LN RHM LTD Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No JKX LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
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185 3621272Q LN SANOFI PASTEUR HOLDING LTD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No JMAT LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
186 7335286Q LN CAMBRIDGE ANTIBODY TECH GRP Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No JPR LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
187 8275783Q LN CARE UK LTD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes KAZ LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
188 ABF LN ASSOCIATED BRITISH FOODS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes KCOM LN Equity Telecommunications 6 6 
189 AEP LN ANGLO-EASTERN PLANTATIONS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes KLR LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
190 AGK LN AGGREKO PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes KESA LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
191 AHT LN ASHTEAD GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes KIE LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
192 AKT LN ARK THERAPEUTICS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes KGF LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
193 ARU LN ARLA FOODS UK PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
Yes 2 No KFX LN Equity Technology 6 6 
194 ASD LN AXIS-SHIELD PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes LAD LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
195 ATK LN ATKINS (WS) PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes LRD LN Equity Technology 6 6 
196 AUN LN ALLIANCE UNICHEM PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
Yes 1 No LVD LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
197 AVE LN AVIS BUDGET EMEA LTD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes LOG LN Equity Technology 6 6 
198 AZM LN ALIZYME PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No LMI LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
199 AZN LN ASTRAZENECA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes LOOK LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
200 BAB LN BABCOCK INTL GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes LWB LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
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201 BAG LN BARR (A.G.) PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes LMR LN Equity Consumer Services 2 5 
202 BATS LN BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes MMC LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
203 BGC LN BTG PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes MKS LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
204 BI/ LN BRAMBLES INDUSTRIES PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No MSLH LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
205 BII LN BIOCOMPATIBLES INTL PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No MARS LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
206 BNZL LN BUNZL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes MCB LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
207 BPP LN BPP HOLDINGS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Died in 
2009 
  4 Yes MGGT LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
208 BRSN LN BERENDSEN PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes MRO LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
209 CAM LN CAMELLIA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes MRS LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
210 CART LN CARTER & CARTER GROUP PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No MNZS LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
211 CBRY LN CADBURY PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes MPI LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
212 CMS LN COMMUNISIS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes MCRO LN Equity Technology 6 6 
213 CPI LN CAPITA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes MLC LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
214 CRG LN CORIN GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No MSY LN Equity Technology 6 6 
215 CSRT LN CONSORT MEDICAL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes MAB LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
216 CSV LN CORPORATE SERVICES GROUP PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
  2 No MTO LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
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217 CWK LN CRANSWICK PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes MNDI LN Equity Basic Materials 0 4 
218 DCA LN DETICA GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No MONY LN Equity Consumer Services 2 4 
219 DCG LN DAIRY CREST GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes MGCR LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
220 DGE LN DIAGEO PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes MGNS LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
221 DLAR LN DE LA RUE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes MTC LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
222 DPH LN DECHRA PHARMACEUTICALS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes MCHL LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
223 DTY LN DIGNITY PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes NEX LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
224 DVO LN DEVRO PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes NG/ LN Equity Utilities 7 6 
225 DWN LN DAWSON HOLDINGS PLC Yes No No Yes No No 
Died in 
2006 
  2 No NCC LN Equity Technology 6 4 
226 ETR LN ENTERPRISE PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No NXT LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
227 FPT LN FORTH PORTS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes NFDS LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
228 FSTA LN FULLER SMITH & TURNER -"A" Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes NTG LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
229 GFS LN G4S PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes NWG LN Equity Utilities 7 6 
230 GLH LN GALLAHER GROUP LTD Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No OPTS LN Equity Health Care 3 5 
231 GRG LN GREGGS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes OXB LN Equity Health Care 3 6 
232 GSD LN GOLDSHIELD GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Died in 
2009 
  4 Yes OXIG LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
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233 GSK LN GLAXOSMITHKLINE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes PIC LN Equity Technology 6 6 
234 GUS LN EXPERIAN FINANCE PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No PSON LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
235 GYG LN GYRUS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No PDG LN Equity Consumer Services 2 5 
236 HAS LN HAYS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes PNN LN Equity Utilities 7 6 
237 HHR LN HELPHIRE GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes PSN LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
238 HIK LN HIKMA PHARMACEUTICALS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes PFC LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
239 HSV LN HOMESERVE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes PNX LN Equity Technology 6 6 
240 HTL LN HUNTLEIGH TECHNOLOGY PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No PHTM LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
241 HYC LN HYDER CONSULTING PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes PCT LN Equity Financials 2 6 
242 IMT LN IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes PFL LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
243 IOV LN INNOVATA PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No PFD LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
244 IRV LN INTERSERVE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes PMO LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
245 ISO LN ISOTRON PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No PSK LN Equity Health Care 3 6 
246 ITE LN ITE GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes PON LN Equity Technology 6 6 
247 ITRK LN INTERTEK GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes PUB LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
248 JRVS LN JARVIS PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No PVCS LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 4 
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249 JSG LN JOHNSON SERVICE GROUP PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No PZC LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
250 MARS LN MARSTON'S PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes QQ/ LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
251 MCB LN MCBRIDE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes RE/ LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 5 
252 MMC LN 
MANAGEMENT CONSULTING 
GROUP 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes RRS LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
253 MPI LN MICHAEL PAGE INTERNATIONAL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes RNK LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
254 MRW LN WM MORRISON SUPERMARKETS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes RB/ LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
255 NFDS LN NORTHERN FOODS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes RDW LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
256 NSR LN NESTOR HEALTHCARE GROUP PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No REL LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
257 NTG LN NORTHGATE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes RSW LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
258 OFF LN OFFICE2OFFICE PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No RNVO LN Equity Health Care 3 5 
259 OXB LN OXFORD BIOMEDICA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes RTO LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
260 PDP LN PD PORTS LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No RTN LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
261 PFD LN PREMIER FOODS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes REX LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
262 PSK LN PROSTRAKAN GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes RCDO LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
263 PTI LN BTG MANAGEMENT SERVICES LTD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No RMV LN Equity Consumer Services 2 5 
264 PZC LN PZ CUSSONS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes RIO LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
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265 RB/ LN RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes RM/ LN Equity Technology 6 6 
266 RFD LN RICHMOND FOODS LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No RWA LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
267 RPS LN RPS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes RWD LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
268 RTO LN RENTOKIL INITIAL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes ROK LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
269 RWA LN ROBERT WALTERS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes RR/ LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
270 RWD LN ROBERT WISEMAN DAIRIES PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes ROR LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
271 SAB LN SABMILLER PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes RDSA LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
272 SBRY LN SAINSBURY (J) PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes RDSB LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
273 SCTN LN SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE LTD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No RPC LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
274 SDY LN SPEEDY HIRE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes RPS LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
275 SHL LN SHL GROUP LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No SAB LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
276 SHP LN SHIRE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes SAFE LN Equity Financials 2 4 
277 SIV LN ST. IVES PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes SGE LN Equity Technology 6 6 
278 SKP LN SKYEPHARMA PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
Yes 3 No SBRY LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
279 SMON LN SIMON GROUP PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No SMDR LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 4 
280 SN/ LN SMITH & NEPHEW PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes SVS LN Equity Financials 2 6 
281 SRG LN SPRING GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Died in 
  4 Yes SWG LN Equity Industrials 4 4 
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282 SRP LN SERCO GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes SDL LN Equity Technology 6 6 
283 SSL LN SSL INTERNATIONAL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
Yes 5 Yes SNR LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
284 SVS LN SAVILLS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes SEPU LN Equity Technology 6 4 
285 TATE LN TATE & LYLE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes SRP LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
286 THT LN THORNTONS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes SFR LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
287 TRB LN TRIBAL GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes SVT LN Equity Utilities 7 6 
288 TRS LN TARSUS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Died in 
2008 
  4 Yes SKS LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
289 TSCO LN TESCO PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes SHP LN Equity Health Care 3 6 
290 ULVR LN UNILEVER PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes SHI LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
291 UNIQ LN UNIQ PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
Yes 3 No SN/ LN Equity Health Care 3 6 
292 VER LN VERNALIS PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No SMIN LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
293 VP/ LN VP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes NWS LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
294 LNGO LN LAING (JOHN) PLC-ORD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No SIA LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
295 MCTY LN MCCARTHY & STONE PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
Yes 1 No SCHE LN Equity Health Care 3 5 
296 MTO LN MITIE GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes SXS LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
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297 VMOB LN VIRGIN MOBILE HLDGS (UK) LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No SDY LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
298 3426724Q LN BURREN ENERGY PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
Yes 3 No SPX LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
299 AMEC LN AMEC PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes SPT LN Equity Technology 6 6 
300 BG/ LN BG GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes SPO LN Equity Consumer Services 2 4 
301 BP/ LN BP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes SPD LN Equity Consumer Services 2 4 
302 CNE LN CAIRN ENERGY PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes SRG LN Equity Industrials 4 4 
303 DNX LN DANA PETROLEUM PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes SSE LN Equity Utilities 7 6 
304 EEN LN EMERALD ENERGY PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Died in 
2009 
  4 Yes SSL LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 5 
305 EXR LN EXPRO INTERNATIONAL GRP LTD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No SIV LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
306 HTG LN HUNTING PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes SGC LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
307 JKX LN JKX OIL & GAS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes STHR LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
308 MRS LN MELROSE RESOURCES PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes STOB LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
309 PFC LN PETROFAC LTD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes STVG LN Equity Consumer Services 2 4 
310 PMO LN PREMIER OIL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes TALV LN Equity Basic Materials 0 4 
311 RDSA LN ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC-A SHS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes TRS LN Equity Consumer Services 2 4 
312 RDSB LN ROYAL DUTCH SHELL PLC-B SHS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes TATE LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
313 SDX LN SONDEX PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
  2 No TW/ LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
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314 SIA LN SOCO INTERNATIONAL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes TED LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
315 TLW LN TULLOW OIL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes TCY LN Equity Technology 6 4 
316 UKC LN UK COAL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes TEP LN Equity Telecommunications 6 6 
317 VPC LN VENTURE PRODUCTION PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Died in 
2009 
  4 Yes TSCO LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
318 WG/ LN WOOD GROUP (JOHN) PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes TCG LN Equity Consumer Services 2 4 
319 3564296Q LN ABBOT GROUP LTD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No TRIL LN Equity Consumer Services 2 4 
320 4082743Q LN RADSTONE TECHNOLOGY PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No THT LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
321 9408593Q LN ARRIVA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
Yes 5 Yes TOMK LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
322 AAT LN AEA TECHNOLOGY GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No TPT LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
323 ABP LN ASSOCIATED BRITISH PORTS Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
Yes 1 No TPK LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
324 ACL LN ACAL PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No TRB LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
325 AGC LN AGCERT INTERNATIONAL Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No TNI LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
326 BA/ LN BAE SYSTEMS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes TTG LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
327 BAA LN BAA AIRPORTS LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No TT/ LN Equity Consumer Services 2 4 
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328 BBA LN BBA AVIATION PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes TLW LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
329 BBY LN BALFOUR BEATTY PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes UBM LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
330 BIOM LN BIOME TECHNOLOGIES PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No UKC LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
331 BMS LN BRAEMAR SHIPPING SERVICES PL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes UKM LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
332 BOY LN BODYCOTE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes ULE LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
333 BPI LN BRITISH POLYTHENE INDUSTRIES Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes UMC LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
334 CHG LN CHEMRING GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes ULVR LN Equity Consumer Goods 1 6 
335 CHLD LN CHLORIDE GROUP LTD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes UU/ LN Equity Utilities 7 6 
336 CHTR LN CHARTER INTERNATIONAL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes UTV LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
337 CKN LN CLARKSON PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes VEC LN Equity Health Care 3 4 
338 CKSN LN COOKSON GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes VED LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
339 CLLN LN CARILLION PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes VPC LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 4 
340 COB LN COBHAM PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes VCT LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
341 COST LN COSTAIN GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes VTC LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
342 CTO LN CLARKE (T.) PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes VOD LN Equity Telecommunications 6 6 
343 DIA LN DIALIGHT PLC Yes No No No No Yes 
Died in 
2006 
  2 No VP/ LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
344 DXS LN DX SERVICES LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No VTG LN Equity Industrials 4 5 
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345 DYS LN DYSON GROUP PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No WEIR LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
346 ECM LN ELECTROCOMPONENTS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes WSM LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 4 
347 ENO LN ENODIS LTD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No JDW LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
348 ETL LN EUROTUNNEL PLC-UTS REGD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No SMWH LN Equity Consumer Services 2 5 
349 FENR LN FENNER PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes WTB LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
350 FGP LN FIRSTGROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes WMH LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
351 FKI LN FKI PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
Yes 3 No WIL LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
352 FSJ LN FISHER (JAMES) & SONS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes WIN LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
353 GFRD LN GALLIFORD TRY PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes MRW LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
354 GLE LN GLEESON (M.J.) GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes WLF LN Equity Technology 6 6 
355 GOG LN GO-AHEAD GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes WOS LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
356 HILS LN HILL & SMITH HOLDINGS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes WG/ LN Equity Oil & Gas 5 6 
357 HLMA LN HALMA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes WPP LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
358 HNS LN HANSON LTD Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No WSH LN Equity Industrials 4 6 
359 HRN LN HORNBY PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes WYG LN Equity Industrials 4 4 
360 HYWD LN HEYWOOD WILLIAMS GROUP PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No XCH LN Equity Industrials 4 4 
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361 IMI LN IMI PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes XTA LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
362 ISYS LN INVENSYS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes YELL LN Equity Consumer Services 2 6 
363 JSP LN JESSOPS PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No YULC LN Equity Basic Materials 0 6 
364 KEL LN KELDA GROUP LTD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No 
    365 KIE LN KIER GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    366 KLR LN KELLER GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    
367 MCA LN ALFRED MCALPINE PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
Yes 3 No 
    368 MCHL LN MOUCHEL GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    369 MGCR LN MORGAN CRUCIBLE COMPANY PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    370 MGGT LN MEGGITT PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    371 MGNS LN MORGAN SINDALL GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    
372 MRX LN METALRAX GROUP PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No 
    373 MSLH LN MARSHALLS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    
374 MWLM LN CARILLION JM LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No 
    375 NEX LN NATIONAL EXPRESS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    376 OXIG LN OXFORD INSTRUMENTS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    377 PFL LN PREMIER FARNELL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
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378 PHTM LN PHOTO-ME INTERNATIONAL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    
379 PILK LN PILKINGTON GROUP LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No 
    
380 PO/ LN PENINSULAR & ORIENTAL STEAM Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No 
    
381 RAY LN RAYMARINE PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No 
    382 RCDO LN RICARDO PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    383 REX LN REXAM PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    
384 ROK LN ROK PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes 
    385 ROR LN ROTORK PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    386 RPC LN RPC GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    387 RR/ LN ROLLS-ROYCE HOLDINGS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    388 RSW LN RENISHAW PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    389 SFR LN SEVERFIELD-ROWEN PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    390 SGC LN STAGECOACH GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    391 SKS LN SHANKS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    392 SMIN LN SMITHS GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    393 SNR LN SENIOR PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    394 SPX LN SPIRAX-SARCO ENGINEERING PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    395 SXS LN SPECTRIS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
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396 TDG LN TDG LTD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No 
    
397 TOMK LN TOMKINS LTD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes 
    398 TTG LN TT ELECTRONICS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    399 UKM LN UK MAIL GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    400 ULE LN ULTRA ELECTRONICS HLDGS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    401 UMC LN UMECO PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    402 VTC LN VITEC GROUP PLC/THE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    
403 VTG LN VT GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
Yes 5 Yes 
    404 WEIR LN WEIR GROUP PLC/THE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    
405 WHM LN WHATMAN LTD Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No 
    406 WSH LN WSP GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    
407 WYG LN WYG PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Died in 
2009 
  4 Yes 
    408 AIE LN ANITE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    409 ARM LN ARM HOLDINGS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    410 AU/ LN AUTONOMY CORP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    411 AVV LN AVEVA GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    412 AXO LN AXON GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
  3 No 
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2008 
413 CCC LN COMPUTACENTER PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    414 CSR LN CSR PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    
415 DDT LN DIMENSION DATA HOLDINGS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
Yes 5 Yes 
    416 DNO LN DOMINO PRINTING SCIENCES PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    417 E2V LN E2V TECHNOLOGIES PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    
418 EID LN EIDOS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Died in 
2009 
Yes 4 Yes 
    419 FDSA LN FIDESSA GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    
420 ICM LN ICM COMPUTER GROUP PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No 
    421 IMG LN IMAGINATION TECH GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    
422 IOT LN ISOFT GROUP PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
Yes 2 No 
    
423 ITL LN INTEC TELECOM SYSTEMS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Died in 
2010 
  5 Yes 
    424 KFX LN KOFAX PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    425 LOG LN LOGICA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    426 MCRO LN MICRO FOCUS INTERNATIONAL Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    
427 MOR LN MORSE PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
Yes 3 No 
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428 MSY LN MISYS PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    
429 NIS LN NORTHGATE INFO SOLUTIONS HOL Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No 
    
430 NSB LN NSB RETAIL SYSTEMS PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No 
    
431 PLM LN PLASMON PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No 
    432 PNX LN PHOENIX IT GROUP LTD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    433 PON LN PSION PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    434 RM/ LN RM PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    
435 RTD LN RETAIL DECISIONS PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No 
    436 SDL LN SDL PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    437 SGE LN SAGE GROUP PLC/THE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    
438 SRF LN SURFCONTROL PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No 
    
439 TIG LN INNOVATION GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Died in 
2008 
  5 Yes 
    
440 WLF LN 
WOLFSON MICROELECTRONICS 
PLC 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    
441 XAN LN XANSA PLC Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
Yes 2 No 
    
442 XAR LN XAAR PLC Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Died in 
2008 
  3 No 
    
271 
 
443 ZTX LN DIODES ZETEX LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No 
    
444 AWG LN AWG PARENT CO LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No 
    
445 BGY LN BRITISH ENERGY GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Died in 
2009 
  4 Yes 
    
446 BWG LN BRISTOL WATER GROUP PLC Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No 
    447 CNA LN CENTRICA PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    448 IPR LN INTERNATIONAL POWER PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    449 NG/ LN NATIONAL GRID PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    
450 NWG LN 
NORTHUMBRIAN WATER GROUP 
PLC 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    451 PNN LN PENNON GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    
452 SPW LN SCOTTISH POWER LTD Yes Yes No No No No 
Died in 
2007 
  2 No 
    453 SSE LN SSE PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    454 SVT LN SEVERN TRENT PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived Yes 6 Yes 
    455 UU/ LN UNITED UTILITIES GROUP PLC Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Survived   6 Yes 
    
456 VRD LN VIRIDIAN GROUP LTD Yes No No No No No 
Died in 
2006 
  1 No 
    
457 HOC LN HOCHSCHILD MINING PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
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458 CRE LN CRESTON PLC No Yes No No No No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  1 No 
    
459 NWS LN SMITHS NEWS PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
460 RMV LN RIGHTMOVE PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
461 VLK LN VISLINK PLC No Yes Yes No No No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  2 No 
    
462 ACE LN ACCIDENT EXCHANGE GROUP PLC No Yes No No No No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  1 No 
    
463 DEB LN DEBENHAMS PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
Yes 5 Yes 
    
464 DNLM LN DUNELM GROUP PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
465 FWEB LN FIBERWEB PLC No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  3 No 
    
466 HOME LN HOME RETAIL GROUP No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
467 HRG LN HOGG ROBINSON GROUP PLC No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  4 Yes 
    
468 MNGS LN MANGANESE BRONZE HLDGS PLC No Yes Yes No No No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  2 No 
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469 SMWH LN WH SMITH PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
Yes 5 Yes 
    
470 AGR LN ASSURA GROUP LTD No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
471 ASM LN ANTISOMA PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  4 Yes 
    
472 BVIC LN BRITVIC PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
473 CHW LN CHIME COMMUNICATIONS PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
474 CNT LN CONNAUGHT PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  4 Yes 
    
475 EXPN LN EXPERIAN PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
476 FOUR LN 4IMPRINT GROUP PLC No Yes No No No No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  1 No 
    
477 LVD LN LAVENDON GROUP PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
478 NAE LN NORD ANGLIA EDUCATION PLC No Yes Yes No No No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  2 No 
    
479 OPD LN OPD GROUP PLC No Yes No No No No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  1 No 
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480 OPTS LN OPTOS PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
481 PURI LN PURICORE PLC No Yes No No No No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  1 No 
    
482 QQ/ LN QINETIQ GROUP PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
483 RE/ LN R.E.A. HOLDINGS PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
484 RNVO LN RENOVO GROUP PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
485 SCHE LN SOUTHERN CROSS HEALTHCARE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
486 STHR LN STHREE PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
487 STY LN STYLES & WOOD GROUP PLC No Yes Yes No No No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  2 No 
    
488 DRX LN DRAX GROUP PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
489 ABU LN ABACUS GROUP PLC No Yes No No No No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  1 No 
    
490 BIFF LN BIFFA LTD No Yes Yes No No No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  2 No 
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491 GPRT LN GOLDENPORT HOLDINGS INC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
492 HAMP LN HAMPSON INDUSTRIES PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
493 LTC LN LATCHWAYS PLC No Yes Yes No No No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  2 No 
    
494 MRO LN MELROSE PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
495 STOB LN STOBART GROUP LTD No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2006 
  5 Yes 
    
496 SWG LN SCOTT WILSON GROUP PLC No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  4 Yes 
    
497 CNP LN CLINPHONE PLC No Yes No No No No 
Born in 
2006 then 
died 
  1 No 
    
498 8209360Q LN ARICOM PLC No No Yes Yes No No 
Born in 
2007 then 
died 
  2 No 
    
499 CRND LN CENTRAL RAND GOLD LTD No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Born in 
2007 then 
died 
  3 No 
    
500 FXPO LN FERREXPO PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
501 GEMD LN GEM DIAMONDS LTD No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
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502 IFL LN INTERNATIONAL FERRO METALS No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
503 MNDI LN MONDI PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
504 TALV LN TALVIVAARA MINING CO PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
505 MONY LN MONEYSUPERMARKET.COM No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
506 SEPU LN SEPURA LTD No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
507 TCY LN TELECITY GROUP PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
508 CINE LN CINEWORLD GROUP PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
509 SAFE LN SAFESTORE HOLDINGS PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
510 SPD LN SPORTS DIRECT INTERNATIONAL No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
511 SPO LN SPORTECH PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
512 TCG LN THOMAS COOK GROUP PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
513 TT/ LN TUI TRAVEL PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
514 GNS LN GENUS PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
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515 HFG LN HILTON FOOD GROUP LTD No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
516 VEC LN VECTURA GROUP PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
517 XCH LN XCHANGING PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
518 EAGA LN CARILLION ENERGY SERVICES No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
519 IEC LN IMPERIAL ENERGY CORP PLC No No Yes Yes No No 
Born in 
2007 then 
died 
  2 No 
    
520 SMDR LN SALAMANDER ENERGY PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
521 WSM LN WELLSTREAM HOLDINGS PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
522 AIP LN AIR PARTNER PLC No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Born in 
2007 then 
died 
  3 No 
    
523 NXR LN NORCROS PLC No No Yes No No No 
Born in 
2007 then 
died 
  1 No 
    
524 SPGH LN SUPERGLASS HOLDINGS PLC No No Yes No No No 
Born in 
2007 then 
died 
  1 No 
    
525 NCC LN NCC GROUP PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
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526 PVCS LN PV CRYSTALOX SOLAR PLC No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2007 
  4 Yes 
    
527 ENRC LN EURASIAN NATURAL RESOURCES No No No Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2008 
  3 No 
    
528 FRES LN FRESNILLO PLC No No No Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2008 
  3 No 
    
529 NAD LN NAMAKWA DIAMONDS LTD No No No Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2008 
  3 No 
    
530 DOM LN DOMINO'S PIZZA UK & IRL PLC No No No Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2008 
  3 No 
    
531 MER LN MEARS GROUP PLC No No No Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2008 
  3 No 
    
532 SPI LN ENSERVE GROUP LTD No No No Yes Yes No 
Born in 
2008 then 
died 
  2 No 
    
533 SYR LN SYNERGY HEALTH PLC No No No Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2008 
  3 No 
    
534 CAD LN CADOGAN PETROLEUM PLC No No No Yes Yes No 
Born in 
2008 then 
died 
  2 No 
    
535 HDY LN HARDY OIL & GAS PLC No No No Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2008 
  3 No 
    
536 HOIL LN HERITAGE OIL PLC No No No Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2008 
  3 No 
    
537 LAM LN LAMPRELL PLC No No No Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2008 
  3 No 
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538 GDWN LN GOODWIN PLC No No No Yes Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2008 
  3 No 
    
539 POG LN PETROPAVLOVSK PLC No No No No Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2009 
  2 No 
    
540 MEC LN MECOM GROUP PLC No No No No Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2009 
  2 No 
    
541 BOK LN BOOKER GROUP PLC No No No No Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2009 
  2 No 
    
542 ALN LN ALTERIAN PLC No No No No Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2009 
  2 No 
    
543 KWL LN KEWILL PLC No No No No Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2009 
  2 No 
    
544 XPP LN XP POWER LTD No No No No Yes Yes 
survived 
from 2009 
  2 No 
    
545 ABG LN AFRICAN BARRICK GOLD PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
546 AZEM LN AZ ELECTRONIC MATERIALS No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
547 CEY LN CENTAMIN PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
548 KMR LN KENMARE RESOURCES PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
549 CW/ LN CABLE & WIRELESS WORLDWIDE No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
550 TALK LN TALKTALK TELECOM GROUP No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
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551 BET LN BETFAIR GROUP PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
552 SBT LN SPORTINGBET PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
553 SGP LN SUPERGROUP PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
554 CPP LN CPP GROUP PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
555 OCDO LN OCADO GROUP PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
556 SPH LN SINCLAIR IS PHARMA PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
557 TNO LN RSM TENON GROUP PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
558 AFR LN AFREN PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
559 ENQ LN ENQUEST PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
560 ESSR LN ESSAR ENERGY PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
561 EXI LN EXILLON ENERGY PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
562 CAR LN CARCLO PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
563 HSN LN HANSEN TRANSMISSIONS INT No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
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564 RNO LN RENOLD PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
565 VLX LN VOLEX PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
    
566 PRW LN PROMETHEAN WORLD PLC No No No No No Yes 
survived 
from 2010 
  1 No 
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Appendix B 
Appendices for chapter 3 
Appendix Ch. 3.1 Tobin’s Q: Multicollinearity was not found to be present in these analyses due to all tolerances being below .20 and all 
variance inflation factors being below 5 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Variables Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance  VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
DIRW 0.887 1.127 0.876 1.141 0.904 1.107 0.922 1.085 0.904 1.106 0.889 1.125 
INDEP 0.862 1.16 0.842 1.188 0.85 1.177 0.841 1.189 0.882 1.133 0.784 1.275 
BSIZE 0.599 1.67 0.593 1.686 0.621 1.61 0.6 1.666 0.569 1.759 0.679 1.473 
EXCREM 0.808 1.238 0.737 1.357 0.673 1.486 0.696 1.437 0.756 1.323 0.712 1.404 
ROLE 0.874 1.144 0.879 1.138 0.909 1.1 0.968 1.033 0.958 1.044 0.912 1.096 
DEBT 0.855 1.17 0.856 1.168 0.827 1.209 0.794 1.259 0.863 1.159 0.835 1.197 
DPOUT 0.955 1.047 0.99 1.01 0.911 1.098 0.982 1.018 0.967 1.034 0.918 1.089 
AUD 0.919 1.088 0.932 1.073 0.883 1.132 0.832 1.653 0.969 1.032 0.961 1.041 
Industry: 
0.416 2.404 0.402 2.488 0.403 2.479 0.416 2.404 0.413 2.424 0.403 2.483 
Cons.Goods 
Industry: 
Cons. Serv 
0.27 3.709 0.241 4.154 0.25 3.993 0.259 3.859 0.268 3.732 0.252 3.966 
Industry: 
Health Care 
0.607 1.648 0.512 1.952 0.529 1.892 0.539 1.855 0.521 1.918 0.601 1.663 
Industry: 
Industrials 
0.25 4.001 0.23 4.353 0.23 4.348 0.233 4.292 0.236 4.243 0.231 4.331 
Industry: Oil 
& Gas 
0.548 1.824 0.516 1.939 0.531 1.884 0.537 1.863 0.547 1.827 0.545 1.834 
Industry: 
Technology 
0.434 2.305 0.39 2.562 0.402 2.487 0.394 2.54 0.414 2.417 0.41 2.439 
Industry: 
Utilities 
0.662 1.51 0.603 1.659 0.592 1.69 0.659 1.517 0.676 1.48 0.63 1.587 
FSIZE 0.585 1.71 0.514 1.945 0.548 1.825 0.577 1.732 0.547 1.828 0.601 1.665 
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Appendix Ch.3.2 ROA: Multicollinearity was not found to be present in these analyses due to all tolerances being below .20 and all 
variance inflation factors being below 5. 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Variables Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
DIRW 0.885 1.13 0.876 1.141 0.903 1.108 0.905 1.105 0.919 1.089 0.899 1.112 
INDEP 0.864 1.157 0.855 1.17 0.826 1.211 0.82 1.22 0.895 1.118 0.794 1.26 
BSIZE 0.603 1.657 0.577 1.732 0.594 1.683 0.574 1.743 0.563 1.777 0.679 1.473 
EXCREM 0.81 1.235 0.718 1.394 0.671 1.491 0.663 1.508 0.757 1.321 0.707 1.415 
ROLE 0.874 1.144 0.875 1.143 0.909 1.101 0.969 1.033 0.959 1.042 0.912 1.097 
DEBT 0.858 1.165 0.828 1.207 0.803 1.246 0.777 1.286 0.837 1.195 0.814 1.229 
DPOUT 0.955 1.047 0.99 1.01 0.903 1.108 0.971 1.03 0.969 1.032 0.922 1.084 
AUD 0.918 1.09 0.93 1.075 0.881 1.135 0.422 2.368 0.97 1.031 0.951 1.051 
Industry: 
0.424 2.359 0.403 2.481 0.429 2.333 0.268 3.731 0.425 2.351 0.437 2.287 
Cons.Goods 
Industry: 
Cons. Serv 
0.272 3.676 0.253 3.958 0.27 3.701 0.578 1.732 0.279 3.582 0.277 3.614 
Industry: 
Health 
Care 
0.607 1.648 0.552 1.81 0.58 1.724 0.243 4.122 0.575 1.741 0.629 1.59 
Industry: 
Industrials 
0.251 3.986 0.233 4.288 0.246 4.067 0.538 1.859 0.255 3.928 0.251 3.976 
Industry: 
Oil & Gas 
0.548 1.823 0.529 1.889 0.545 1.834 0.409 2.443 0.561 1.783 0.558 1.793 
Industry: 
Technology 
0.434 2.304 0.391 2.554 0.419 2.387 0.659 1.518 0.434 2.305 0.432 2.312 
Industry: 
Utilities 
0.662 1.51 0.603 1.659 0.59 1.696 0.57 1.755 0.685 1.461 0.637 1.569 
FSIZE 0.59 1.695 0.517 1.933 0.547 1.829 0.905 1.105 0.551 1.815 0.61 1.641 
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Appendix Ch. 3.3 Tobin’s Q: Homoscedasticity was verified in all analyses through the construction of scatterplots of the regression 
standardized residuals and regression standardized predicted values 
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Appendix Ch. 3.4 Tobin’s Q: Homoscedasticity was verified in all analyses through the construction of scatterplots of the regression 
standardized residuals and regression standardized predicted values 
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Appendix Ch. 3.5 Tobin’s Q: Histograms of the residual errors as well as probability-probability plots were also constructed in order to 
ensure the normality of these residual errors, which was found to be the case in these analyses 
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Appendix Ch. 3.6 ROA: Histograms of the residual errors as well as probability-probability plots were also constructed in order to 
ensure the normality of these residual errors, which was found to be the case in these analyses 
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Appendix c 
Appendices for Chapter 4 
Appendix CH. 4.1 Correlation between explanatory variable 
Appendix Ch. 4.1.1 Correlation between Debt and Dividend Payout 
  DEBT2005 DEBT2006 DEBT2007 DEBT2008 DEBT2009 DEBT2010 
Dpout 
2005 
Dpout 
2006 
Dpout 
2007 
Dpout 
2008 
Dpout 
2009 
Dpout 
2010 
DEBT2005 
1                       
DEBT2006 
.728
**
 1                     
DEBT2007 
.646
**
 .818
**
 1                   
DEBT2008 
.576
**
 .776
**
 .856
**
 1                 
DEBT2009 
.583
**
 .771
**
 .815
**
 .918
**
 1               
DEBT2010 
.589
**
 .736
**
 .785
**
 .859
**
 .921
**
 1             
Dpout 2005 .011 -.071 -.104 -.079 -.052 -.048 1           
Dpout 2006 -.021 .012 -.002 .024 .033 .040 .195
**
 1         
Dpout 2007 -.058 -.058 -.023 -.061 -.064 -.079 -.030 .016 1       
Dpout 2008 -.005 -.006 -.004 -.008 .005 .005 .035 .020 .029 1     
Dpout 2009 -.035 -.040 -.068 -.067 -.069 -.077 .031 .115
*
 -.015 .013 1   
Dpout 2010 -.048 -.008 .040 .018 .026 .055 .018 -.056 -.021 .004 -.025 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.2Correlation between Firm size and Debt 
  LGFSIZE2005 LGFSIZE2006 LGFSIZE2007 LGFSIZE2008 LGFSIZE2009 LGFSIZE2010 
DEBT 
2005 
DEBT 
2006 
DEBT 
2007 
DEBT 
2008 
DEBT 
2009 
DEBT 
2010 
LGFSIZE2005 
1                       
LGFSIZE2006 
.984** 1                     
LGFSIZE2007 
.966** .983** 1                   
LGFSIZE2008 
.952** .972** .988** 1                 
LGFSIZE2009 
.947** .968** .979** .993** 1               
LGFSIZE2010 
.935** .959** .968** .986** .994** 1             
DEBT 2005 
.217** .242** .228** .221** .216** .203** 1           
DEBT 2006 
.277** .243** .219** .208** .207** .194** .728** 1         
DEBT 2007 
.276** .270** .275** .262** .250** .230** .646** .818** 1       
DEBT 2008 
.295** .296** .286** .285** .264** .244** .576** .776** .856** 1     
DEBT 2009 
.287** .292** .283** .286** .260** .240** .583** .771** .815** .918** 1   
DEBT 2010 
.291** .298** .291** .299** .273** .261** .589** .736** .785** .859** .921** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.3 Correlation between Firm Size and Dividend Payout  
  LGFSize2005 LGFSize2006 LGFSize2007 LGFSize2008 LGFSize2009 LGFSize2010 
Dpout 
2005 
Dpout 
2006 
Dpout 
2007 
Dpout 
2008 
Dpout 
2009 
Dpout 
2010 
LGFSize2005 1                       
LGFSize2006 .984
**
 1                     
LGFSize2007 .966
**
 .983
**
 1                   
LGFSize2008 .952
**
 .972
**
 .988
**
 1                 
LGFSize2009 .947
**
 .968
**
 .979
**
 .993
**
 1               
LGFSize2010 .935
**
 .959
**
 .968
**
 .986
**
 .994
**
 1             
Dpout 2005 -.025 -.041 -.062 -.070 -.057 -.056 1           
Dpout 2006 -.057 -.041 -.052 -.053 -.053 -.050 .195
**
 1         
Dpout 2007 .009 .005 -.059 -.068 -.067 -.072 -.030 .016 1       
Dpout 2008 .003 .003 -.003 -.002 -.005 -.010 .035 .020 .029 1     
Dpout 2009 -.084 -.055 -.049 -.045 -.044 -.036 .031 .115
*
 -.015 .013 1   
Dpout 2010 .020 .003 -.008 -.012 -.007 -.011 .018 -.056 -.021 .004 -.025 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.4 Correlation between Directors’ Ownership and Debt 
  DIRW2005 DIRW2006 DIRW2007 DIRW2008 DIRW2009 DIRW2010 
Debt 
2005 
Debt 
2006 
Debt 
2007 
Debt 
2008 
Debt 
2009 
Debt 
2010 
DIRW2005 1                       
DIRW2006 .964
**
 1                     
DIRW2007 .887
**
 .931
**
 1                   
DIRW2009 .849
**
 .900
**
 .978
**
 1                 
DIRW2009 .765
**
 .820
**
 .914
**
 .923
**
 1               
DIRW2010 .730
**
 .788
**
 .895
**
 .904
**
 .985
**
 1 -.090           
Debt 2005 -.130
*
 -.111
*
 -.096 -.073 -.080 -.090 1           
Debt 2006 -.135
*
 -.141
**
 -.115
*
 -.109
*
 -.100 -.107 .728
**
 1         
Debt 2007 -.156
**
 -.139
**
 -.133
*
 -.122
*
 -.111
*
 -.122
*
 .646
**
 .818
**
 1       
Debt 2008 -.149
**
 -.121
*
 -.084 -.086 -.065 -.075 .576
**
 .776
**
 .856
**
 1     
Debt 2009 -.116
*
 -.090 -.054 -.054 -.041 -.063 .583
**
 .771
**
 .815
**
 .918
**
 1   
Debt 2010 -.117
*
 -.089 -.057 -.061 -.048 -.069 .589
**
 .736
**
 .785
**
 .859
**
 .921
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.5 Correlation between Directors’ Ownership and Dividend Payout  
  DIRW2005 DIRW2006 DIRW2007 DIRW2008 DIRW2009 DIRW2010 
Dpout 
2005 
Dpout 
2006 
Dpout 
2007 
Dpout 
2008 
Dpout 
2009 
Dpout 
2010 
DIRW2005 1                       
DIRW2006 .964
**
 1                     
DIRW2007 .887
**
 .931
**
 1                   
DIRW2008 .849
**
 .900
**
 .978
**
 1                 
DIRW2009 .765
**
 .820
**
 .914
**
 .923
**
 1               
DIRW2010 .730
**
 .788
**
 .895
**
 .904
**
 .985
**
 1             
Dpout 2005 .102 .050 .035 .005 -.007 .005 1           
Dpout 2006 .187
**
 .188
**
 .169
**
 .152
**
 .158
**
 .163
**
 .195
**
 1         
Dpout 2007 .139
*
 .136
*
 .125
*
 .140
**
 .128
*
 .132
*
 -.030 .016 1       
Dpout 2008 -.016 -.020 -.029 -.029 -.030 -.033 .035 .020 .029 1     
Dpout 2009 .007 -.005 .047 .041 .043 .040 .031 .115
*
 -.015 .013 1   
Dpout 2010 -.039 -.044 -.012 -.023 -.017 -.023 .018 -.056 -.021 .004 -.025 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.6 Correlation between Directors’ Ownership and Firm Size 
  DIRW2005 DIRW2006 DIRW2007 DIRW2008 DIRW2009 DIRW2010 LGFSize2005 LGFSize2006 LGFSize2007 LGFSize2008 LGFSize2009 LGFSize2010 
DIRW2005 1                       
DIRW2005 .964** 1                     
DIRW2005 .887** .931** 1                   
DIRW2005 .849** .900** .978** 1                 
DIRW2005 .765** .820** .914** .923** 1               
DIRW2005 .730** .788** .895** .904** .985** 1             
LGFSize2005 -.233** -.218** -.263** -.255** -.250** -.255** 1           
LGFSize2006 -.243** -.221** -.254** -.245** -.243** -.250** .984** 1         
LGFSize2007 -.246** -.221** -.249** -.240** -.241** -.250** .966** .983** 1       
LGFSize2008 -.231** -.207** -.237** -.231** -.236** -.247** .952** .972** .988** 1     
LGFSize2009 -.236** -.214** -.251** -.244** -.248** -.246** .947** .968** .979** .993** 1   
LGFSize2010 -.236** -.214** -.250** -.245** -.243** -.234** .935** .959** .968** .986** .994** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.7 Correlation between Executive Remuneration and Debt  
  LGREM2005 LGREM2006 LGREM2007 LGREM2008 LGREM2009 LGREM2010 
DEBT 
2005 
DEBT 
2006 
DEBT 
2007 
DEBT 
2008 
DEBT 
2009 
DEBT 
2010 
LGREM2005 1                       
LGREM2006 .918
**
 1                     
LGREM2007 .877
**
 .900
**
 1                   
LGREM2008 .844
**
 .867
**
 .903
**
 1                 
LGREM2009 .824
**
 .837
**
 .861
**
 .908
**
 1               
LGREM2010 .817
**
 .827
**
 .848
**
 .886
**
 .926
**
 1             
DEBT 2005 .178
**
 .148
**
 .172
**
 .167
**
 .161
**
 .146
**
 1           
DEBT 2006 .173
**
 .164
**
 .132
*
 .119
*
 .104 .124
*
 .728
**
 1         
DEBT 2007 .224
**
 .225
**
 .189
**
 .171
**
 .157
**
 .198
**
 .646
**
 .818
**
 1       
DEBT 2008 .193
**
 .165
**
 .161
**
 .107
*
 .108
*
 .137
*
 .576
**
 .776
**
 .856
**
 1     
DEBT 2009 .149
**
 .130
*
 .121
*
 .078 .081 .114
*
 .583
**
 .771
**
 .815
**
 .918
**
 1   
DEBT 2010 .132
*
 .129
*
 .128
*
 .109
*
 .103 .130
*
 .589
**
 .736
**
 .785
**
 .859
**
 .921
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.8 Correlation between Executive Remuneration and Dividend Payout 
  LGEXCREM2005 LGEXREM2006 LGEXCREM2007 LGEXCREM2008 LGEXCREM2009 LGEXCREM2010 
Dpout 
2005 
Dpout 
2006 
Dpout 
2007 
Dpout 
2008 
Dpout 
2009 
Dpout 
2010 
LGEXCREM2005 1                       
LGEXCREM2006 .918** 1                     
LGEXCREM2007 .877** .900** 1                   
LGEXCREM2008 .844** .867** .903** 1                 
LGEXCREM2009 .824** .837** .861** .908** 1               
LGEXCREM2010 .817** .827** .848** .886** .926** 1             
Dpout 2005 -.017 -.017 .010 .002 -.005 -.036 1           
Dpout 2006 -.012 -.012 -.006 -.006 -.020 .012 .195** 1         
Dpout 2007 -.069 -.086 -.108* -.097 -.076 -.088 -.030 .016 1       
Dpout 2008 .039 .029 .037 .074 .061 .041 .035 .020 .029 1     
Dpout 2009 -.013 -.013 -.018 .009 -.022 .025 .031 .115* -.015 .013 1   
Dpout 2010 .018 .026 -.022 -.019 .003 -.077 .018 -.056 -.021 .004 -.025 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
328 
 
Appendix Ch. 4.1.9 Correlation between Board Size and Dividend Payout 
  BSIZE2005 BSIZE2005 BSIZE2005 BSIZE2005 BSIZE2005 BSIZE2005 
Dpout 
2005 
Dpout 
2006 
Dpout 
2007 
Dpout 
2008 
Dpout 
2009 
Dpout 
2010 
BrdSize2005 1                       
BrdSize2006 .872
**
 1                     
BrdSize2007 .822
**
 .890
**
 1                   
BrdSize2008 .750
**
 .821
**
 .888
**
 1                 
BrdSize2009 .735
**
 .778
**
 .815
**
 .889
**
 1               
BrdSize2010 .677
**
 .704
**
 .747
**
 .794
**
 .867
**
 1             
Dpout 2005 -.052 -.023 -.029 -.046 -.072 -.063 1           
Dpout 2006 -.042 -.022 -.027 -.037 -.052 -.036 .195
**
 1         
Dpout 2007 -.083 -.092 -.101 -.088 -.087 -.090 -.030 .016 1       
Dpout 2008 .042 .058 .046 .050 .037 .042 .035 .020 .029 1     
Dpout 2009 -.090 -.042 -.050 -.055 -.080 -.036 .031 .115
*
 -.015 .013 1   
Dpout 2010 -.017 .003 -.011 -.033 -.005 -.034 .018 -.056 -.021 .004 -.025 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.10 Correlation between Board size and Independent Directors  
  BSIZE2005 BSIZE2005 BSIZE2005 BSIZE2005 BSIZE2005 BSIZE2005 INDEP2005 INDEP2005 INDEP2005 INDEP2005 INDEP2005 INDEP2005 
BSIZE2005 1                       
BSIZE2006 .872** 1                     
BSIZE2007 .822** .890** 1                   
BSIZE2008 .750** .821** .888** 1                 
BSIZE2009 .735** .778** .815** .889** 1               
BSIZE2010 .677** .704** .747** .794** .867** 1             
INDEP2005 .053 .084 .090 .100 .125* .103 1           
INDEP 2006 .059 .044 .031 .075 .105 .080 .745** 1         
INDEP 2007 .093 .075 .046 .062 .101 .098 .602** .752** 1       
INDEP 2008 .114* .111* .085 .053 .097 .105 .513** .630** .752** 1     
INDEP 2009 .139* .136* .110* .077 .107* .108* .509** .598** .677** .738** 1   
INDEP 2010 .143* .198** .163** .139** .186** .099 .446** .454** .540** .590** .723** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.11 Correlation between Independent Directors and Debt 
  INDEP 2005 
INDEP 
2006 
INDEP 
2007 
INDEP 
2008 
INDEP 
2009 
INDEP 
2010 
DEBT 
2005 
DEBT 
2006 
DEBT 
2007 
DEBT 
2008 
DEBT 
2009 
DEBT 
2010 
INDEP 2005 1                       
INDEP 2006 .745
**
 1                     
INDEP 2007 .602
**
 .752
**
 1                   
INDEP 2008 .513
**
 .630
**
 .752
**
 1                 
INDEP 2009 .509
**
 .598
**
 .677
**
 .738
**
 1               
INDEP 2010 .446
**
 .454
**
 .540
**
 .590
**
 .723
**
 1             
DEBT2005 .088 .093 .024 .073 .039 -.036 1           
DEBT2006 .048 .033 -.009 .011 -.017 -.047 .728
**
 1         
DEBT2007 .036 .006 .009 .016 .000 -.003 .646
**
 .818
**
 1       
DEBT2008 .043 .027 .024 .048 .053 .042 .576
**
 .776
**
 .856
**
 1     
DEBT2009 .042 .058 .064 .065 .052 .027 .583
**
 .771
**
 .815
**
 .918
**
 1   
DEBT2010 .037 .062 .062 .062 .056 .047 .589
**
 .736
**
 .785
**
 .859
**
 .921
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.12 Correlation between Independent Directors and Dividend Payout 
  
INDEP  
2005 
INDEP  
2006 
INDEP 
2007 
INDEP 
2008 
INDEP 
2009 
INDEP 
2010 
Dpout 
2005 
Dpout 
2006 
Dpout 
2007 
Dpout 
2008 
Dpout 
2009 
Dpout 
2010 
INDEP 2005 1                       
INDEP 2006 .745
**
 1                     
INDEP 2007 .602
**
 .752
**
 1                   
INDEP 2008 .513
**
 .630
**
 .752
**
 1                 
INDEP 2009 .509
**
 .598
**
 .677
**
 .738
**
 1               
INDEP 2010 .446
**
 .454
**
 .540
**
 .590
**
 .723
**
 1             
Dpout 2005 -.031 -.032 .009 .089 .000 -.037 1           
Dpout 2006 -.046 -.133
*
 -.079 .001 -.056 -.075 .195
**
 1         
Dpout 2007 -.072 -.076 -.006 -.002 -.033 -.007 -.030 .016 1       
Dpout 2008 -.017 .050 .048 .042 .010 -.045 .035 .020 .029 1     
Dpout 2009 -.047 -.032 .003 -.055 -.074 -.037 .031 .115
*
 -.015 .013 1   
Dpout 2010 .108 .069 .014 .024 .034 .025 .018 -.056 -.021 .004 -.025 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.13 Correlation between Independent Directors and Firm Size 
  INDEP 2005 
INDEP 
2006 
INDEP 
2007 
INDEP 
2008 
INDEP 
2009 
INDEP 
2010 LGFMSize2005 LGFSize2006 LGFSize2007 LGFSize2008 LGFSize2009 LGFSize2010 
INDEP 2005 1                       
INDEP 2006 .745** 1                     
INDEP 2007 .602** .752** 1                   
INDEP 2008 .513** .630** .752** 1                 
INDEP 2009 .509** .598** .677** .738** 1               
INDEP 2010 .446** .454** .540** .590** .723** 1             
LGFSize2005 .321** .327** .350** .358** .369** .349** 1           
LGFSize2006 .317** .332** .359** .361** .373** .345** .984** 1         
LGFSize2007 .334** .351** .352** .344** .360** .347** .966** .983** 1       
LGFSize2008 .334** .344** .349** .346** .365** .365** .952** .972** .988** 1     
LGFSize2009 .344** .338** .346** .358** .373** .377** .947** .968** .979** .993** 1   
LGFSize2010 .348** .341** .342** .360** .373** .383** .935** .959** .968** .986** .994** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.14 Correlation between Independent Directors and Directors’ Ownership  
  INDEP2005 INDEP2006 INDEP2007 INDEP2008 INDEP2009 INDEP2010 DIRW2005 DIRW2006 DIRW2007 DIRW2008 DIRW2009 DIRW2010 
INDEP2005 1                       
INDEP2006 .745** 1                     
INDEP2007 .602** .752** 1                   
INDEP2008 .513** .630** .752** 1                 
INDEP2009 .509** .598** .677** .738** 1               
INDEP2010 .446** .454** .540** .590** .723** 1             
DIRW2005 -.230** -.234** -.164** -.145** -.183** -.177** 1           
DIRW2006 -.216** -.218** -.159** -.159** -.190** -.170** .964** 1         
DIRW2007 -.236** -.203** -.141** -.157** -.201** -.157** .887** .931** 1       
DIRW2008 -.187** -.161** -.105* -.145** -.187** -.158** .849** .900** .978** 1     
DIRW2009 -.196** -.133* -.108* -.129* -.182** -.168** .765** .820** .914** .923** 1   
DIRW2010 -.190** -.134* -.101 -.122* -.185** -.176** .730** .788** .895** .904** .985** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.15 Correlation between Independent Directors and Executive Remuneration  
  
INDEP
2005 
INDEP
2005 
INDEP
2005 
INDEP
2005 
INDEP
2005 
INDEP
2005 
LGEXECRE
M2005 
LGEXECRE
M2006 
LGEXECRE
M2007 
LGEXECRE
M2008 
LGEXECRE
M2009 
LGEXECRE
M2010 
INDEP2005 1                       
INDEP2006 .745
**
 1                     
INDEP2007 .602
**
 .752
**
 1                   
INDEP2008 .513
**
 .630
**
 .752
**
 1                 
INDEP2009 .509
**
 .598
**
 .677
**
 .738
**
 1               
INDEP2010 .446
**
 .454
**
 .540
**
 .590
**
 .723
**
 1             
LGEXECRE
M2005 
.102 .066 .098 .082 .121
*
 .111
*
 1           
LGEXECRE
M2006 
.089 .022 .053 .065 .083 .092 .918
**
 1         
LGEXECRE
M2007 
.085 .030 .050 .077 .093 .131
*
 .877
**
 .900
**
 1       
LGEXECRE
M2008 
.080 .011 .015 .023 .061 .112
*
 .844
**
 .867
**
 .903
**
 1     
LGEXECRE
M2009 
.058 .024 .017 .031 .044 .119
*
 .824
**
 .837
**
 .861
**
 .908
**
 1   
LGEXECRE
M2010 
.085 .030 -.008 .003 .017 .093 .817
**
 .827
**
 .848
**
 .886
**
 .926
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
335 
 
Appendix Ch. 4.1.16 Correlation between Directors’ Ownership and Executive Remuneration  
  
DIRW2
005 
DIRW2
006 
DIRW2
007 
DIRW2
008 
DIRW2
009 
DIRW2
010 
LEXECRE
M2005 
LEXECRE
M2006 
LEXECRE
M2007 
LEXECRE
M2008 
LEXECRE
M2009 
LEXECRE
M2010 
DIRW2005 1                       
DIRW2006 .964
**
 1                     
DIRW2007 .887
**
 .931
**
 1                   
DIRW2008 .849
**
 .900
**
 .978
**
 1                 
DIRW2009 .765
**
 .820
**
 .914
**
 .923
**
 1               
DIRW2010 .730
**
 .788
**
 .895
**
 .904
**
 .985
**
 1             
LEXECRE
M2005 
-.216
**
 -.193
**
 -.269
**
 -.261
**
 -.257
**
 -.264
**
 1           
LEXECRE
M2006 
-.128
*
 -.144
**
 -.270
**
 -.262
**
 -.260
**
 -.273
**
 .918
**
 1         
LEXECRE
M2007 
-.143
**
 -.142
**
 -.201
**
 -.202
**
 -.200
**
 -.200
**
 .877
**
 .900
**
 1       
LEXECRE
M2008 
-.137
*
 -.141
**
 -.228
**
 -.233
**
 -.231
**
 -.237
**
 .844
**
 .867
**
 .903
**
 1     
LEXECRE
M2009 
-.135
*
 -.126
*
 -.217
**
 -.239
**
 -.244
**
 -.242
**
 .824
**
 .837
**
 .861
**
 .908
**
 1   
LEXECRE
M2010 
-.199
**
 -.175
**
 -.227
**
 -.244
**
 -.242
**
 -.232
**
 .817
**
 .827
**
 .848
**
 .886
**
 .926
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.17 Correlation between Board size and Debt 
  BSIZE2005 BSIZE2006 BSIZE2007 BSIZE2008 BSIZE2009 BSIZE2010 
DEBT 
2005 
DEBT 
2006 
DEBT 
2007 
DEBT 
2008 
DEBT 
2009 
DEBT 
2010 
BSIZE2005 1                       
BSIZE2006 .872
**
 1                     
BSIZE2007 .822
**
 .890
**
 1                   
BSIZE2008 .750
**
 .821
**
 .888
**
 1                 
BSIZE2009 .735
**
 .778
**
 .815
**
 .889
**
 1               
BSIZE2010 .677
**
 .704
**
 .747
**
 .794
**
 .867
**
 1             
DEBT 2005 .115
*
 .074 .052 .086 .077 .040 1           
DEBT 2006 .109
*
 .071 .052 .093 .099 .058 .728
**
 1         
DEBT 2007 .140
*
 .111
*
 .120
*
 .146
**
 .143
**
 .108
*
 .646
**
 .818
**
 1       
DEBT 2008 .134
*
 .122
*
 .128
*
 .155
**
 .125
*
 .104 .576
**
 .776
**
 .856
**
 1     
DEBT 2009 .158
**
 .131
*
 .116
*
 .152
**
 .130
*
 .096 .583
**
 .771
**
 .815
**
 .918
**
 1   
DEBT 2010 .138
*
 .117
*
 .109
*
 .138
*
 .133
*
 .085 .589
**
 .736
**
 .785
**
 .859
**
 .921
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.18 Correlation between Board size and Directors’ Ownership  
  BSIZE2005 BSIZE2006 BSIZE2007 BSIZE2008 BSIZE2009 BSIZE2010 DIRW2005 DIRW2006 DIRW2007 DIRW2008 DIRW2009 DIRW2010 
BSIZE2005 1                       
BSIZE2006 .872** 1                     
BSIZE2007 .822** .890** 1                   
BSIZE2008 .750** .821** .888** 1                 
BSIZE2009 .735** .778** .815** .889** 1               
BSIZE2010 .677** .704** .747** .794** .867** 1             
DIRW2005 -.143** -.161** -.136* -.098 -.141* -.176** 1           
DIRW2006 -.119* -.144** -.114* -.074 -.108* -.137* .964** 1         
DIRW2007 -.160** -.159** -.171** -.134* -.142** -.157** .887** .931** 1       
DIRW2008 -.154** -.152** -.169** -.124* -.133* -.152** .849** .900** .978** 1     
DIRW2009 -.144** -.150** -.168** -.137** -.137** -.142** .765** .820** .914** .923** 1   
DIRW2010 -.156** -.175** -.190** -.163** -.142** -.123* .730** .788** .895** .904** .985** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.19 Correlation between Board size and Executive Remuneration  
  
BSIZE2
005 
BSIZE2
006 
BSIZE2
007 
BSIZE2
008 
BSIZE2
009 
BSIZE2
010 
LEXECREM
2005 
LEXECREM
2006 
LEXECREM
2007 
LEXECREM
2008 
LEXECREM
2009 
LEXECREM
2010 
BSIZE2005 
1                       
BSIZE2006 
.872** 1                     
BSIZE2007 
.822** .890** 1                   
BSIZE2008 
.750** .821** .888** 1                 
BSIZE2009 
.735** .778** .815** .889** 1               
BSIZE2010 
.677** .704** .747** .794** .867** 1             
LEXECREM
2005 
.666** .644** .630** .581** .596** .570** 1           
LEXECREM
2006 
.692** .694** .666** .626** .620** .583** .918** 1         
LEXECREM
2007 
.662** .688** .646** .593** .601** .567** .877** .900** 1       
LEXECREM
2008 
.636** .676** .651** .616** .625** .602** .844** .867** .903** 1     
LEXECREM
2009 
.630** .659** .658** .648** .661** .625** .824** .837** .861** .908** 1   
LEXECREM
2010 
.628** .640** .627** .615** .645** .633** .817** .827** .848** .886** .926** 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.1.20 Correlation between Board size and Firm Size 
  
BSIZE20
05 
BSIZE20
06 
BSIZE20
07 
BSIZE20
08 
BSIZE20
09 
BSIZE20
10 
LGFSIZE2
005 
LGFSIZE2
006 
LGFSIZE2
007 
LGFSIZE2
008 
LGFSIZE2
009 
LGFSIZE2
010 
BSIZE2005 1                       
BSIZE2006 .872
**
 1                     
BSIZE2007 .822
**
 .890
**
 1                   
BSIZE2008 .750
**
 .821
**
 .888
**
 1                 
BSIZE2009 .735
**
 .778
**
 .815
**
 .889
**
 1               
BrdSize201
0 
.677
**
 .704
**
 .747
**
 .794
**
 .867
**
 1             
LGFSIZE2
005 
.650
**
 .657
**
 .626
**
 .592
**
 .619
**
 .584
**
 1           
LGFSIZE2
006 
.633
**
 .648
**
 .620
**
 .593
**
 .621
**
 .595
**
 .984
**
 1         
LGFSIZE2
007 
.630
**
 .655
**
 .638
**
 .624
**
 .650
**
 .621
**
 .966
**
 .983
**
 1       
LGFSIZE2
008 
.616
**
 .648
**
 .632
**
 .625
**
 .653
**
 .630
**
 .952
**
 .972
**
 .988
**
 1     
LGFSIZE2
009 
.610
**
 .637
**
 .622
**
 .618
**
 .653
**
 .630
**
 .947
**
 .968
**
 .979
**
 .993
**
 1   
LGFSIZE2
010 
.599
**
 .626
**
 .617
**
 .615
**
 .654
**
 .631
**
 .935
**
 .959
**
 .968
**
 .986
**
 .994
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch. 4.2 
Correlation between Independent Variables and Error Term 2SLS with 
Appendix Ch.4.2.1 Correlation between Independent Variables and Error Term 2SLS with IVs Lag of Endogenous Variables (INDEP 
and BSIZE) 
  BSIZE2007 INDEP2007 Audit 2007  ROLE2007 DIRW2007 LGEXCREM2007 DEBT2007 DPOUT2007 ET2006 
BSIZE2007 1                 
INDEP2007 .046 1               
Audit 2007  -.028 -.035 1             
ROLE2007 -.077 .012 -.161
**
 1           
DIRW2007 -.171
**
 -.141
**
 .028 -.035 1         
LGEXCREM2007 .646
**
 .050 -.137
**
 -.014 -.201
**
 1       
DEBT2007 .120
*
 .009 .018 .082 -.133
*
 .189
**
 1     
DPOUT2007 .638
**
 .352
**
 -.082 -.017 -.249
**
 .708
**
 .275
**
 1   
ET2006 .112
*
 .016 -.294
**
 .275
**
 .238
**
 .152
**
 .101 .064 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
  BSIZE2008 INDEP2008 
Audit 
2008  ROLE2008  DIREW2008 LGEXCREM2008 
DEBT 
2008 
Dpout 
2008 LGFMSize2008 ET2007 
BSIZE2008 1                   
INDEP2008 .053 1                 
Audit 2008  -.096 -.167
**
 1               
ROLE2008  -.034 .071 -.253
**
 1             
DIREW2008 -.124
*
 -.145
**
 .026 -.063 1           
LGEXCREM2008 .616
**
 .023 -.083 .016 -.233
**
 1         
DEBT 2008 .155
**
 .048 .021 .034 -.086 .107
*
 1       
Dpout 2008 .050 .042 .006 .002 -.029 .074 -.008 1     
LGFMSize2008 .625
**
 .346
**
 -.120
*
 .006 -.231
**
 .699
**
 .285
**
 -.002 1   
ET2007 .086 -.028 -.292
**
 .304
**
 .203
**
 .106 .037 .009 .026 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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  BZISE2009 INDEP2009 
AUDIT 
2009  
ROLE 
2009  DIRW2009 LGEXCREM2009 DEBT2009 
Dpout 
2009 LGFSIZE2009 ET2008 
BZISE2009 1                   
INDEP2009 .107
*
 1                 
AUDIT 2009  -.134
*
 -.172
**
 1               
ROLE 2009  -.050 .056 -.110
*
 1             
DIRW2009 -.137
**
 -.182
**
 .052 -.072 1           
LGEXCREM2009 .661
**
 .044 -.160
**
 -.044 -.244
**
 1         
DEBT2009 .130
*
 .052 -.010 -.039 -.041 .081 1       
Dpout 2009 -.080 -.074 -.013 -.002 .043 -.022 -.069 1     
LGFSIZE2009 .653
**
 .373
**
 -.173
**
 -.002 -.248
**
 .709
**
 .260
**
 -.044 1   
ET2008 .185
**
 .033 -.239
**
 .371
**
 .105 .141
**
 .093 .008 .096 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
  BSIZE2010 INDEP2010 
Audit 
2010  
ROLE 
2010  DIREW2010 LGEXCREM2010 
DEBT 
2010 
Dpout 
2010 LGFSize2010 ET2009 
BSIZE2010 1                   
INDEP2010 .099 1                 
Audit 2010  .010 -.036 1               
ROLE 2010  -.073 .029 .043 1             
DIREW2010 -.123
*
 -.176
**
 .000 -.062 1           
LGEXCREM2010 .633
**
 .093 -.037 -.019 -.232
**
 1         
DEBT 2010 .085 .047 .028 -.083 -.069 .130
*
 1       
Dpout 2010 -.034 .025 .035 -.018 -.023 -.077 .055 1     
LGFSize2010 .631
**
 .383
**
 -.071 -.015 -.234
**
 .737
**
 .261
**
 -.011 1   
ET2009 .095 .076 -.127
*
 .348
**
 .109 .120
*
 .098 -.025 .094 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix Ch.4.2.2 Correlation between instrumental variables and error term 2SLS with IVs lag of endogenous variables (BSIZE AND 
INDEP) 
  BSIZE2005 INDEP2005 
Audit 
2006  
ROLE 
2006  DIRW2006 LEXCGREM2006 DEBT2006 
Dpout 
2006 LGFSize2006 ET2005 
BSIZE2005 1                   
INDEP2005 .053 1                 
Audit 2006  -.003 -.033 1               
ROLE 2006  -.017 .022 -.092 1             
DIRW2006 -.119
*
 -.216
**
 .038 .053 1           
LEXCGREM2006 .692
**
 .089 -.094 .032 -.144
**
 1         
DEBT2006 .109
*
 .048 .057 .107 -.141
**
 .164
**
 1       
Dpout 2006 -.042 -.046 .016 -.020 .188
**
 -.012 .012 1     
LGFSize2006 .633
**
 .317
**
 .010 .016 -.221
**
 .692
**
 .243
**
 -.041 1   
ET2005 .000 .000 -.441
**
 .311
**
 .205
**
 .148
*
 .019 .108 .044 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
  BSIZE2006 BINDR2006 
AUDIT 
2007 ( 
Dummy 
Variable) 
ROLE 
2007  DIRW2007 LGEXCREM2007 
DEBT 
2007 
Dpout 
2007 LGFSize2007 ET2006 
BSIZE2006 1                   
BINDR2006 .044 1                 
AUDIT 2007 ( 
Dummy Variable) 
-.052 -.054 1               
ROLE 2007  -.043 .029 -.161
**
 1             
DIRW2007 -.159
**
 -.203
**
 .028 -.035 1           
LGEXCREM2007 .688
**
 .030 -.137
**
 -.014 -.201
**
 1         
DEBT 2007 .111
*
 .006 .018 .082 -.133
*
 .189
**
 1       
Dpout 2007 -.092 -.076 .009 -.010 .125
*
 -.108
*
 -.023 1     
LGFSize2007 .655
**
 .351
**
 -.082 -.017 -.249
**
 .708
**
 .275
**
 -.059 1   
ET2006 .000 .000 -.294
**
 .275
**
 .238
**
 .152
**
 .101 .071 .064 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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  BSIZE2007 INDEP2007 
AUDIT 
2008  
ROLE 
2008  DIRW2008 LGEXCREM2008 
DEBT 
2008 
Dpout 
2008 LGFSize2008 ET2007 
BSIZE2007 1                   
INDEP2007 .046 1                 
AUDIT 2008  -.074 -.137
**
 1               
ROLE 2008  -.075 .043 -.253
**
 1             
DIRW2008 -.169
**
 -.105
*
 .026 -.063 1           
LGEXCREM2008 .651
**
 .015 -.083 .016 -.233
**
 1         
DEBT 2008 .128
*
 .024 .021 .034 -.086 .107
*
 1       
Dpout 2008 .046 .048 .006 .002 -.029 .074 -.008 1     
LGFSize2008 .632
**
 .349
**
 -.120
*
 .006 -.231
**
 .699
**
 .285
**
 -.002 1   
ET2007 .000 .000 -.292
**
 .304
**
 .203
**
 .106 .037 .009 .026 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
  BSIZE2008 INDEP2008 
AUDIT 
2009  
ROLE 
2009  DIRW2009 LGEXCREM2009 
DEBT 
2009 
Dpout 
2009 LGFSize2009 ET2008 
BSIZE2008 1                   
INDEP2008 .053 1                 
AUDIT 2009 ( 
Dummy Variable) 
-.166
**
 -.087 1               
ROLE 2009  -.070 .061 -.110
*
 1             
DIRW2009 -.137
**
 -.129
*
 .052 -.072 1           
LGEXCREM2009 .648
**
 .031 -.160
**
 -.044 -.244
**
 1         
DEBT 2009 .152
**
 .065 -.010 -.039 -.041 .081 1       
Dpout 2009 -.055 -.055 -.013 -.002 .043 -.022 -.069 1     
LGFSize2009 .618
**
 .358
**
 -.173
**
 -.002 -.248
**
 .709
**
 .260
**
 -.044 1   
ET2008 .000 .000 -.239
**
 .371
**
 .105 .141
**
 .093 .008 .096 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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  BSIZE2009 INDEP2009 
AUDIT 
2010  
ROLE 
2010  DIRW2010 LGEXCREM2010 
DEBT 
2010 
Dpout 
2010 LGFSize2010 ET2009 
BSIZE2009 1                   
INDEP2009 .107
*
 1                 
AUDIT 2010  -.009 -.041 1               
ROLE 2010  -.023 .046 .043 1             
DIRW2010 -.142
**
 -.185
**
 .000 -.062 1           
LGEXCREM2010 .645
**
 .017 -.037 -.019 -.232
**
 1         
DEBT 2010 .133
*
 .056 .028 -.083 -.069 .130
*
 1       
Dpout 2010 -.005 .034 .035 -.018 -.023 -.077 .055 1     
LGFSize2010 .654
**
 .373
**
 -.071 -.015 -.234
**
 .737
**
 .261
**
 -.011 1   
ET2009 .000 .000 -.127
*
 .348
**
 .109 .120
*
 .098 -.025 .094 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix CH. 4.3 Step by step 2SLS 
Results step by step OLS for instrumental variables (LAG INDEP AND LAG BSIZE), First OLS equation is;  
The first OLS regression is; 
 
INDEPn = INDEPn-1 + BSIZEn + DIRWn, + EXCRn+ DEBTn+ DPOUTn+ FSIZEn + IC 
 
 
Second OLS equation is; 
Q= predicted INDEP + BSIZEn + DIRWn + EXCRn+ DEBTn+ DPOUTn+ FSIZEn + IC 
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Result of the second OLS equation.  
Model                                                  Dependent variables Tobin’s Q  
years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Observation 299 323 335 326 307 
Constant -8.431*** -7.642*** -6.163** -7.272*** -5.616** 
Predicted INDEP 0.021** 0.02** 0.02** 0.018* 0.02** 
BSIZE 0.021 0.068* 0.054* 0.044 0.06* 
ROLE 0.44* 0.5* 0.246 0.319 0.306 
AUD -0.047 0.351 -0.634 -0.374 0.009 
DIRW 0.005 0.007 -0.003 0.01 0.011* 
LGEXCREM 0.672*** 0.543*** 0.509*** 0.534*** 0.389** 
DEBT 0.001 0.004 0.006* 0.002 -0.002 
DPOUT 0.026 -0.006 -0.012 0.053* 0.109* 
FSIZE -0.409*** -0.365*** -0.311*** -0.24*** -0.227*** 
Industry: Cons. Goods 0.269 0.205 -0.076 0.074 0.191 
Industry: Cons. Serv. 0.106 0.199 0.052 0.126 -0.185 
Industry: Health Care 0.001 -0.023 -0.163 -0.2 -0.222 
Industry: Industrials 0.15 0.242 0.003 0.107 -0.129 
Industry: Oil & Gas -0.019 0.016 -0.14 -0.035 -0.088 
Industry: Technology 0.03 -0.099 -0.255 -0.164 -0.07 
Industry: Utilities 0.21 -0.048 -0.229 -0.199 -0.238 
R-sq 0.238 0.151 0.117 0.095 0.089 
Adj. R-sq 0.195 0.106 0.073 0.048 0.039 
F  5.519*** 3.442*** 2.424** 2.076** 1.925** 
The dependent variable is measured by Tobin‘s Q, which is measured by (Market Cap + Liabilities + Preferred Equity + Minority Interest) / Total Assets. The independent 
variables include DIRW: Director ownership= the total shareholdings of directors over the total number of shares, INDEP: Independent directors= Proportion of non-
executive directors to total number of directors; BSIZE: board size = Total number of directors on the board; AUD: Audit Committee = Dummy variable; 1 if there is an audit 
committee,0 otherwise; ROLE: role duality = Dummy variable—1 if the chairman is also the CEO, 0 otherwise; EXCREM: Executive Remuneration= Natural logarithm of 
total board remuneration ( both remuneration executive and non-executive); DEBT: total debt = Total debt /total assets; DPOUT: dividend payout = Dividend per 
share/earnings per share; FSIZE: firm size = the natural logarithm of total assets. All OLS regression includes seven dummy variables for each of the eight industries based 
on Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB).  ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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The same procedure is applied to BSIZE.OLS equation for BSIZE is as follows:   
 
BSIZEn = INDEPn + BSIZEn-1 + DIRWn, + EXCRn+ DEBTn+ DPOUTn+ FSIZEn + IC 
 
 
Second OLS equation is; 
Q= INDEPn +Predicted BSIZEn + DIRWn + EXCRn+ DEBTn+ DPOUTn+ FSIZEn + IC 
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Result of the second OLS equation:  
Model                                                  Dependent variables Tobin’s Q  
Years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Observation 299 323 335 326  307 
Constant -8.169*** -7.376*** -5.075** -6.586** -5.403** 
INDEP 0.01* 0.019** 0.016** 0.011* 0.012* 
BSIZE -0.014 0.074 0.101 0.039 0.028 
ROLE 0.471* 0.507* 0.28 0.326 0.291 
AUD -0.045 0.336 -0.714 -0.463 0.015 
DIRW 0.003 0.007 -0.004 0.009 0.01* 
LGEXCREM 0.692*** 0.526*** 0.431*** 0.516*** 0.404** 
DEBT 0 0.004 0.005 0.002* -0.002 
DPOUT 0.019 -0.007 -0.012 0.051 0.112* 
FSIZE -0.352*** -0.36*** -0.319*** -0.208*** 0.18** 
Industry: Cons. Goods 0.305 0.205 -0.049 0.066 0.125 
Industry: Cons. Serv. 0.133 0.203 0.079 0.114 -0.23 
Industry: Health Care -0.007 -0.023 -0.143 -0.213 -0.278 
Industry: Industrials 0.179 0.236 -0.017 0.102 -0.136 
Industry: Oil & Gas -0.021 0.018 -0.107 -0.036 -0.15 
Industry: Technology 0.022 -0.102 -0.195 -0.188 -0.145 
Industry: Utilities 0.216 -0.047 -0.208 -0.211 -0.295 
R-sq 0.226 0.169 0.122 0.093 0.089 
Adj. R-sq 0.182 0.126 0.078 0.046 0.039 
F  5.169*** 3.915*** 2.778** 1.993** 1.774** 
The dependent variable is measured by Tobin‘s Q, which is measured by (Market Cap + Liabilities + Preferred Equity + Minority Interest) / Total Assets. The independent 
variables include DIRW: Director ownership= the total shareholdings of directors over the total number of shares, INDEP: Independent directors= Proportion of non-
executive directors to total number of directors; BSIZE: board size = Total number of directors on the board; AUD: Audit Committee = Dummy variable; 1 if there is an audit 
committee,0 otherwise; ROLE: role duality = Dummy variable—1 if the chairman is also the CEO, 0 otherwise; EXCREM: Executive Remuneration= Natural logarithm of 
total board remuneration ( both remuneration executive and non-executive); DEBT: total debt = Total debt /total assets; DPOUT: dividend payout = Dividend per 
share/earnings per share; FSIZE: firm size = Natural logarithm of total assets. All OLS regression includes seven dummy variables for each of the eight industries based on 
Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB).  ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Then the predicted INDEP and the predicted BSIZE was regressed together with other exogenous variables (DIRWn + EXCRn+ DEBTn+ 
DPOUTn+ FSIZEn + IC), using OLS, that is: 
  
Q= predicted INDEP+ predicted BSIZE+ DIRWn + EXCRn+ DEBTn+ DPOUTn+ FSIZEn + IC 
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The result of OLS is similar to the result produced by using 2SLS in the SPSS. 
 
Model                                                  Dependent variables Tobin’s Q  
Years 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Observation 299 323 335 326 307 
Constant -8.615*** -7.556*** -5.819 -7.261** -5.765** 
Predicted 
0.02** 0.02** 0.022** 0.018* 0.019* 
INDEP 
Predicted 
0.007 0.07* 
0.108** 
0.045 0.047 
BSIZE 
 
ROLE 0.441* 0.502* 0.268 0.321 0.297 
AUD -0.04 0.346 -0.494 -0.37 0.016 
DIRW 0.005 0.007 -0.003 0.01 0.011 
LGEXCREM 0.692*** 0.538*** 0.455*** 0.541*** 0.405** 
DEBT 0 0.004 0.005* 0.002* -0.002 
DPOUT 0.026 -0.007 -0.014 0.053 0.109* 
FSIZE -0.399*** -0.363*** -0.351*** -0.24*** -0.219*** 
Industry: Cons. Goods 0.282 0.205 -0.088 0.076 0.187 
Industry: Cons. Serv. 0.109 0.2 0.064 0.129 -0.184 
Industry: Health Care 0.001 -0.023 -0.167 -0.2 -0.222 
Industry: Industrials 0.165 0.24 -0.047 0.106 -0.12 
Industry: Oil & Gas -0.018 0.017 -0.129 -0.033 -0.087 
Industry: Technology 0.024 -0.1 -0.218 -0.162 -0.075 
Industry: Utilities 0.211 -0.048 -0.226 -0.198 -0.238 
R-sq 0.237 0.147 0.12 0.095 0.089 
Adj. R-sq 0.193 0.102 0.076 0.049 0.039 
F  5.480*** 3.305*** 2.729*** 2.043*** 1.784*** 
The dependent variable is measured by Tobin‘s Q, which is measured by (Market Cap + Liabilities + Preferred Equity + Minority Interest) / Total Assets. The independent 
variables include DIRW: Director ownership= the total shareholdings of directors over the total number of shares, INDEP: Independent directors= Proportion of non-
executive directors to total number of directors; BSIZE: board size = Total number of directors on the board; AUD: Audit Committee = Dummy variable; 1 if there is an audit 
committee,0 otherwise; ROLE: role duality = Dummy variable—1 if the chairman is also the CEO, 0 otherwise; EXCREM: Executive Remuneration= Natural logarithm of 
total board remuneration ( both remuneration executive and non-executive); DEBT: total debt = Total debt /total assets; DPOUT: dividend payout = Dividend per 
share/earnings per share; FSIZE: firm size = The natural logarithm of total assets. All OLS regression includes seven dummy variables for each of the eight industries based 
on Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB).  ***, **, * denotes significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
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